



Research Article

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Received: 26 April 2022 / Accepted: 30 June 2022 / Published: 5 July 2022

Turkey - Africa Institutional Cooperation: Strategic Impacts, Significance and Challenges

Francis Kwesi Kyirewiah

Getachew Toma Bilate

Jilin University,
No.2699, Qianjin Street,
Changchun, China

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.36941/mjss-2022-0026>

Abstract

The development of economic cooperation, diplomacy, and political relations between Turkey and Africa in the past years is attracting many courtesies. Current trends show an increasing engagement and relations between African nations and Turkey which seems to exhibit consistent growth since Ankara declared 2005 as 'the year of Africa.' This study examines the institutional cooperation, strategic impacts, their significance, and challenges to Turkey-Africa relations. The argument is given based on the fact that Turkish ideologically distanced itself from the global South during and after the Cold War period. However, the fast-paced collaboration in the 21st century signifies a partial revision in its foreign policy orientations towards Africa. In the background of this revisionist orientation, Turkey considers Africa as a way of not only reframing its relations with its nations but also strengthening cooperation with African political and economic institutions. Despite their historical ties, both Africa and Turkey's cooperation have not transcended to a comprehensive and strategic level. This study finding indicates that Turkey's growing involvement in Africa reflects its need to establish new markets for its manufactured goods, and its defense and armaments industry and present itself as a relevant regional and global actor different from traditional western players on the continent. What is more, African leaders also seek to attract Turkish Foreign Direct Investment, diversify economic and political partners to reduce dependency, and fuel their state-building projects. Currently, the political cooperation between Turkey and Africa seems to be in good health. Turkey's endeavors in the field of development cooperation demonstrate its dedication to the efforts aimed at poverty eradication and development for a better future for all. However, both Turkey-Africa's institutional cooperation is less effective due to a lack of commitments from both sides, inadequate technological resources, political dynamics, and instabilities in some parts of Africa.

Keywords: Africa, Institutional, Cooperation, Turkey, Diplomacy

1. Introductions

Turkey and Africa have been politically, economically, and culturally allied for many years. Turkey has been ramping up its interest in Africa, seeking to forge a method that includes energetic diplomacy, social outreach, and financial partnership. Its ability to set up a new inter-regional relation essentially relies upon the way it manages its economic and political relationships with its

African companions to develop strategic cooperation. In the face of a shipping deficit in setting up multinational economic value chains, Turkey may also increasingly turn to use security cooperation with African nations as leverage to deepen its financial relations. The fate of Turkey-Africa relations depends on three elements: the evolution of Turkey's monetary and political occasions; the political and security potentialities in locations that might be critical for Ankara's-Africa strategy and the competition among international and regional powers on the continent. With Leaders set to remain in power, it's miles probably that Turkey will see via its long-time period strategy for Africa. African countries' increasing willingness to test out new alliances with powers will bolster their desires and have political effects inside the region (Pinto, 2021). The ambition of Turkey is to be one of the reliable partners for Africa. Unlike the conventional partners, Turkey hope to use new strategies to establish its partnerships with the African states. However, its overseas coverage in Africa isn't always competitive (Gunn, 2020) and its presence surprised the traditional companions of African nations which can be operating inside the region for a protracted duration. Turkey is operating in Africa by leveraging international cooperation techniques. It's miles a result of a few beyond moves that began during the ottomans period (Gunn, 2020). Both relations have always exhibited sturdy growth because Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AK Party) came to power in 2002(insightturkey. com, 2021).

Turkish city Istanbul facilitated the 3rd Africa-Turkey Financial and Trade Gathering that brought together around 2,000 members, agents of 45 African nations, territorial financial communities, and private segment agents from both sides in 2021. The gathering was a high-level meeting in Istanbul that brought interested heads of state and government from African nations and Turkey, agents of territorial financial communities, and worldwide organizations(Altan, 2021). These are a manifestation of Turkey's extending ties with Africa.

However, Turkey's international arrangement in Africa depends on an organized program that includes all divisions and tries to characterize a new step within global participation. The presence of Turkey in Africa is based on numerous perspectives, but the Turkish authorities have used a liberal system by giving priority to the private sector to discover the African market. Accordingly, the political decisions are trying to determine the economic issues of both nations. It goes beyond the military presence, education, and aid cooperation(Gunn, 2020):

Thus, the strategies, impacts, and their significance need to be studied. Globalization of the economy has changed the strategic approach in terms of cooperation. Turkey has the ambition to be counted as one of the great partners for Africa and thus using a new method to establish with the African States. Its foreign policy with Africa is not aggressive and relies on a structured program and defining a new step in the international cooperation arena. The presence of Turkey in Africa is based on multiple aspects: peace and security, political, economic, and diplomacy. Thus, it needs to be studied and it is important to ask the question: what are the vitality, impacts, significance, and consequences of Turkish-African cooperation?

The paper aims to identify the strategic effects of Turkey's cooperation and its policy toward Africa, analyze how Africa perceives the new presence of Turkey in the region and addresses major challenges facing this Turkish strategy. In addressing these questions, the study focuses on some dimensions: highlighting Turkey's and Africa's political, economic, and historical relations, a wide assessment of the Turkish engagement objectives on the continent, and a look at the future perspectives. These dimensions help contextualize Turkey's rising influence in Africa and the role of African governments and African non-state actors in shaping and determining the nature of the renewed Turko-African relations.

2. Highlights of Turkey-Africa Diplomatic Cooperation's: Institutional Impacts and Its Strategic Consequences

The relationship between Turks and Africans has been built amid the Ottoman Empire between the 15th and 16th centuries. The Ottoman Empire was more connected to North Africa since this locale

was a portion of its organization. From Egypt to Algeria, there was a share of chronicled legacy related to Muslim culture and religion. The North African region constitutes for the Ottomans the new overseas (Saddiki, 2020). This region was recognizable to Turks and relations got to be more effective and were solidified for a long time. Since the 1990s, Turkey has been inclining up its action in Africa, producing a comprehensive procedure that incorporates dynamic strategy, social outreach, and financial association. It too offers a “third way” for nations that don’t need to be a pawn within the U.S and other’ power players (Pinto, 2021).

The Ottomans through their extensions are associated with a few African regions, particularly the North, and the East, and built up several associations with the South of Africa. The creation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 didn’t establish a normal connection with African countries even though Turkey recognized the independence process in Africa. After the cold war, Turkey and Africa established new types of partnerships (Gunn, 2020). The diplomatic collaboration aspect of Turkey-Africa relations varies in many ways. One of the goals of the Turkish opening to Africa achievement strategy is to increase the Turkish diplomatic mission in Africa. The motivation here is to improve exchanges for the total good of both Turkey and African countries. Turkey ignited its foreign policy with Africa by declaring the year 2005 the ‘Year of Africa’. In the same year, Turkey obtained observer status at the African Union (Gunn, 2020).

In the diplomatic realm, Turkey has been equally determined and it is a “turning point” for Turkish-African relations, Ankara declared 2005 as a year of Africa, during which several unprecedented high-level visits took place, and Turkey considered an observer status in the African Union. The former Turkish President Abdullah Gül was a notably frequent presence in Africa in 2009 and 2010 when he visited Kenya, Tanzania, Cameroon, and the Democratic Republic of Congo and it was Turkey’s new aggressively friendly stance towards Africa: in the last years alone, Turkey’s diplomatic representation has nearly tripled, increasing from twelve embassies in 2009 to 34 by the end of 2012 (Kaya & Warner, 2012). The number of Turkish embassies in Africa has risen currently and reached 43, with a mission soon to open in Guinea-Bissau. Meanwhile, the number of African embassies in Ankara rose from 10 in 2008 to 37 in 2021 (Altan, 2021). Currently, the subject of diplomatic representations rose to 53 in Africa. Turkish Airlines flies to more destinations on the continent than any other airline. Turkey presents itself as a global power driven by an ‘enterprising humanitarian’ foreign policy that is seeking to develop partnerships, integration, and policies of mutual benefit with African countries and reverse what Turkish officials call remnants of colonial policies and exploitation by the West. In response, however, there is a tendency among critics of Turkey’s renewed engagement with Africa to accuse Ankara of pursuing an aggressive neo-Ottoman agenda often characterized as ‘anti-western’ and ‘pan-Islamism’- in Africa (Dahir, 2021).

Turkish people’s perceptions of the government’s new African engagement vary because the depth of relations with Africa is not widely known in Turkey. In general, people in Turkey are unsure about the benefits that Africa could offer to Turkey, and while no “anti-Africa” lobby exists, some citizens are curious why Turkey would want to invest so much time in the continent, given that it has never been a high priority for Turkish foreign policy (Kaya & Warner, 2012). In 2008, the Turkish-African collaboration got a high-level stage. The Turkey-Africa Cooperation summit was the take-off of this relation. Turkey became a tactical partner for the African Union and also a non-regional member of the African Development Bank. The establishment of embassies is a proper gateway to a solid partnership (Gunn, 2020).

The Ottoman’s existence was also visible in the South of the continent when the Ottoman Honorary Consulate was recognized in Cape Town in 1861 and when the first ottoman Imam, Abu Bakr Effendi was referred to as the Muslim community. The Turkish presence was noticeable in Sudan and the Horn of Africa. But the relationship was not as close as it was recognized in the North Africa region. From 1923 to the end of the cold war, Turkish-African relation was poor due to the internal situation of Turkey being the priority of the government. Only a few Turkish international organizations and individual movements of some diplomats were observable in the African continent. However, Turkey supported the decolonization process and recognized the freedom of the new

African States, and Turkey embassies were opened in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and later in Sudan, Ghana, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Senegal, and after the apartheid in South Africa. But after the cold war, the nature of the connection with Africa has changed (Gunn, 2020).

Since the 1950s, Turkey's role in international development cooperation has gone through vital changes. New economic dynamics and an increasing sense of concern for promoting global peace through conducive to global sustainable development have allowed Turkey to develop as a new and dynamic player in international cooperation. Official development assistance has progressively become an essential part of Turkey's foreign policy in line with the policy objective of contributory to the formation of a more peaceful and stable environment in the neighboring regions, and Turkey has come as an active stakeholder in regional stability. As part of its policy of utilizing a wide range of soft power instruments such as assuming a mediator role in regional conflicts, Turkey also boosted its development assistance to various countries affected by conflicts and other sources of instability such as natural disasters (mfa.gov.tr, 2011).

The first Turkey-Africa summit was whispered in 2008 in Istanbul, and the second one in 2014 in Malabo Equatorial Guinea. Turkey aims to continue its policy towards closer collaboration with the African Union as it attaches excessive status to sharing political and cultural experiences and facilities and resources with African countries. From 2004-to 2018 Turkish top leaders paid official visits to many African countries escorted by ministers, bureaucrats, and businessmen. Turkey opened embassies in all African countries. Turkey also provided annual support of US\$1 million to the African Union since 2009 (Demirci & Hafiz, 2018).

At the third Turkey and Africa conference, African heads of state attended were 16, including Félix Tshisekedi, the then African Union Chairman, Senegal's Macky Sall, Ghana's Nana Akufo-Addo, representing Ecowas, Rwanda's Paul Kagame, Zimbabwe's Emmerson Mnangagwa and Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria. They were escorted by 102 ministers, from 39 countries and 26 foreign ministers (Altan, 2021). Moussa Faki Mahamat, Albert Muchanga, AU commissioner for economic development, trade, industry, and mining, and Josefa Leonel Correia, commissioner for agriculture, rural development, blue economy, and sustainable environment, and other high officials from AU member states were also in presence. The conference agenda swotted cooperation between Turkey and Africa as the theme of the event was 'Enhanced Partnership for Common Development and Prosperity, the conference provided guidelines for cooperation, with projects that will directly involve the private sector. The "Turkey-Africa Partnership Joint Action Plan 2021-2026" covers concrete actions to be implemented mutually by Turkey, the AU, and its Member States. It covers the areas: Peace, security, investment and industry, Education, skills, human resources development; Infrastructure development and agriculture; and promoting resilient health systems (Altan, 2021).

On the other hand, African countries supported Turkey in the international arena by giving their vote in favor of Turkey. In 2008, Turkey is admitted as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council with the vote of African countries. In the diplomatic field, African countries are sure to have the support of Turkey on all issues. Turkey is assured of the 53 votes from African countries in the UN and became the spokesman for Africans in the international arena. The Turkish-Africa relationship is soft diplomacy and Turkey's relation with Africa is an offensive option. Even though Turkey needs African products, its foreign policy is based on pragmatic cooperation and a transfer of capabilities. This kind of diplomacy is different and African leaders are willing to deal with Turkey's assurance and the political expansion of Turkey in Africa is naturally followed by economic and trade perspectives (Gunn, 2020).

3. Turkey's Institutional Cooperation Strategies, Its Impacts, and Significance for Africa Economic Development

Africa's interest in Turkey has been intensifying from the region's prevailing concerns about economic and human development cooperation. For the most part, African leaders are all too willing to entertain the arrival of a new economic partner; mainly one that they can potentially play against

more deep-rooted trading partners, and strategic allies for its issues in the international community. In 2015, Turkey's official development assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa alone was US\$395.77 million. Turkey's bilateral trade volume with Africa increased from 2003 to reach US\$18.8 billion in 2017, as exports totaled US\$11.6 billion and imported US\$7.1 billion (Demirci & Hafiz, 2018). Turkey's economic relations across the African continent have witnessed a remarkable expansion from 2003 based on the Strategy for Enhancing the Economic and Commercial Relations with Africa and from 2003 to 2020, Turkey's bilateral trade cooperation increased with Africa. Similarly, Turkish foreign direct investment in Africa has surged to US\$6.5 billion in 2021, an astounding increase over the 2003 level of just US\$100 million. The grand strategy of transforming Turkey into an interregional power, and outreach to Africa over the past decades was not unique among international actors and, in fact, formed one part of a wider global phenomenon of new economic engagement with the continent (Tanchum, 2021). Turkey's economic cooperation with Africa has grown rapidly and its foreign direct investment in the continent recently passed the US\$6 billion mark, with more than 1,150 projects underway. Trade increased fivefold between 2003 and 2019, from US\$5.5 billion to more than US\$26 billion currently. Air transport has played a crucial role in partnership: there are now 52 African cities served by Turkish Airlines, and that number is expected to increase (Pinto, 2021).

African businessmen are now willing to collaborate with Turkish. Turkish people know more about Africa than fifteen years ago. African products such as agricultural ones are present in Turkey during the agricultural trade fairs organized in many cities in Turkey. The soft and underground diplomacy used by Turkey in Africa opened a new era for a solid relationship. The perspectives of Turkey and Africa cooperation are qualified as positive. Turkey and the African States are taking benefit from this kind of cooperation. Many African countries established a strong relationship with Turkey (Gunn, 2020).

Turkey's growing engagement in Africa since the turn of the Millennium appears to be complementary to Ankara's relations with the West or the Global North and a strategic threshold point in its relations with the rest of the world, particularly the Global South. Turkey aspires to play in the global South may account for growing ties and the importance Ankara attached to South-South Cooperation. The incumbent Turkish government believes that reaping the benefits of supporting Africa's development efforts towards a more equitable world will be easier when BRICS economic institutions collaborate. Turkey aspires to play in the global South and indicates that it instrumentalizes the South-South Cooperation to achieve its wider foreign policy goals in the future (Bayram, 2020).

The volume of bilateral trade between Turkey and Africa rose from US\$5.4bn in 2003 to US\$25.3bn in 2020. Over the same period, Turkish foreign direct investment in the continent grew from US\$100m to US\$6.5bn, and Turkish companies have become increasingly present across Africa. The main sectors for Turkish trade and investment are construction, steel, and cement, followed by textiles, household goods, and electronic devices. South Africa is Turkey's largest trading partner on the continent, with bilateral trade of US\$1.3bn in 2019, but Ethiopia, where Turkish firms have more than 20,000 employees, has drawn nearly a third of Turkey's investment in sub-Saharan Africa. What began with economic outreach has progressed into a complex Africa policy encompassing business, aid, diplomacy, culture, and military support (Altan, 2021).

The objective of the third Turkey-Africa summit is to deliver 'win-win' agreements and deepen Turkey-Africa cooperation based on trade, investment, technology, and logistics to give good hope. More than 2500 participants attended from Turkey and 71 countries (including 46 African countries), with 43 high-level speakers, 22 ministers, four deputy ministers, and representatives of African regional economic communities. President Erdoğan announced that Turkey's goal is to double its bilateral trade volume with Africa to \$50bn (Altan, 2021).

Various milestones have marked Turkey's opening to Africa. Turkish main strategy is to develop economic diplomacy relations with African Countries. Turkey also started participating in African Union Summits as a guest country. Cooperation mainly to make involvement in the diplomatic, political, economic, and military arenas to a higher level. Prime Minister Erdoğan's visits to Ethiopia

and South Africa in March 2005 marked the first time a Turkish prime minister visited Sub-Saharan Africa since the Turkish Republic was established. Also in 2005, Turkey obtained “observer status” in the African Union, with the Turkish Embassy in Addis Ababa becoming accredited by the organization as Turkey’s representative office (Kaya & Warner, 2012).

The Turkish international trade programs with Africa constitute the major aspect of economic cooperation. Significant progress has been realized in terms of trade and business with African countries (Bilgic & Nascimento, 2014). Products exported from Turkey to Africa are steel, iron, textiles, medical equipment, hygienic products, food industry, construction articles, and machinery (Panetier, 2012). In return, Turkey imported from Africa raw materials, pearls, valuable stones, and jewelry up to US\$813 million in 2013 (Gunn, 2020). To enable more mobility between Turkey and African countries, Turkish airlines link Turkish and African businessmen and investors. Turkish companies like Summa-Limack, Tosyanli, and Yapi Merkezi are present in Africa and contribute to the development of relations. They are present in Senegal, Ghana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Nigeria, Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia, etc. Ruhsar Pekcan, Turkish minister of trade affirmed that during the past 15 years, Turkish companies realized in Africa US\$65 billion (Gunn, 2020).

Turkish companies are investing in energy especially in electricity in Ghana and also operating in Nigeria by exporting natural gas and petrol. The win-win cooperation between Turkey and Africa continues in 2022, Turkey wants to increase commercial exchanges to 100 billion USD. Moreover, the cooperation between Turkey and Senegal is increasing and marks the achievement of the presence of Turkey in Africa. In 2020, president Erdogan visited Senegal marking the kind of cooperation between Turkey and Africa as strategic. In Senegal, the Turkish company’s cooperation is effective in all sectors. President Macky Sall affirms that Turkish companies are vigorous for Senegal and Turkish companies planned to invest 400 million USD in Senegal. In the case of infrastructure, Summa-Limack has constructed Blaise Diagne airport in Dakar and is about the construct a sports complex. Alper agricultural machinery, Kolin construction, and Force group in 2018 obtained from Senegal an agreement for 474 million € for the next years. Kolin construction is focusing on road construction for 400 million €. Alper agricultural machinery provides this sector with new engines for 60 million € and this group has the ambition to participate in the development and modernization of agriculture in Africa. Thus, Senegal is the first example and then the success is generalized to the whole continent and economic partnership is very significant for cooperation (Gunn, 2020).

Turkish current strategies, for Africa, is painstaking as a goal and a means, targeting trade and investment, as the region represents a huge market with about 200 million consumers and a source for potential strategic alliances and President Erdogan announced during his official visit to Algeria on 2020, that Turkey is seeking to increase the trade volume with Africa to 50 billion dollars (Saddiki, 2020). The Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey has recognized business councils with 35 African countries. The first Turkey-Africa Agriculture Ministers Meeting was held in Antalya, Turkey, in April 2017 (Demirci & Hafiz, 2018). Turkish investments in Africa are significant and trade activities are also vigorous and cooperation reached also education through the presence of Turkish schools and universities. The Turkish presence is also real in the humanitarian domain and religious affairs. The results of this partnership are in common due to the intimidation of exchanges through political, economic, and cultural activities. Turkish and Africans are showing interest in opportunism which can bring development to each country. The positive aspect of this presence in Africa must not avoid some negative aspects. Turkey needed to cooperate more with civil society and help to avoid corruption and promote more human rights in some African countries. The integration of the young African leaders will make strong cooperation in the future (Gunn, 2020).

4. Turkey-Africa Peace and Security Institutional Engagements and its Strategic Effects

Turkish-African peace and security institutional cooperation started decades ago. But there the cooperation lacks strategic dimensions. The arrangement of security affairs ranges from instances of equitable partnership with some of the African continent’s more powerful states, for example, South

Africa, Nigeria, and Ethiopia to Turkish protectionism towards the region's more tumultuous states: Somalia and Libya to instances of training and collaboration on various topical issues.

Turkey cooperates with Africans in areas of peace and security. Turkey's cooperation to stability in Africa has been taken into account by the Turkish government and by doing so, Turkey implements military bases in Somalia, Sudan, and Djibouti and is present in Libya (Gunn, 2020). Moreover, Turkey realizes Africa as a key customer for its military industry and started cooperation to provide securities services for African countries, including Kenya, Uganda, and Tunisia. This strategy bolsters domestic goals, as Ankara wants to strengthen its defense manufacturers and become self-sufficient in the sector by 2023. Ankara has conventional at least 37 military offices across the regions and signed agreements for military cooperation with African countries, including Chad, Niger, and Somalia. Geopolitically, these countries are relevant to Ankara's African ambitions. The prospect of Turkey-Africa security cooperation is of huge importance to African countries (Pinto, 2021). To the Africa Union, this security cooperation will aid the Union in its bid to be a role player in African security affairs through the African Union Peace and Security Council. Based on their historical and cultural ties, Turkey and African countries developed close relations after the Cold War. Since the turn of the 21st century, however, they have been engaged in fast-paced cooperation (Bayram, 2020).

Turkish influence and cooperation are growing in the Sahel and West Africa, on the other hand, France has decided to reduce its military presence there, while the U.S. may also pull back. Ankara's efforts to engage with Senegal, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Nigeria, Niger, and Chad are crucial because it considers the region in containing the Gulen movement. In the Horn of Africa, domestic events in Sudan and Ethiopia will determine future scenarios. In Sudan, President Erdogan had signed important agreements. But agreements have lost strength, as the transitional coalition seems to favor engagement with the West and in Ethiopia, where the outlook for stability remains critical (Pinto, 2021).

On the other hand, some Africans express fears of a sort of "neo-Ottomanism" from Turkey in Africa and other groups on the continent are openly hostile. The terrorist group, Al-Shebab has ridiculed Turkey as "a stooge of the West," a disdain that manifested itself in the Al-Shebab-led bombings of the Turkish embassy in Mogadishu in December 2011 is a good example (www.kulmiyenews.com, 2011). Turkey and its alliances with the EU and the U.S. will likely benefit Western interests. As Ankara became more ambitious, the revival of the Ottoman Empire and Pan-Islamism and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, hopping the country as a growing regional power and an "Afro-Eurasian state." (Pinto, 2021) Turkish ambitions and its influence in the Horn of Africa require zoom, medium, and wide-angle lenses the fact that, when coupled with Turkey's political introversion and a surge of interest from Gulf adversaries, could diminish Ankara's comparative edge in the Horn of Africa region (Vertin, 2019).

Somalia provided Turkey with a gateway to the Indian Ocean and provides strategic access to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden and it is a key point for competition and tension between Arab states. President Erdogan visited Mogadishu and offered humanitarian aid and since then, Ankara has provided Somalia with more than US\$1 billion in aid and investments, including the construction of roads, hospitals, and schools. In 2017, Ankara opened a military base in Mogadishu, Camp TURKSOM, which also includes a military training center. One year later, allegedly at the request of the Somali authorities, the United Arab Emirates ended its military training program in the country and Ankara paid off US\$2.4 million of Somalia's debt to the International Monetary Fund currently (Pinto, 2021). Turkey also implements the capacity-building program by taking charge of the training of Somali troops, and the implementation of a military base in Mogadishu. Turkey offered the construction of a state administration. Turkey shows its military presence in Africa by taking part in peacebuilding missions for example, in 2012 Turkey participated in different UN missions. In Côte d'Ivoire, Turkey participated in ONUCI missions, in Liberia (UNMIL), the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), Sudan (UNMIS), and Darfur (UNAMID)(Gunn, 2020).

Due to Ankara's ambitions over disputed waters and resources in the East Mediterranean, and

its rivalries with other powers, Libya has played a critical role in Turkey's and Africa's strategies. Following an agreement between Turkey and the UN-backed Tripoli government, Turkish forces have provided training and support to the Libyan Armed Forces. Turkey's rivals the UAE, Egypt, and France had all supported, either implicitly or explicitly, a competing Libyan government based in Tobruk that was backed by the forces of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Ankara's projecting part in Libya has been accompanied by intensifying military and economic cooperation with Tunisia and Algeria the latter now being Turkey's second-largest trading partner on the continent recently (Pinto, 2021).

In general, the Turkish military support towards African positions can be identified in two ways. The first one is capable of equitable military cooperation with African great powers such as South Africa, Nigeria, and Ethiopia, and the second aspect is protectionism like the military presence in Somalia, Djibouti, and Libya. The military cooperation with Africa constitutes the acquisition of military infrastructures such as guns, and helicopters from countries like South Africa. With Nigeria, Turkey agreed to the procurement of naval ships and training and Nigerian Forces will participate in the training of the Turkish Navy. In Ethiopia, Turkey signed a military cooperation agreement in 2006 in which, the Ethiopian Armed Forces will be trained by Turkey, and apart from this aspect, Turkey exports to South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Ethiopia, Cameroon, electronic military equipment, armored vehicles, defense equipment and so on (Kaya & Warner, 2012).

Moreover, the military institutional cooperation with some African countries is based on protectionism particularly, for Somalia, Turkey uses its military force to protect this State against instability and terrorist attacks from the AL-Shebab groups. Backstage, the military presence in Somalia is of course too safe for the country and brings peace and security. The Horn of Africa is a strategic zone for worldwide trade and its stability is vital for the international economy (Dan Berg & Meester, 2019). The military and security institutions' presence in Africa constitutes a geopolitics perspective and this will permit Turkey to deal with western great powers and also secure the growth of its economy. As a strategic partner for Africa, Turkey institutionally plays a vital role in defense and security in Africa (Kaya & Warner, 2012). Turkish institutions operate in Mogadishu's air and seaports, its markets are flush with Turkish-manufactured goods, and Turkish Airways flies direct to the capital city the first major international carrier to do so. Thus, Ankara's diplomats lament being lumped together with Gulf "newcomers" when talking about the Horn of Africa region and wider competition in the Red Sea region (Vertin, 2019). However, Turkey's military and security cooperation is becoming institutionalized in the African continent.

5. Impacts and Outcomes of Ankara's Institutional Initiatives in Africa

Africa is progressively attracting the attention of new various emerging actors on the continent, such as Turkey. Thus, Ankara's institutional initiatives in Africa are relatively new but vital for its development programs. Turkey rejects 'Western-centred Orientalist' approaches to the African continent and efforts to embrace the peoples of the African continent without discrimination and focuses much attention on economic and security cooperation. Turkey has implemented institutional programs in Africa particularly, in areas of trade and investment, peace and security, education and culture, youth empowerment and technology transfer, rural economy and agriculture, energy and transportation.

However, Turkey's ministry of foreign affairs director-general for Africa affairs Mr. Nur Sağman by his words, expressed to the media, that 'Without Africa, there cannot be a prosperous world' he added that "We want to develop together. The ideas 'We want to support African countries and be on their side' is good but still missing practical implementations based on the benefits of both nations. Anyways, it indicates a positive sense that the world would one day realize that without Africa, there cannot be a wealthy and healthy international system. So that the global societies need to move forward, hand in hand with African communities (Vertin, 2019). Thus, the coming of Turkey as a more assertive regional power appears to be favorably received by African countries that aspire to diversify

their development partners but having been accorded observer status at the African Union in 2005, Turkey was declared a strategic partner by the African Union Summit (Bacchi, 2015).

Turkey's institutional plans and hopes will elevate its status as a key regional and global power. Indeed, Turkey is trying to create a new image for itself institutionally in international affairs by taking advantage of its soft power and diplomatic clout to show how it can be an asset to the 21st-century global order. As such, the world is likely to see a more assertive Turkey institutional approach towards African politics. For its part, African states appear to be equally open to the new Turkish presence and cooperation. The African countries are openly welcoming Turkey's institutional approaches as a military partner, and trading cohort (Kaya & Warner, 2012).

The fact that African leaders believed Turkey was a significant international actor was confirmed by high-level participation in the ensuing summit diplomacy of Ankara and it is of note that African countries participated in the Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summits. The conference initiated the institutionalization of Turkish-African ties via the Framework of Cooperation for Turkey Africa Partnership adopted at the event in question. Sectors like Agriculture, health, education, energy, infrastructure, and security were listed among the primary areas of institutional cooperation. The 2nd Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit took place in November 2014 in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea. It was held under the theme of "a new model of partnership for the strengthening of sustainable development and integration", to increase the Turkish FDI to Africa and create an environment conducive to the economic development of African countries (Bacchi, 2015).

Somalia and Sudan have proven the targets for Turkish institutional cooperation, neighboring Ethiopia is the region's ascendant power and the most recent subject of new Gulf entreaties. Though Turkish schools and mosque diplomacy two core instruments of Erdogan's Islamic soft power have been deployed in Ethiopia, Ankara has been relatively visible in the predominantly Orthodox Christian nation too. Moreover, its economic diplomacy in Ethiopia reportedly outweighs those in both Somalia and Sudan and a growing number of Turkish voices are urging Ankara to make it a priority (Vertin, 2019).

However, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, trying to mark new institutional approaches in with the African Union and African countries. Turkey's interest in Africa is not temporary, it is a maintained commitment too. Our African leaders are showing they are interested in better cooperation with Turkey. Ankara's institutional presence has grown quickly on the continent under President Erdoğan, who has visited many African countries more than any other African leader (Vertin, 2019).

6. Institutional Cooperation of Turkey Africa: Critical Challenges

Irrespective of all the engagement and development and processes two important dynamics are likely to impact the institutional cooperation between Turkey and Africa. The first of such dynamics is Turkey's role in some conflicts in Africa. The government of Ankara for some time now has adopted the policy of supporting the "democratic demands of the people." This policy has since seen Ankara offering support for the anti-government movement in some African countries. The result of this democratic change has subsequently led to Turkey's refusal to acknowledge Abdelfettah el-Sisi as the legitimate leader of Egypt while supporting opponents of the Sisi in Egypt. This amount to meddling in the internal affairs of Egypt. The role of Egypt in the formation of the African Union and Africa as a continent demands that issues concerning Africa can't be done without the involvement of Egypt. Turkey on the other side should know the line of its diplomatic activities and respects the sovereignty of all African states.

Another important issue of major concern is Turkey's role in the conflict in Libya. Turkey was more visible in the Libyan crisis as expected of a third party by supporting one of the crises at the expense of the international community instead of playing the role of a peacemaker in the crisis. For example, in Africa Africa, Turkey supported former Sudan president al-Bashir with the help of Qatar, who was eventually toppled by a mass demonstration. The second issue of concern is the internal

dispute between Turkey's government and the socio-religious organization led by Fethullah Gulen. The leader of this group Fethullah Gulen, who is in exile in the USA, his organization regarded by Ankara as a terrorist cell in 2016. This among others seems to pose a challenge to the Turkey- African cooperation. The government in Ankara blames the movement for its role in many attacks on Turkey's national in Africa.

Thirdly, Turkey's cooperation in Africa has been seen as an agenda for the propagation of the Islamic religion and ideas in Africa. This is evidence of Turkey's support for predominantly Muslim-dominated countries in Africa. In addition to this, most of Turkey's humanitarian organizations are largely in Muslim-dominated countries.

7. Conclusion

Turkey- African institutional cooperation serves to offer the African people more opportunities in their development agenda. An African proverb says "variety of meat does not spoil the soup but rather makes it more delicious." Turkey's engagement in Africa can be appreciated through diplomatic cooperation, economic development cooperation, peace and security cooperation, as well as institutional cooperation strategies. Turkey-Africa institutional cooperation does not only seem to equip and improve African institutional capacities but also offers a market for both Turkey and Africa. To some degree Turkey's engagement with Africa is a result of Turkey's domestic political transformation and a shift in policy from its traditional economic partner, it also seems to affirm the dynamics in the global political environment and economy in the seemingly multi-polar world order. Turkey's engagement explains a multi-functional foreign policy based on institutional development for both economic and political gains. In this sense, Turkey's opening to Africa is a major part of this new redefinition of the country's foreign policy (Mehmet, 2010). Following Turkey's institutional strategies toward Africa suggest that African reactions to Turkey's initiative thus far have been a "mixture of mild expectation and confusion"(Mehmet, 2010).

Following China and India, the question of why Turkey has shown what some consider to be an unexpected interest in the continent still does not have a clear answer for Turkey's African partners. Nevertheless, Turkey's lack of colonial history in the continent and its emphasis on an equal partnership with African countries have spread optimism about the future of the relationship among African leaders

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