

True New Agenda for South East Europe and EU

Dr. Eva Teqja (Allushi)

Aleksander Moisiu University, Durrës, Albania
Email: eva.allushi@gmail.com

Abstract The purpose of this paper is to explain, in a clear and concise way, how the EU's enlargement policy is affecting western Balkans countries. It aims to give an overview of how the EU strategy has grown since this idea is created. Where it stands today after having undergone its most important round of enlargement and what the perspective of accepting new members in the future is. The proposed paper examines how is proceeding EU with its next enlargement round in the conditions of so called "enlargement fatigue" that has gripped the European Union, with the global financial and economic crisis drawing much attention away from the Balkans accession issue. And in the other hand, as a result of this if inhabitants of the Western Balkans are becoming increasingly aware that enlargement is no longer fashionable in the EU. The paper discusses about the fact that EU member states should strongly reaffirm their Thessaloniki commitment, and so even further by giving their support to EU accession proposals for the western Balkans in the European Council. Furthermore it addresses the problem of the completion of the process in the region, the commitment of the EU in the front of the Balkans European future, the major challenges that have to affront both of them, the problems in the European home, and the duties of Western Balkans countries. Despite a number of unresolved issues in the region, one can see a new spirit of rapprochement and genuine cooperation in the Western Balkans enlargement is a strategic policy decision of the European Union. Elaborating the advancement measures to sustain the current rapprochement policy over the period ahead is a priority. The moment must be seized and the trend must be translated into an irreversible process. This is where South-East Europe and the European Union could find a true new agenda.

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to explain, in a clear and concise way, how the EU's enlargement policy is affecting western Balkans countries. It aims to give an overview of how the EU strategy has grown since this idea is created. Where it stands today after having undergone its most important round of enlargement and what the perspective of accepting new members in the future is. The proposed paper examines how is proceeding EU with its next enlargement round in the conditions of so called "enlargement fatigue" that has gripped the European Union, with the global financial and economic crisis drawing much attention away from the Balkans accession issue. And in the other hand, as a result of this if inhabitants of the Western Balkans are becoming increasingly aware that enlargement is no longer fashionable in the EU. The paper discusses about the fact that EU member states should strongly reaffirm their Thessaloniki commitment, and so even further by giving their support to EU accession proposals for the western Balkans in the European Council. Further more it addresses the problem of the completion of the process in the region, the commitment of the EU in the front of the Balkans European future, the major challenges that have to affront both of them, the problems in the European home, and the duties of Western Balkans countries.

Should it be a new Strategy for Western Balkans?

In light of recent political events, this leads to the following question: Which enlargement strategy is applied in the case of the Western Balkans? The paper mainly focuses on a study of EU relations towards (potential) candidate countries in the Western Balkans. The article addresses the strategies of the Western Balkans' key political actors towards the EU and public opinion on accession, the economic and political transformations in the region, the political strategies of EU member states regarding the Western Balkans and public opinion on further enlargement, the EU's policies towards the Western Balkans, the EU's constitutional debate as well as regional conflicts in the Western Balkans.

The results of the analysis raise the question whether these measures represent only a transitional period of EU enlargement policy or whether they will generate permanent options of 'flexible participation' for the Western Balkans. Membership will only happen when each one of the countries meets the necessary requirements. The EU enlargement policy ensures a well managed accession process, so that enlargement brings benefits simultaneously to the EU and to the countries joining. For the EU, it is important to obtain guarantees on the date and effectiveness of each candidate's implementation of the rules.

“The Tiredness of Europe”

Since the enlargement of 1 May 2004, the EU and the western Balkans have become even closer neighbors, and so the situation in the western Balkan countries, their progress on the road to European integration and their present and future relations with the EU really are of immediate concern to the EU itself. If the EU reneges on Balkan enlargement it's at its own peril. Enlargement “fatigue” and Europe's economic woes have seen the membership hopes of most western Balkan countries dwindle and fade. Without the countries of the western Balkans in the EU, the process of unification will remain incomplete (Schily, Otto. 2009). To make a united Europe become reality, the European Union must demonstrate its own commitment to the western Balkans.

It is the attractions of the EU model that make significant change in the western Balkans possible. But if the EU were to water down the Balkan countries' accession hopes or to postpone the prospect of eventual membership to some distant day, that would have the effect of denying those countries their rewards for the improvements they've already made, undermine the EU's own credibility and remake the most important incentive for the difficult and unpopular reforms the whole region has still to undertake.

Yet in spite of the commitments made by EU heads of government at their Thessaloniki summit in 2003, when they reaffirmed the membership prospects of all the western Balkan countries provided they can meet all the necessary criteria, the integration process is now stumbling; the EU is hesitating over how to proceed with its next enlargement round. Another bout of enlargement fatigue has gripped the European Union, with the global financial and economic crisis drawing much attention away from the Balkans accession issue. The result of all this is that the inhabitants of the Western Balkans are becoming increasingly aware that enlargement is no longer fashionable in the EU, so they themselves have begun to recognise that EU accession is no longer a convincing political prospect.

Without strong and credible EU hopes, the western Balkans could relapse back into being a genuine threat to security and peace in Europe. The dwindling likelihood of EU membership will also mean the weakening of Brussels' soft power and of the EU's influence on the reform process in the region.

Far from being allowed to slow down, progress of the Balkan countries towards EU membership should be accelerated and given fresh impetus. EU member states should strongly reaffirm their Thessaloniki commitment, and so even further by giving their support to EU accession proposals for the western Balkans in the European Council. To offer the region a credible prospect of EU membership, the Copenhagen Criteria and the EU's own institutional capacity should be the only preconditions for accession negotiations to begin. Indeed, when any European country can meet these longstanding conditions for accession it should be accepted as a member.

Allaying Balkan countries' fears about their European prospects would also help to overcome some of the worst consequences of the financial crisis. It is far from being only in the interest of the people of the western Balkans, that the region should be able to press ahead with political and economic reform and reconciliation between its peoples. It is in the wider strategic interest of the EU. But here again, the consolidation of stability and the enhancement of reform in the western Balkans can only be achieved once there is definite progress in the accession process.

In geopolitical terms, the EU's security will obviously be all the greater once the western Balkans is an integral part of the Union. And organised crime and corruption clearly pose much more of a threat to European Union member states if the Balkan countries remain outside the EU. The international community has already invested enormous sums of money, goodwill and human resources in the region, but unless these investments are accompanied by credible EU prospect they risk being wasted. So far, the EU's successive enlargements have made it stronger, and there is every reason to believe that further enlargements will also do so.

The Steps Towards Enlargement

Such economic preparations cannot, of course, answer the big question: When will south Eastern Europe become part of the EU proper? That will probably remain unclear for several years yet (Busek, Erhard. 2009). The EU has outlined a roadmap in the context of the Stabilisation and Association Process, but the timetable depends on a multitude of factors, including many outside the region's control. The troubled ratification process of the EU's Lisbon Treaty is clearly a stumbling block and the EU is also still coming to terms with some of its newer member states, particularly Bulgaria and Romania. A degree of enlargement fatigue may be quite natural after the EU's successive expansions in 2004 and 2007, but the EU's difficulties with Sofia and Bucharest are having a knock-on effect in the western Balkans.

Where does this leave the countries of the western Balkans on their long road to EU membership, and what are their prospects in the foreseeable future? The basic position of each country is pretty well known. Croatia has been member of the EU actually. But the Zagreb government must still address a number of outstanding issues; some concern

privatisation, but mainly they are questions about justice and home affairs. Macedonia is the only other official candidate country, but the start of its formal membership negotiations is being held up by neighboring. On the one hand, the region will have to wait on developments in Brussels and other EU capitals. On the other, the most essential decisions lie within the region's own grasp. These countries still have further to travel in the right direction and they have to be able to stick with the Copenhagen-criteria for EU membership (Chaillot Paper, 2010).

In a world preoccupied by economic recession and the global banking crisis, EU leaders will tend to forget about their troublesome neighbors, but the Balkans nevertheless remains part of Europe, and will loom ever larger on its list of unfinished business.

EU leaders signed the Accession Treaty with Croatia at the European Council on 9 December 2011. The opening of negotiations with Montenegro will be re-examined in June 2012. Serbia received candidate status for membership in February 2012. Despite enjoying candidate status since 2005 and in spite of a positive EC opinion to initiate negotiations, Macedonia has not conducted accession talks with the EU because of a block by Greece, which does not recognize the country's constitutional name, the Republic of Macedonia. The EC has once again concluded that, apart from Croatia, Macedonia was the most advanced among the countries of the region in implementing reforms recommended by the EU. Still, strengthening the freedom of media and expression, improving both judiciary independence and administration capacities, and fighting against corruption remain among the challenges.

Albania has not received candidate status even though it submitted an application for EU membership in April 2009. This is because of the ongoing political deadlock since mid-2009. EC report showed little progress in meeting the criteria required to obtain candidate status. Political stalemate also blocked the integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the EU (Żornaczuk, Tomasz. 2012.)

Only in January 2012 was compromise reached over the formation of a central government in line with the parliamentary elections of October 2010. The adjustment of the country's constitution to the European Convention on Human Rights will be one of the main tasks for the new government and a condition for further integration with the Union. The EC report has once again pointed to the weakness of state institutions and to the early stage of the country's alignment to the EU laws. In the case of Kosovo, the lack of prospects for progress in European integration stems both from its early stage in building state institutions and the weakness of its reforms as well as the lack of a precise Union strategy. The European Council has announced that talks will take place on a visa waiver after the required reforms are conducted, primarily in the areas of justice, freedom and security.

What makes the coming crisis in the Balkans really dangerous is that the European public is not prepared for it. And what makes it really important is that this is also a crisis that the EU badly needs. It is in the Balkans that the EU must demonstrate it has the power to bring about the transformation of states that are weak and societies that are divided. Unless the EU has the capacity to bring security and development, it risks losing credibility in international politics (Krastev, Ivan. 2005.)

After the Lisbon agreement on streamlining the EU's institutional architecture, a reinvigorated accession process will undoubtedly contribute to the Union's consolidation, both territorially and politically.

It remains to be seen whether the favourable international environment makes it any easier for the EU to shape a coherent regional approach. But this is also where 'enlargement fatigue' within the EU meets 'accession fatigue' in the Balkans (Petritsch, Wolfgang, 2008.) The latter has two faces: the region's political elites sometimes use verbal commitments to EU integration as a smokescreen for politics as a business model while we witness the erosion of popular support for EU accession: strongest where it is least advanced, in Albania, weakest where it is most advanced, in Croatia.

The EU should strengthen the regional approach by giving all the countries of the region candidate status and a date for the opening of negotiations. The pace and completion of the process will depend on each country's capacity to deliver, thus making their respective responsibilities clear and the political costs involved more palatable to political elites in the region. But that, in turn, requires the EU to overcome its hesitation between containment and integration and to renew its commitment to the Balkans' European future in order to restore its credibility in the region and at international level.

With the Euro in crisis and the EU under extraordinary stress, some might wonder why the western Balkan states are so keen to join. In fact, no country will follow Croatia for many years, but the answer is still simple enough.

The Western Balkans still face major challenges in EU accession process. For the candidate and potential candidate countries policy of EU facilitates a profound transformation; A transformation to a stable, pluralistic democracy which upholds and reinforces the rule of law; A transformation to a functioning market economy and the prospect of long term prosperity; A transformation to a modern society, which fully embraces the values at the heart of the European Union.

This same process benefits the European Union and its Member States. (Fule, Stefan, 2011). Should stalemate in the European integration process not be properly managed both now and in the future, the EU risks a serious loss of

credibility – both as a mediator and as “an anchor for change”. Though overshadowed by so-called ‘enlargement fatigue’ and, more importantly, by the current Euro debt crisis, the Western Balkans have gone through some valuable changes during the past two years, bringing about a new wave of EU rapprochement.

Though one could claim that the EU integration process has so far been fairly successful, various controversies remain which will require additional common efforts to reach an acceptable equilibrium. Should this stalemate not be properly managed, however, the EU risks a serious loss of credibility – both as a mediator and, to use EU jargon, as “an anchor for change”. For Member States, credibility means applying rigorous conditionality towards the applicants, but also providing them with a tangible European perspective as they fulfill the relevant conditions”.

The NEB questionnaire offers a dozen different indicators evaluating how well applicant countries are meeting the Copenhagen criteria. Whereas the Eurobarometer opinion polls ask citizens in applicant countries what they think of the European Union, the NEB asks people what they think of their own government. The most recent round of surveys in 2004/5 not only covered applicant countries but also eight of the countries that had just joined the EU ((Rose, Richard, 2006).

Eventual EU membership is the light by which all Balkan political system trying to navigate. If it fades or goes out, peace efforts will be doomed throughout the region (Bildt, Carl. 2005). Despite a number of unresolved issues in the region, one can see a new spirit of rapprochement and genuine cooperation in the Western Balkans and its leaders must seize the moment in order to translate this trend into an irreversible process (Biščević Hido.2010)

This obsession with uniformity and the control of developments – both in the broader Europe and the EU – is formally reinstated with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and some of the solutions included therein which are relevant to human rights. This includes the accession of the EU as an organization, as such, to the European Convention of Human Right, whilst obviously not making any significant changes in terms of their institutions and system (Lozanoska, Jana. 2010)

The prospect of European integration has had a defining impact on politics throughout the western Balkans, for often contentious reforms in return for demonstrable progress towards membership of the EU (Bancroft, Ian, 2010). As this perspective becomes increasingly mired in uncertainties deriving from the global financial crisis, delays in ratifying the Lisbon treaty and a rise in enlargement-skepticism, however, political platforms premised primarily on securing the benefits of EU accession are likely to find themselves ever more strained. (Huszka, Bea.2011).

A recent World Bank report, entitled ‘Doing Business 2010: Reforming through Difficult Times’, showed how all the countries of the Western Balkans had improved their business environments in ten key categories – starting and closing a business, dealing with construction permits, employing workers, registering property, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders and enforcing contracts. (Obradovic-Wochnik, Jelena, 2011)

The road to EU membership has been long and does not look like it will end any time soon, the prospect of candidacy has spurred on some real changes in the region, demonstrating that when the political elite is mature and understands the importance of change, huge leaps can be made in cooperation and improved relations in a relatively short time.

Academic researchers have argued that the EU has primarily managed its enlargement in accordance with the “classical Community method” (Preston 1995). In light of recent political events, this leads to the following question: Which enlargement strategy is applied in the case of the Western Balkans?

The analysis leads to the conclusion that, in the case of the Western Balkans, the EU is continuing its enlargement policy as a matter of principle. However, years of constitutional debate and the current financial crisis have rendered the EU contemplative. The permissive consensus on further enlargement has been replaced by an increasing politicization.

The results of the analysis raise the question whether these policy instruments represent only a transitional period of EU enlargement or whether they will generate permanent forms of “flexible participation” for the Western Balkans. 2. The classical method of EU enlargement: Accession conditionality prominent scholars of European integration have concluded that EU enlargement is a largely neglected subject (Wallace 2000; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002). Enlargement has always been an essential part of the process of European integration.

On the whole, EU enlargement is widely considered to be a “success story” (Council 2007, 2) in bringing about fundamental reforms beyond European borders. The enlargement of the EU has evolved during each enlargement round. In spite of distinct changes according to Christopher Preston, there is a consistent pattern of previous enlargement rounds that constitute the “classical Community method” (Preston 1995) of EU enlargement.

The author identifies six principles of the classical method of EU enlargement: (1) candidates for accession have to accept the *acquis communautaire* in its entirety, (2) formal negotiations on accession focus exclusively on questions of the *acquis* implementation, (3) the EU’s rising complexity and heterogeneity are managed by new policy instruments which overlay existing ones, rather than by substantial policy reforms, (4) new member states are integrated into the EU’s institutional structure only on the basis of limited incremental adaptation, (5) the EU prefers to negotiate with groups of

states that already have close relations with one another, and (6) existing members promote their own interests and collectively externalize internal problems. Among these principles, the non-negotiability of the *acquis* has been the most crucial one.

Researchers have identified several mechanisms applied by the EU to affect domestic rule adoption through the accession process, but the “the most important mechanism is the EU’s gate-keeping role in determining when each candidate can progress to the next stage towards accession” (Grabbe 2001, 1019-1020). The efforts of the applicant countries to fully implement the *acquis* are finally rewarded with full membership to the EU. Therefore, this strategy of enlargement is called “accession conditionality”.

The EU is trying to change the domestic structures of the Western Balkan countries in order to promote peace, stability and prosperity in the region. Furthermore, the EU has even offered the Western Balkans a membership perspective. But which enlargement strategy is applied in the case of the Western Balkans? In taking a synoptic approach, the following part of the paper addresses (1) the strategies of the Western Balkans’ governments towards the EU and public opinion on accession, (2) the political and economic transformation in the region, (3) the strategies of EU member states regarding the Western Balkans and public opinion on further enlargement, (4) the EU policy making towards the Western Balkans, (5) the EU’s internal crisis management, and (6) regional conflicts in the Western Balkans.

Do the governments in the Western Balkans consider EU accession to be of highest priority? This is obviously in Croatia. Four other Western Balkans states have officially expressed their will to join the EU by filing an application for membership.

Enlargement; How Much Support Does It Still Has

But what do people in the Western Balkans think about accession to the EU? The most detailed picture of public opinion in the Western Balkans is provided by the Balkan Monitor. The Balkan Monitor was launched in 2006 by Gallup and is an annually comparative survey project in all Western Balkan countries. These surveys show that in all Western Balkan countries, joining the EU is perceived as a good thing. There is only one exception: Croatia. According to the last Balkan Monitor in 2010, only 25% of the Croats believe that the integration of their country into the EU would be a good thing. In 2006, 35% said this was the case. Ironically, support for EU membership is lowest in the country which is closest to its accession to the EU. In contrast, support for EU membership is the highest in Kosovo (87%), even though integration of the Kosovo is far-off. However, positive or negative expectations of EU membership are not equivalent to high or low support for actually joining the EU. At the end of the accession process there will be a referendum with only two choices to choose from: “Yes” and “No”. The responses to the question on voting intentions in the event of such a referendum are unambiguous for the period between 2009 and 2010: the majority in all Western Balkan states stated that they would vote “Yes”. Support for EU accession ranges from 63% in Serbia up to 93% in Albania. Once again, the only exception is Croatia. In line with the low level of EU support, the number of those who would vote “No” is higher than those who would vote “Yes” (43% and 38%, respectively). What does the public in the EU member states think about enlargement? Eurobarometer surveys provide a detailed picture of public attitudes towards enlargement. Over the last years, the idea of an enlargement of the EU has become less and less popular among European citizens. Support for further enlargement declined from a high point of 53% registered in the autumn of 2004 to 42% in the spring of 2011. At the same time, the opposition to enlargement has risen from 25% to 47%. With an average of 63%, support of enlargement remains significantly higher in the twelve new member states than in the EU-15, where only 36% support further enlargement whereas 54% oppose it.

Ethno-political conflicts in the Western Balkans have been one of the main concerns of the European engagement in the Western Balkans since the beginning of the early 1990s. Peace and stability in the region are the goals of the EU enlargement policy, but at the same time they are a prerequisite for EU accession. The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIC) provides an informative overview of the regional developments since 2004. The HIIC’s Conflict Barometer describes trends in cases of conflicts, ranging from “latent conflict”, to “manifest conflict”, to “crisis”, to “severe crisis”, to “war”. According to this distinction, the level of conflict intensity ranges from 1 to 5 (HIIC 2010, 88).

Conclusions and Recommendations

This paper analysed the evolution of the EU’s enlargement strategy while focusing on the Western Balkans. According to the analysis of the academic literature, in the case of Bulgaria and Romania, the EU changed its approach from a strategy of “accession conditionality” to a strategy of “post-membership socialisation”. The main aim of the paper was to

outline the enlargement strategy that is currently applied to the Western Balkans. Therefore, a synoptic approach was taken which focused on six main factors that have influenced the enlargement process since 2004.

According to the analysis, political elites in all Western Balkan states push for EU membership. These membership aspirations are strongly supported by their citizens. Political and economic transformations have been underway for the past years, but have been slow and tenuous. With the exception of Croatia, all Western Balkans states suffer from serious weaknesses in governance and institutional capacity.

The global financial crisis has further delayed the economic transformation and has resulted in a decline of FDI and increasing rates of unemployment. In spite of the Western Balkans slow but steady progress, EU member states show clear signs of enlargement fatigue.

The lack of positive leadership has reinforced public skepticism about further enlargement. Current EU public opinion opposes a possible membership of all Western Balkans states except Croatia. The diverging national expectations of the future of EU enlargement undermine the decision-making at the EU's institutional level. The European Commission has tried to take into account both the reservations of EU member states to further enlargement and the fears of the Western Balkans of remaining outsiders.

In the context of enlargement fatigue and the current financial crisis, it is improbable that the EU is ready for such a paradigm change. Therefore, it is important to keep the Western Balkans countries on track regarding their EU membership with a proactive and unequivocal enlargement strategy.

The European Council's decisions from December 2011 are evidence of a careful and firm approach to the enlargement process in the Western Balkans during a time of reform the eurozone and when there is a debate around the a deeper integration. In the future member states will make use of additional criteria in order to firmly consolidate the democratization at an early stage of a country's European integration.

At the same time, conducting the screening by the EC at an earlier stage will accelerate the specification of the most difficult areas in talks with the Union. The development of regional cooperation is in the best interests of all the western Balkan countries: it is a key factor for establishing political stability, security and economic prosperity. It corresponds to a commitment made by the countries of the region at the EU–Western Balkans Summits of Zagreb (2000) and Thessaloniki (2003). Regional cooperation is a principle of the highest importance for the political stability, the security and economic development of the western Balkan countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo.

Regional cooperation in the western Balkans is:

- needed as a crucial ingredient of stability;
- a catalyst for reconciliation, good-neighborliness and good political relations;
- about helping overcome nationalism and intolerance and promoting mutual understanding and political dialogue in the region.

Rapprochement with the EU will go hand in hand with the development of regional cooperation in the western Balkans. Enhanced regional cooperation is one of the major objectives set down in the Thessaloniki agenda, endorsed in the EU–Western Balkans Summit of June 2003, to strengthen the stabilization and association process. The western Balkan countries committed themselves to continue to develop regional cooperation and to promote a series of specific objectives. Elaborating the advancement measures to sustain the current rapprochement policy over the period ahead is a priority. The moment must be seized and the trend must be translated into an irreversible process. This is where South-East Europe and the European Union could find a true new agenda.

References

- Avery, Graham. 2004. "The Enlargement Negotiations." In *The Future of Europe. Integration and Enlargement*, edited by Fraser Cameron, 35-62. London: Routledge.
- Bancroft, Ian, 2010. *Missing out on Europe*.
- Busek, Erhard. 2009. *Assessing the western Balkans' EU membership hopes*. <http://www.mediahandbook.org/?q=content/introduction-2009-erhard-busek>
- Chaillot Paper - No126 - 06 June 2011 *The Western Balkans and the EU: 'the hour of Europe*. Edited by Jacques Rupnik
- Council of the European Union. 1993. *Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council (21/22 June 1993)*. Brussels.
- Council of the European Union. 2006. *Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council (15/16 June 2006)*. Brussels.
- Council of the European Union. 2007. *Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council (14/15 December 2006)*. Brussels.
- Dimitrova, Antoaneta, and Pridham, Geoffrey. 2004. "International Actors and Democracy Promotion in Central and Eastern Europe: The Integration Model and its Limits." *Democratization* 5:91-112. No. 113). Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.
- European Commission. 2005. *2005 enlargement strategy paper (COM (2005) 561)*. Brussels.

- European Commission. 2006a. Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006 – 2007. Including annexed special report on the EU's capacity to integrate new members (COM (2006) 649). Brussels.
- European Commission. 2006b. The Western Balkans on the road to the EU: consolidating stability and raising prosperity (COM (2006) 27). Brussels.
- European Commission. 2011c. Standard Eurobarometer 75 (Spring 2011). Brussels.
- European Commission. 2011d. Standard Eurobarometer 74 (Autumn 2010). Brussels.
- European Commission. 2011e. Albania 2011 Progress Report (SEC (2011) 1205). Brussels.
- Government of Kosovo. 2011. Action Plan 2011 for the Implementation of European Partnership for Kosovo. Pristina.
- Grabbe, Heather. 2001. "How does Europeanisation affect SEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity." *Journal of European Public Policy* 4:1013-1031. edited by Fraser Cameron, 35-62. London: Routledge.
- Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research. 2010. Conflict Barometer 2010.
- Hillion, Christophe. 2010. The Creeping Nationalisation of the EU Enlargement Policy. Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies.
- Huszka, Bea. 2011. Western Balkans – the situation is gloomier than it may seem Edited by TransConflict Subscribe to the transconflict RSS feed.
- Lozanoska, Jana. 2011. More Europe in the Southeast is the answer? <http://www.eurasiareview.com/17102011>
- Obradovic-Wochnik, Jelena, 2010. The Western Balkans in 2010 – small improvements, big scandals. TransConflict Subscribe to the transconflict RSS feed.
- Petritsch, Wolfgang, 2008. The EU must speed-up its Western Balkans enlargement. http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21179/language/en-US/Default.aspx
- Preston, Christopher. 1995. "Obstacles to EU Enlargement: The Classical Community Method and the Prospects for a Wider Europe." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 3:451-463.
- Preston, Christopher. 1997. Enlargement and Integration in the European Union. London: Routledge.
- Resistance, and Revival, edited by Maria G. Cowles and Michael Smith, 149-163. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schily, Otto. 2009. If the EU reneges on Balkan enlargement it's at its own peril. www.europesworld.org
- Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2003. "Strategic Action in a Community Environment. The Decision to Enlarge the European Union.
- Wallace, Helen. 2000. "EU Enlargement. A Neglected Subject." In *The State of the European Union. Risks, Reform,*
- Żornaczuk, Tomasz. 2012. European Integration in the Western Balkans at the Beginning of 2012. BULLETIN No. 4 (337) January 13, 2012 © PISM Editors: Marcin Zaborowski (Editor-in-Chief), Katarzyna Staniewska (Jarosław Ćwiek-Karpowicz, Beata Górka-Winter, Artur Gradziuk, Leszek Jesien, Beata Wojna Krastev, Ivan. 2005. The Balkans explosion that could benefit Europe. http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/ArticleView/ArticleID/21060/