

Modernism in Late Ottoman Empire and in Early Turkey

Yılmaz Şimşek

Ankara Emniyet Müdürlüğü
Email: ysimsek@yahoo.com

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Abstract Methods in public administration have changed by the changes and improvements in society and its understanding of administration. These changes and improvements need new ideas and imaginations to break routine understanding of administration. A fashionable way of administration a century ago can be dated today unless it has dynamics rather than bounded rules. This paper explores the experiments of modernity both in late Ottoman Empire and early Turkish Republic. It focuses in particular on continuity rather than change by the name of modernity.

Keywords: Experiments of Modernity, Public Administration, Change, Ottoman Empire, Turkish Republic.

1. Introduction

Methods of public administration are the product of those who came before us. Thus, it is very important to know the historical change of a country's administration system. The evolution of modern public administration thinking begins in the 19th century and rose during the 20th century. Those centuries had witnessed a change in administration structure of the Ottomans as well. They tried to keep up with their counterparts in Western Europe.

After realizing that they were losing power, Ottomans first, tried to reform in public bureaucracy and military; however, those changes were not enough to keep up with their counterparts in Western Europe. Also, the traditionalists were opposing to the new reform experiments. Therefore, reformists could not be able to manage their reforms until the new republic of Turkey in 1923.

Both the late Ottomans and the founders of the Turkish Republic expected a rational democracy. Their ultimate goal was to enable to catch up with the Western modernization. They thought it would be possible only by trusting on centralization of power and creating a new kind of nation, thinking logically. In this article, first, the concept of modernism will be examined. Then, a particular attention is given to its applications in late Ottoman Empire time, in Turkey's early republican term under the authority of Atatürk, and in Turkey's single-party period. Finally, a conclusion to show the similarities and continuity in experiments of modernization in those terms is made.

2. Modernism

Modernist public administration starts with desires. The practicalities of it can be traced back to thousands of years ago, across cultures, and in different nations in the world (Vigoda, 2002). All of them used power and authority as the most efficient control system for individuals, governmental institutions, and processes. By the time past, using only power and authority were not enough to solve organizational problems, so administrator faced administrative problems such as how to achieve greater efficiency, effectiveness, economy, and how to satisfy the needs of the people (Vigoda, 2002). Later, they prefer to be rational to overcome these problems.

Modernity is centered on rationalization, and sees the system as a machine (Farmer, 1995; Weber, 1978). According to Weber (1978), increasing rationality means more happiness and greater morality. He characterizes it as the separation of the substantive reasons in religion into three spheres: science, morality, and art (Farmer, 1995). Starting with the Enlightenment in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it has

constituted the leading mind-set of the Western "assumptions and beliefs about the power and nature of the human subject and human reason" (Farmer, 1995, p.5). It understands the range of reason not to be limited, and refuses all traditional powers and conditions with the result of more freedom and opportunities (Farmer, 1995).

The basis of modernity, as they apply to management, are the domination of means/end reason, the separation of facts and values, the use of the scientific method to solve public problems, the declaration of universal values, the belief in applicability of basic principles underlying the social and political worlds, the faith in progress (John, 2004). For public administration, these principles mean application of the principle of specialization, dominance of hierarchy in organizations, and emergence of large line bureaucracies which are the means of transforming social action into rationally organized action (John, 2004; Weber, 1978). As Max Weber (1978) mentioned, the development of bureaucracy is one of the important rationalizing mechanisms of society.

In order to make organizations efficient, modernist public administration gives importance on rationalism; therefore, it rises of the bureaucratic form of organization, and creates an administrative technology. Weber (1978) divided it into value-rationality, which is concerned with ends, and instrumental-rationality, which is concerned with means. For him (1958), the bureaucrat is one who occupies himself with the rational efficiency of means, not the question of ends. He identifies it with an increasing division of labor, bureaucracy and mechanization, and associates it with depersonalization, oppressive routine, rising secularism, as well as being destructive of individual freedom (Gerth and Mills, 1946).

Modernization also requires administrative efficiency. It is indispensable for the progressive officials and academics that created the modern discipline of public administration. It is somewhat related with economics and economic systems (Farmer, 1995). Achieving greater efficiency through the elimination of overlap and duplication of functions will greatly improve the operation of government agencies and increase the legitimacy of government in the eyes of citizens (Simon, 1997).

After the World War II, logical positivism was fashionable; thus, most of the modernists saw their charge to create a science based social technology that would enable prediction and control of human behavior. It was a desire to make organizations more effective. They believed the practice of administration could more efficiently allocate the public's scarce resources (Gulick and Urwick, 1937). According to Taylor (1911) the best management depends on true science defined laws, rules, and principles. He argues scientific management enables both labor and management most productive as Weber talks of bureaucracy in relation to tradition. Taylor emphasis on time measurement and task analysis; however, he does not emphasis on the human factors within the organizations. According to Simon (1997), administrative principles such as "span of control", "centralization", "hierarchy", etc. were nothing more than terms of art, filled with contradictions, and of little use as guides to action. He seeks to accomplish goals of enhancing efficiency through improved approaches to administrative decision making.

All administrative scientists sought universalism for public administration as a science (Farmer, 1995). For them, objective observation generates data about social behavior in order to make and test theories, laws, and generalizations (Simon, 1997). They all had trouble with identifying a moral grip for core values because, at the core of this science was the need to separate facts from values (Farmer, 1995).

Modernity has strong rules and regulations that restrict creativity and imagination. These restrictions, usually, can be seen as discipline, specialization and autonomy (Farmer, 1995). Henri Fayol (Gulick and Urwick, 1937) describes fourteen principles of administration; half of his principles are based on administrative control, like authority, discipline, unity of command and administration, centralization, hierarchy, order. An increasing anxiety about control and accountability of public administration has led to more extensive and complex controls which have increased bureaucratic distance between administrators and the public they are expected to serve (Jones, 2000). In order to maximize consistency and control, harsh bureaucracy led to dehumanized relationships among personnel, and has negative results like "iron cage" explained by Weber (1958).

Critical theorists, like Habermas, view modernity as an unfinished project, and postmodernists see it limited with particularism, scientism, technologism, enterprise, and hermeneutics (Farmer, 1995). In each five area modernist public administration faces with paradoxes and blind spots that limit its capability for explanation and understanding (Farmer, 1995). For example, decision making in modernist public administration is not aware of any good but efficiency. It may be useful to public administrators to spot problems truly and to lay down effective solutions to those problems; however, real problem solving also raises questions of value --right and wrong. Therefore, ethic and morality ought to play an important role in the conduct of the public's business.

2.1. *Modernism in Ottoman Empire*

In the 15th and 16th centuries, the Ottoman Empire was one of greatest empires of the world, located from the Caucasus to the Balkans to North Africa. Starting from the end of the 16th century to the end of the 19th century, it lost momentum slowly (Heper, 2000). During this term, the emperors showed signs of losing their dominant position in the polity; whereas, religious institutions and the military gained power in administration (Heper, 2000).

At the same time, the intellectual, economic and technological transformations were taking place in Europe, but the Ottomans remained oblivious to these developments. At the end of 18th century, they realized that they were declining and losing power. Because of this decline, they made great efforts to regain the old governmental power and structure, but this strategy did not prevent them from losing power.

In order to change the Empire's structure, they, first, tried to reform in public bureaucracy and military (Heper, 2000). They tried to change them as their counterparts in Western Europe. However, these reform experiments were faced opposition from the traditionalists, especially Islamists, so they were not able to gain control over the country until the new the Turkish Republic in 1923.

The whole Ottoman political system was designed to eliminate rivals to central power (Kongar, 1986). The warriors, who were opposed by eclectic popular culture, heterodox religious sects and threatening rival principalities were formed the state (Heper, 2000). Maintaining law and order within the country and keeping the dominion together were the most critical concerns of the government (Heper, 2000). An Ottoman statesman and historian, Tursun Beg, states that "harmony among men living in society is achieved by statecraft" (Inalcik, 1964, p.42). This had been an Ottoman maxim since the 15th century. This maxim led the Ottomans to concentrate power of the emperor; therefore, the Empire's political organization was marked by personal rule of the emperor. Consequently, laws made by emperors were not considered permanent (Inalcik, 1964). Thus, adab tradition which "identified the state with established values, not with the reigning ruler" was appeared (Findley, 1980, p.9). For example, in the Decree of Alliance (Sened-i Ittifak) of 1808, "the state," not "the emperor," was mentioned as a part to the pact between the central administration and local notables (Inalcik, 1964). The Ottomans could not completely separate the state from the emperor, but the state always constituted an important part of the Ottoman political culture because they believed that the happiness of the people depended on the well-being of the state (Heper, 2000).

The Ottoman Empire was itself a European power in the continent, and as early as the beginning of the 19th century, the reformist emperors wanted to modernize it by adopting the Western, especially French, structures, behaviors and customs (Rouleau, 1993). Before 19th century, sons of high officials were enjoyed a definite advantage over common people in terms of permission into the system (Gerber, 1994). In order to change this understanding and modernize the country, Ottomans sent many people to Western Europe to learn their system. Thus, European educated civilian bureaucratic elite was appeared in later decades.

In the early 19th century, members of the other religions, Jews and Christians, were granted cultural rights and permitted to organize their own systems (Heper, 2000). By creating a department of the Chief Mufti religion was bureaucratized, and the religious Canon Law (Shari'a) and secular statues (orf-i sultani) were formulated (Aktay, 1993; Heper, 2000). Then, the modernizing emperor Sultan Mahmut II, together with the

civilian bureaucratic elite, could push the members of the religious institution and abolish the rebellious Yeniceri (Janissary) Corps as a first step in which they projected to train "modern" officers for a "modern" army (Heper, 2000). After the reforming the army with the Western model, the emperorship was started to be seen as a barrier to "modernization" by the new formed military elite educated in Western Europe. These new bureaucratic and military reforms enhanced the dichotomic social sets: executive elite, and the common people; however, the stability of Ottoman economic growth disallowed the rise of any more powerful class such as the bourgeoisie (Kongar, 1986).

There had been a Western impact in the Empire with the Enlightenment. French Revolution, together with Enlightenment, became effective for the idea of the salvation of the state which was sought in the sphere of political thought (Kongar, 1986). By the 1839 (Tanzimat) reform, the announcement of civil rights to all the citizens regardless of race and religion, the modernizing high-level bureaucrats, who trained in modern technocrat schools set up by emperor Abdulhamit II, resorted to personal rule which changed the way of understanding bureaucracy, an amassing wealth by abusing or usurping state powers of the Empire (Heper, 2000).

The Tanzimat reform was not only a systematical legalization of the minority rights, but also a critical empowerment of the central bureaucracy (Kongar, 1986). Personal knowledge, predictability, meritocracy, and professionalization were exist and highly important (Gerber, 1994). Although the earlier center of the state was the emperor, the elite, who were educated in Western Europe, took over much of this role in the beginning of the 19th century. Elite became increasingly familiar with Western, especially French, culture while the people continued with their traditional, Islamic customs and norms. Consequently, the cultural distance between normal citizens and the elite was increased.

At the end of the 19th century, the elites undertook the task of saving the Empire (Kongar, 1986). The Young Turks neutralized the Old Ottomans and initiated the First Constitutional Period, which lasted from 1876 to 1908 (Heper, 2000). They used "Young Turks" in their name to symbolize their nationalistic view because they believed nationalism lays in the basis of modernity. For them, congress was not a place for representation, but a place for elite discusses to fight of enlightened opinions led to create the best policy (Lewis, 1961). They took positivist sociology to make public authority on social, religious, moral and political problems (Lewis, 1961).

The decay of the Ottoman Empire was very fast in the 19th century. Industry was hardly established, and there was not any main productive layer or civil society inconsistent with the feudal system as bourgeoisie in Western states; therefore, the leadership of the first revolution in 1908 was composed of army officers called "Young Turks" --mostly journalists, mid-level bureaucrats, and military elites (Leicht, 1998). They governed Ottoman politics between 1912 and 1918 (Heper, 2000). They sought rationalism to be efficient in their control.

Young Turks were mostly studied in Western Europe, and they become familiar with the regime existing there (Leicht, 1998). To legitimate their own elite look, they got the social engineering aspect of Auguste Comte's sociology which provided the knowledge for political authority; however, they still thought that the salvation of society depended on the welfare of the state (Heper, 2000). Aiming a western-like country, they formed the Party of "Union and Progress," and worked for bureaucratic reform (Kongar, 1986). After getting the government power in 1912, they entered the 1st World War alongside the German Empire. At the end of the war, the Ottoman Empire, like Germany, was defeated by Britain, France and Italy (Leicht, 1998). Then, the allied (British, French, and Italian) forces terminated parliament and unseated the Young Turks; this caused the rise of Mustafa Kemal (Candar and Pryce-Jones, 2000).

The memory of the fall of the Ottoman Empire vitalized and enforced concern for national unity as a continuous emphasis on the need for being "one and together." This over-emphasis on harmony was the main obstacle to the emergence of adversarial politics in early days of Turkish Republic; therefore, as in the Ottoman time, personal rules characterized politics during the first years of the new republic (Heper, 2000).

2.2. Ataturk Era

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, born in Selanik in 1881, served in Syria, Libya, and Bulgaria as a military officer in the Ottoman army (Kazancigil and Ozbudun, 1981). When the 1st World War ended, the armies of the allied forces, together with the Greeks, occupied nearly all parts of the Ottoman Empire. He did never give up, and collected the leftovers of the Ottoman army. He and his friends wanted to establish a Republic as opposed to the Ottoman Monarchy, so they chose Ankara as headquarter for its central location. Then, they started the War of Independence and the seeds of a new country from there. The War of Independence took three years and by the end of 1922, all of the invaders had left the country. In 1923, Mustafa Kemal was declared as the president of the new Turkish republic. The Emperor of the Ottomans was allowed to continue as Caliph (Khalifa) of the Muslims. Later, he was sent into exile to Paris and died there in 1944 (Candar and Pryce-Jones, 2000). The new government was attracted to rationalism in its decision making process to seek practical solutions for its problems on the basis of knowledge and experience.

The philosophy behind Ataturk's reforms is now known as Kemalism. The heredity of the Kemalism can be traced back to the Young Turks' the Union and Progress party; the declaration of the constitution, the nationalism, the emergence of secular organizations, and the creation of political parties were among the reforms of the Union and Progress (Kongar, 1986). Modernization, economic growth, and Westernization were the basic driving forces of "Kemalism" (Noel, 1995). It emphasizes a modern country, with its own national culture, open to the heritage of world civilization and modernization. It, first, appeared as the introduction of the rights to the nation, and as the expression of the national sovereignty. It was a challenge to reach the level of modern civilization and an attempt to modernization. It requires experiencing a modern social life, establishing a secular state, and governing with a positive scientific mentality (Kazancigil and Ozbudun, 1981).

Kemalism got some motivations from both French and the Soviet models. From the French the concept of a centralized state, the secularist idea, and state nationalism rather than ethnic or religious identity, and from the Soviets, it adopted a single-party regulation, in its early time's authoritarian structure and an etatist economic system (Rouleau, 1996). Ataturk, first, declared his basic principles [of Kemalism] as the principles of the Turkey's first and single-party, Republican Populist Party (RPP). Those six basic principles were written into Article Two of the Constitution of the Turkish Republic in February 1937:

1. Republicanism
2. Nationalism
3. Populism
4. Etatism (Statism)
5. Secularism
6. Reformism (Revolutionism)

Kemalism also has "secondary or complementary principles" which includes:

1. National sovereignty
2. National independence
3. National unity and togetherness
4. Peace at home peace abroad
5. Modernization
6. Scientificism and rationalism
7. Humanitarianism

Republicanism refers a political reform from the system of the Ottoman multinational monarchy to the nation state of Turkey (Akarsu, 1995). Kemalism believes that republican regime is the best to characterize the wishes of the people. The new Turkish republic was not only an administrative replacement of Ottoman

Empire, but also an explicit new national identity which defined a new vision of nation through the nature of the state (Cooper, 2002).

Nationalism is a principle which believes the Turkish state is an inseparable one piece comprising its land and people. Also, it makes Turkish people not only citizens of the state but also members of the nation. As an umbrella, it covers elements of national consciousness, identity, and loyalty. The homogenous nation in Kemalism dedicated to modernity (Rouleau, 1996). It was not racist (Kazancigil and Ozbudun, 1981). As a modernist action, it is against all traditional powers and imperialism. It also refuses the rule of any particular social class over Turkish society. It means to preserve the independence of the Turkish Republic, and to respect the right to independence of all other nations. It is based on ultimate value of Turkish citizenship as a kind of realization of national identity of modern Turkey (Heper, 2000).

Ataturk reinvented Turkey on the model of a nation-state. Creation of a new version of Turkish language, and rejection of the Muslim religion as a basis for government were placed a national entity (Cooper, 2002). Mustafa Kemal Ataturk did not just seek modernizing the Turkish nation; he, at the same time, had to make a nation out of the people who lived within Turkey's borders. A kind of Turkish Anatolian nationalism was invented. All who lived within the borders of Turkish state were expected as Turks (Noel, 1995).

Populism is a policy in the interests of the people and the denial of class contradictions (Kazancigil and Ozbudun, 1981). It is against class privileges and class distinctions and it recognized no individual, no family, no class and no organization as being above others. Ataturk stated that the true rulers of Turkey were the peasants (Akarsu, 1995). Populism also includes a revolutionary change in the status of women through the adoption of Western codes (i.e. the Swiss Civil Code) in Turkey.

Ataturk stated that Turkey's complete modernization was dependent on economic and technological developments (Kazancigil and Ozbudun, 1981). Etatism or statism can be interpreted to mean that the state regulates the country's general economic activity, and engages in areas where private enterprises are not willing to do (Akarsu, 1995). This principle was based on the needs of the new Turkish Republic because the number of entrepreneurs, in that time, was not adequate for national interests. Therefore, statism was the necessity caused by the conditions.

The Ottoman economy of the early nineteenth century was almost entirely agricultural. Ataturk, with his new Kemalist regime, sought to build up a modern industrial base under explicit state sponsorship (Cooper, 2002). This sponsorship includes the direct government configuration of industries because of the lack of private entrepreneurs to accumulate sufficient capital to major industries and businesses just after the war years. Also, while formulating a five year plan for industrial development in 1933, the government of the new Turkish republic was influenced by developments in the Soviet Socialist Republics Union (Cooper, 2002). In practice, production rose rapidly with that nationalist economic policy, and the heavy industry were established; these changes in the production created tremendous challenges to organization and management that had not been confronted before (Cooper, 2002). New governmental factories caused flows from rural areas to cities.

Secular citizenship tied to the Western Enlightenment (Rouleau, 1996). In Ottoman Empire, Islam dominated all areas of social, political, cultural and economic spheres of life, not only as a religion, but also as a way of living. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and his friends attacked religious dogmatism to start on a series of new socio-cultural reforms (Kongar, 1986). Kemalist secularism does not only mean separation of state and religion, but also the respect for freedom of moral sense, worship and religion for every individual (Akarsu, 1995). It includes the separation of religion from educational system, cultural life and legal affairs. It aims independence of thought and independence of institutions from the dominance of religion. Kemalist secularism is a rationalist and anti-clerical secularism; it did and does not advocate atheism, but against any religion which was opposed to modernization (Kazancigil and Ozbudun, 1981).

Reformism or revolutionism went beyond the recognition of the reforms which Turkey replaced traditional institutions with modern institutions. It means that traditional concepts can be eliminated and

modern concepts can be adopted whenever they needed (Akarsu, 1995). It is not a static principle. It makes the principles of Kemalism alive all the time with the understanding of dynamism. Dynamic changes, depending on the needs of the modern time, are in the core of it.

Breaking with hundreds of years of Ottoman tradition, in his 15-16 years of leadership, Atatürk realized lots of political social, legal, economic and cultural reforms: the Sultanate (emperorship) was abolished in 1922; the Republic was declared in 1923; the Caliphship was abolished in 1924; the hat as opposed to fez was introduced in 1925; the activities of religious sects were banned by law in 1925; Western calendar was introduced in 1925; the modern secular system of jurisprudence was changed with old religious laws in 1926, with civil and penal codes borrowed, respectively, from Switzerland and Italy; the Latin alphabet was accepted in 1928; the Metric system was introduced in 1931; the nicknames and personal titles were abolished in 1934; religious dress was prohibited in public in 1934; women received right to vote and be elected to parliament in 1934; and the surname law was introduced in 1934 when Mustafa Kemal got his surname Atatürk, the father of Turks (Akarsu, 1995).

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk changed Turkey into a modern, dynamic European country. He replaced an absolute monarchy with a democratic republic, an Islamic culture with a firm secularism, administrative system with an efficient centralized bureaucracy, a fractured agricultural economy with an increasingly urban and industrial society. No nation had ever founded a greater revolutionary zeal and undergone more sweeping change than the Turkish Republic in such a short time. Mustafa Kemal's methods could be somewhat cruel, but his aims were more benign; he wanted to change the state into a Western-style country (Noel, 1995).

In order to promote national unity, Mustafa Kemal encouraged a new national culture by cutting off from its religious Ottoman roots and imposing the Turkish language with Latinized the old Ottoman alphabet based on Arab scripts (Rouleau, 1996). In Ottoman time, the paradoxical relation between the new and the old modes of life formed a deep dichotomisation of parts mentioned as religious bureaucracy and civil-military bureaucracy or secular elite and anti-secularist commoner (Aktay, 1993). Most of the power conflicts occurred, before the new Turkish republic, usually related to and explained by that dichotomy (Aktay, 1993). The Unification of Education was the most efficient step in the process of creating a homogeneous society, and to remove that dual character of the Turkish intellectual and political life in favor of the secularist or civil-military bureaucracy.

For creating a nation state, all people had to be educated from single ideological sources, as the unified educations, equally understandable scriptures, or nationalism (Aktay, 1993). In the beginning of 1920s, only 20 percent of the Turkish population could read and write, and those who could read and write are mostly elite (Noel, 1995). Atatürk gave civil servants an ultimatum: master the Latin characters or look for another job (Lawlor, 1996). Then, Qur'an was translated into Turkish, and teaching of Arabic had been banned by the reforming fervor of Atatürk; thus, the only link with Islam was left (Aktay, 1993).

Moreover, science was given importance very much in all areas of the life, including management. Mustafa Kemal's words "the best and the real guide in life are knowledge and science," which were carved on the walls of the Faculty of Language History and Geography in Ankara University, reflect this logical approach (Kongar, 1986). In an Izmir speech, on February 3, 1923, Atatürk stated "for a religion to be natural it must conform to reason, to science, to knowledge and logic... There is no clergy among us [Muslims]. We are all equal." (Reed, 1956, p. 299). Like a modernist public administration theorist, he had great faith in "scientific methods" in administration; he considered that, as science, the westernization of his society throughout a positive approach would guarantee the universality of his reforms (Kongar, 1986).

In addition to science, with the Kemalist reforms, Turkish Republic tended to rule with an increasingly centralized government. Since then, local governments have not been empowered to be more independent from the central government, and the mayors have been responsible to the governors who were appointed by the central government (Yüksel, 1999). Additionally, most of the government offices started to be managed

by a central general office in Ankara. In Kemalist Turkey, modification through reform and centralization by an interrelated midpoint was the principle aim, as it had been in Ottoman Empire (Yuksel, 1999).

Later, the new Turkish Republic had two attempts for transition to multiparty regime of democracy until the third and last and rather permanent experience of the Democrat Party in 1945. The first two of them was realized when Ataturk was alive. The first one was tried in 1924 with (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası) the "Progressive Republican Party" (PRP) which is the most important alternative to the Republican Populist Party (RPP) (Kazancigil and Ozbudun, 1981). The members of the party were somewhat conservative, and they declared that "the party is respectful to religious convictions and ideas" (Tunaya, 1991, p.158). At the same time, Sheikh Said was rebelling by using religion. Following the approval of the special law of "Law of Establishing the Order," PRP was closed relying on the decision of the executives that the party, or some members of the party, was exploiting the religious feelings (Tunaya, 1991). In 1930, the second experience of multiparty democracy was realized with (Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası) the "Free Republican Party" (FRP). However, following some of its policies, supporting some religious demands of the people, the government again closed the party and put an end to democratic life (Tunaya, 1991).

After Ataturk died, Kemalism was evident that public administration of RPP, as a single-party government, wielded considerable power and influence in policy framing, policy making, and policy implementation; therefore, it is subject to growing pressures of political players, social actors, managerial professionals, and the overall economic market (Vigoda, 2002).

2.3. Single-Party Period

When Ataturk died, in November 1938, Ismet Inonu, a close friend of Ataturk and the leader of the RPP, had become President. Despite Prime Minister Ismet Inonu's efforts to bureaucratize the administration, Ataturk, as a president, had ignored bureaucratic procedures and insisted that the ministers report directly to him (Atay, 1969). Similarly, President Inonu declared himself as the "National Chief" and the permanent chairman of the Republican Populist Party (RPP), and held the power of the state to safeguard Kemalist reforms (Heper, 2000; Kongar, 1986). He, as a prime minister from 1925 to 1937, president from 1938 to 1950 and again prime minister from 1961 to 1965, believed in the strong state, remote from the societal groups, as in the Ottoman state-oriented political viewpoint, adab tradition (Heper, 2000).

In fact, Ataturk knew that Turkish nation was not prepared to embrace modernity and revolve firmly to the West because of their strong links to their past, so he enforced them over the protests of the old order. However, he did not aim to insert Kemalism into personal life as a system of public relations or ethical values (Noel, 1995). Conversely, RPP, as a single party just after him, tried to insert Kemalism into private life as an inflexible and unchangeable policy of the new republic. This policy, in fact, is against the faith of the dynamic principle of Kemalist reformism which accepts and requires changes with time rather than stability.

Since his death the Turkish state has created a somewhat of cult figure of Ataturk (Leicht, 1998). It can be easily seen by a new one who visits Turkey. He would see an Ataturk portrait on the wall of the passenger cabin of the Turkish Airlines, and in the city-center, he would possibly have to pass Ataturk Boulevard at some point. The cult adjoining Ataturk is probably as tough as the cults that were in the Soviet Union (Candar and Pryce-Jones, 2000). Every morning in school playgrounds, all the students state loudly and publicly their allegiance to Ataturk (Leicht, 1998). It is the creation of a narrow, authoritarian understanding of his principles, dreams, and ideas by successors who altered Kemalism into an inflexible policy and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk into an untouchable public symbol (Candar and Pryce-Jones, 2000).

Although Kemalism, just after Ataturk, was considered an anti-religious ideology, it had nothing against the religion except to deny religion as a source of political power (Kongar, 1986). Ataturk, in fact, was a practicing Muslim himself; his secularist project tried to achieve disconnection of religion from those areas of life of the modern Western state (Noel, 1995). However, unlike the secularism of the Anglo-Saxon tradition, with its emphasis on religious tolerance and pluralism, Turkish secularism, especially after Ataturk, carries

overtone of irreligion; the advocates of this fundamental secularism think religion is contrary with pluralism and democracy (Candar and Pryce-Jones, 2000). Therefore, so-called secularist elite in RPP, in the name of democracy, have made it harder for devout religious to get a proper education -- they saw secularism as an inflexible status has to stop women from wearing what they want.

Attacking Islam as an obstacle to development was also in accordance with a firm belief in western positivism (Kongar, 1986). In fact, the positivist ideas came from the Young Turks, who absorbed such ideas directly from France. They thought that Islam presented a threat to modern Turkey, as the Catholic Church was to pose a threat to the French Republic (Candar and Pryce-Jones, 2000). However, they did not imagine that Islam did not have any institution that functions as a church, so their attempt to enforce secularism was altered into an authoritarian movement against persons (Candar and Pryce-Jones, 2000). Consequently, secularism has become a radical political dichotomy that divides the single-party members and the common people.

Furthermore, the state elite, who followed Kemalism, mandated a militantly secular, ethnically homogeneous republic prepared to join the modern world. They were even determined to banish Islam from the public sphere to become a functioning nation-state (Candar and Pryce-Jones, 2000). During the single party period, Kemalism was affected by the traditional political culture and patrimonial infrastructure which allow the governing elite not tolerate criticism to their powers or policies (Yuksel, 1999).

Like in the Ottoman Empire, the state elite in the RPP era was lost in thought with "high politics" rather than paid attention to socio-economic issues; Westernization, for example, governed the politics during the single-party period from 1923 to 1945 (Heper, 2000). In this period, administration exercised considerable power and influence in policy framing, policy making, and policy implementation, so it was subject matter to increasing pressures of political and social actors, administrative professionals, and the general economic market (Vigoda, 2002).

Since a multiparty regime in 1946, RPP shifted the guardianship of Kemalism with army, which is the firmest stronghold of Kemalism and the persistent guardian of the nationalism. Turkish military pressured the government to act in the boundary of Kemalism many times (Candar and Pryce-Jones, 2000). However, Turkey's laws do little to subordinate the army to civilian control. Also, military officers, similar to the Ottoman period and the single-party years of the Republic, placed much more emphasis on the needs of the state as a whole, rather than on the needs of individual groups (Heper, 2000).

Actually, soldiers were in central place in late Ottoman governmental policies, especially both in the second constitutional period (1908-1918), and in the war of independence (1918-1922). As a former soldier in Ottoman army, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk also relied upon the military for his reforms, so the military has been an important political actor in Turkey, like in late Ottoman politics (Demirel, 2003). Unlike most armies in democratic countries, Turkish army is held in high esteem. Rather than a professional job, it is a national duty of guardianship of the state and Kemalism which is the result of over-emphasis on power state. Therefore, it felt authorized to intervene in civilian politics when they interpreted civilian politics against Kemalism. After switching to the multiparty regime, between 1960 and 1980, it overthrew the governments three times by the sake of protecting Kemalism (Demirel, 2003). In 1983, the military generals, however, voluntarily restored civilian ruling, and a newly selected government took office (Candar and Pryce-Jones, 2000).

3. Conclusion

Since the late Ottoman period, Turks tried to reach modernism by imitating Western reforms and policies. This pursuit continued for more than a hundred year without a complete success, but there was always a faith in progress. For the sake of modernization, they tried rationalization, specialization in bureaucracy, and scientific methods for universal values. Later, they refused all traditional powers and tried to catch modernity by a central nation-state. They realized lots of reforms, but, as shown above, there had been a hidden continuity rather than change since the beginning of the modernization of Turkey.

Kemalist cultural modernization of Turkey, affecting education, political life, communications, religion, women's rights, and even the acceptable style of headwear, is the furthestmost case in modern history of a whole nation being reformed by a person and of that reforming being accepted by most of the population. The spirit of it was the liberty and unity of the nation and country, the creation of a society without classes and privileges, secularism and republican approach, and reformism by the needs of modernization. However, in the hands of the Kemalist elite, principles of Kemalism hardened into a firm accepted view that became a barrier to promote democratic and economic growth in a changing globe.

Unlike traditional understanding, modernity is a continuing subject and needs changes day by day. Yesterday's modernity cannot be modernity today; however, single-party interpretation of modernism is very static and bounded by strong rules. Whoever imagined out of those limits was seen against Kemalism. Those established bounds were not different than the experiments of the Ottoman modernism. Actually, reformism, as a dynamic principle of Kemalism, might change that continuity, but strict regulations, which restricted creativity and imagination, was the main obstacle for that change.

First, the confidence on strong central power at the end of the Ottoman Empire was not change in new Turkish Republic (Yüksel, 1999). This caused a real dominance of hierarchy and autonomy which was the main reason of [bureaucratic] distance between administrators and the public. This made the Turkish modernization experiment, under the authoritarian regime of Atatürk, same as the late Ottoman modernization, which also dependent on dictatorial autonomy of Young Turks.

Secondly, the dichotomic structure of the nation did not change. There was always dichotomisation of parts mentioned as civil-military elite and traditional-religious people. Sometimes, it was seen as single-party members or bureaucrats and common people. Therefore, it is easy to say that the Ottoman heritage of using bureaucracy to usurp state powers also dominated Turkish political traditions and practice (Heper, 2000). This is an important point to show the continuity rather than change.

Another example of continuity can be seen in over-emphasizing on rational logic and science. Both the late Ottomans and early Republicans looked for universal values for their reforms. To be efficient in their administrative process was so important that they chose to be rational on their administrative decisions. Primarily, Young Turks at the end of Ottoman period tried to create a science based social technology to provide the knowledge for political authority. Their French based positivist ideas also affected new Republicans in their administrative reforms. They based on science to guarantee the universality of their reforms.

Through the late Ottoman Empire and new Turkish Republic, nationalism addressed the theme of culture and identity. As a modernist course of action, it operated most of developments in the form of a nation-state in Turkey. It was used by the elite as a driving motive for social mobility to govern the masses. However, in both terms, they never gave up the idea of power state. In the republican era, the belief in strong state reached its maxim which required a strong connection between the state and the administrator; therefore, as in Ottoman Empire, salvation of society depended on the interests of the state. As the result of the concept of power state, not only in Ottoman Empire, but also in early Turkish republic, army had a mission of guardianship of the state interests.

As a result of modernity, the shift to popular sovereignty and representative government became possible only when elected officials learned how to appoint and control public officials charged with the implementation of public policies. However, in any regime dominated by appointed officials it may be assumed that lazy and greedy bureaucrats will abuse their powers and bad public administration will result. In order to complete transformation into a fully modernity, imagination and creativity should not be bounded by strict rules, and all ideas need to be respected equal-democratic and secular.

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