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Research Article

European Union's Integration through Democracy: A Different Sort of Europe

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Abstract

The most pressing issue the European Union must address is how to best resolve tensions regarding integration in the areas of foreign policy, economics, and culture. The essay makes the case that one specific type of democratic integration is preferable to the two standard methods. This strategy is based on the actual democratic conciliation of integration practices that inhabitants actually participate in every day, but which are typically ignored and suppressed in the mainstream strategies.

Keywords: Culture, Democracy, European, foreign policy, economics, law, Union integration

1. Introduction

The varied kinds of incorporation of the numerous adherents of the European Union have been the subject of critical thought and discussion ever since the formation of the European Society. Nevertheless, since the outbreak of global war on terror and the

escalation of disagreements over settlement, economic strategy, and overseas policy, the topic of integration come to light as the most serious issue confronting Europeans. It acts as the center of both regional disputes and risky analyses. And competing way out in the media, policy groups, and scholarly investigation. As a stranger, I want to provide for deliberation a fresh solution to the incorporation challenge that is pertinent to the issues of today In light of this response to this difficult and unpredictably evolving landscape of integration skirmishes and disintegration tendencies. This isn't a precise solution in the sagacity of a list of policy suggestions, but relatively a more general way to introduce citizens, policymakers, and academic scholars to the integration difficulties. A special type of democratic integration is the direction toward the integration issues of the varied adherents of the EU that is both essentially useful and normatively authentic. When I refer to "diverse members," I'm referring to the inhabitants and minorities from the 27 representative nations with their many national cultures, as well as the various individual, minority, and majoritarian civilizations (multi-civilizational). The term "integration" raises the three primary facets of European Union integration: foreign, economic, and cultural. Neither policy nor theory currently favor the exact form of democratic integration that I advocate. But I'm not just saying that another world is possible in the abstract because this alternate form of democratic integration is theoretically feasible. Instead, I want to argue that this democratic method to incorporation is real, but it is ignored, and resultantly, it is overcome. It is a form of integration that occurs in reality during the course of Europeans' day-to-day lives, nevertheless, which the majority of policy communities and theoretic institutions ignore. Even researchers and policymakers who make an effort to observe these developing daily integration practices have a tendency to base their observations on the common forms of representation of these practices, passing them by and omitting them in the process, aggravating the very issues they are trying to solve. They may be taken for granted because they are so commonplace, but even they tend to be based on the methods of representation that are currently in use. The European society would be a brand-new and distinctive kind of association if this covert method of democratic integration was made explicit and given more significance in the acknowledged institutions of integration. To bring its various members together, the organization would be based on democratic ideals. As a result, it would be open to new ideas, responsive innovation, and revitalization.

2. Three-Pronged Methodologies to Integration

The necessity that every individual and group member of the European Society have a meaningful democratic voice regarding the integration criteria to which they are its subject is the universal notion of "democratic integration." The integration requirements must be "open" to democratic dialogue by those who must uphold them. People who are part and parcel of them must be "free" to engage in these discussions, both directly

and through trusted delegates who are held responsible by democratic conciliation procedures by the people they purport to represent. This can be stated as follows the lawfulness and usefulness of integration standards are based on two types of ongoing "discursive practices": "putting question, challenging it, agreeing and disagreeing with it," "negotiation and modifications or reaffirming the current norms," "implementation and experimentation with a modified regime of integration norms," and "acting in accordance with a modified regime of integration norms." This is the outdated meaning of democracy and rule by and of the people as well as democratic citizenship or democratic freedom, which implies that citizens have a participation say over the laws to which they are focus. It also applies to integration legislation.

The second and third strategies assert to be pro-democracy and to represent the democratic ideal. However, they are significantly dissimilar. The second I'll refer to as "low intensity" or "limited," and the third I'll refer to as "open-ended" or "non-restricted" democracy. The strategy that is ignored and which I advise is the open-ended one. Which of these three integration-oriented approaches will be dominant in the twenty-first century, in my opinion, is the key question facing the rest of the globe and Europe today.

The fundamental differences between the two may be easily seen by examining the restricted and non-restricted procedures across four characteristics of democratic conciliation of integration regimes.

The "limited" method imposes restrictions on each of the four facets of democratic negotiation:

1. The democratic conciliation of integration standards is limited to what we may refer to as the authorized institutions of the public arena. Second, authorized representatives of the disputing parties often listen in on the discussions.
2. Democratic conciliation takes place inside a set of predetermined processes, and taking part in them often implies saying "YES" or "NO" to a proposed standard defined somewhere else.
3. A general sketch of the integration standard that must exist is given at the beginning of the negotiations. Typically, it is presented as unquestionable in big narratives about global transformation, decent governance, democratisation, rights of human or civilization processes.
4. The broad norm-conciliation procedures are understood as a separate stage in a wider norm creation course that is nearing its end. Democratic negotiation is used to produce suitable and ultimate integration standards.

The non-restricted and open-ended approach to democratic integration clashes with each of the four restrictions on democratic negotiation in this confined model.

1. This democratic negotiation of integration norms occurs anywhere individuals, groups, nations, or civilizations in the EU encounter an integration standard they feel unfair, and a site of contention erupts. In addition to the official forums of the traditional public realm, this exists. According to this viewpoint, what makes

an integration norm "democratic" is precisely the freedom of those who are subject to it to contest it right away, to argue for a different interpretation of it or, if necessary, to change it, and to participate in democratic debates about how to behave differently considering it or, if it is not possible, how to discuss its transformation. Second, the rule in question applies to all members represented by official spokespersons in theory, not only those who are authorized to visit public spaces as representatives of their constituency. The democratic maxim, "Audi alteram partem," holds everyone who speaks on another's behalf accountable (always listen to the other side).

2. The negotiation processes cannot be predetermined and declared unassailable by any dubious assertions regarding their meta-democratic status because they are essentially another set of integration norms. They must also be open to many interpretations, inquiries, and adjustments from people who may be affected by the negotiations. This is typically the main contention. Additionally, limiting individuals who are held to a standard to just voting YES or NO on a fresh regulation conceived elsewhere and imposed from above is insufficient. Democratic dialogues between the subject's culturally diverse constituents are required for the establishment of the norm as well as the understanding of its various connotations and ways to conduct in accordance with it.

3. It is not permissible to impose the general practice that the standard of integration must be taken beforehand by making an argument that modernization, democratization, legalization, or Europeanization processes are universal, necessary, or self-evident. In the incredibly unlike Europe of today, it is frequently these framing discourses that are being questioned and brought into question. Alternative modernism and a variety of civilizations and cultures must be acknowledged and considered if Europe is to be successfully democratically united. We have learned from modern events that attempts at undemocratic integration through the imposition of assimilative, restrictive, and partial governments always result in the nastiest conceivable reactions on both sides.

4. Lastly, there is no clear progression toward a definite resolution in the dialogues—or rather, multilogues—that are taking place as the parameters of integration are being discussed. They are the ongoing, incomplete, and non-final elements of a democratic mode of life.

A multicultural, multinational, and multi-civilizational association isn't kept together by a predetermined set of public institutions of debate, conciliation strategies, common narratives, or ultimate integration standards on which everyone must approve, and which fixes the parameters of democratic negotiation, according to the open-ended view. The restricted approach, in contrast to the anti-democratic exclusionary methodology, permits presence in democratic consultations over integration standards, but it imposes four assimilative limits on those negotiations in precisely the areas where

disagreement in diverse societies is most likely to occur, deflecting those conflicts rather than facing them head-on. The democratic viewpoint, which holds that neither of these four qualities is ever inevitable or the subject of universal agreement, provides the answer instead. What unites the various community members and fosters a wisdom of belonging to the public as an entire despite ongoing differences is the fact that the dominant organizations, processes, and integration standards are consistently standby to free and democratic discussion. Finally, the term "democratic negotiation" designates two distinct negotiations that are essential for integration. The first involves activities like contesting accepted norms of integration and recognition, having conversations about them, and, if successful, revising accepted norms before putting them into practice and performing experiments with them. This kind of democratic negotiation has received the most attention from deliberative and agonistic democracy researchers, at least in its more public and official contexts.

When multiple individuals share the same integration norm but conduct differently in accordance with it, democratic negotiation of the second kind occurs. Regardless of how they conceptualize and use the norm-following, they can all be seen performing in accordance with the integration standards they distribute with others. Regardless of their many cultural, national, civilizational, or artistic perspectives, this is true. This variety of behaviours within the bounds of socially acceptable norms may be referred to as "ethical content" or "democratic ethos." It has received less attention and is usually entirely ignored, but this special method of uniting diverse people under shared rules is crucial. People tend to neglect the extended array of the multiplicity of human practices and experiments that exist within the common procedures of any complex relationship because of the pervasive but false belief that standards can only be useful and tracked in one correct way, i.e., a rule dictates rule-following behavior. This fallacious rule-following hypothesis contends that if players need to alter whatever or behave contrarily, they must alter the game's rules. Because of this, theory, political practice, research, policy, and policy usually focus entirely on the guidelines and future procedures while neglecting the range of following the rule behaviors (Tully 2003). However, as Antje Wiener in her theoretical and empirical reading appropriately titled The Invisible Constitution, various members of the EU discuss the common procedures and rules through their nationally, culturally, and improvised diverse customs of regulation following daily (Weiner 2007).

3. Integration through Culture

I will examine three overlying and related integration parts to determine which of the following two democratic integration methods provides a more real and democratic substitute to the antidemocratic method and which launches a non-coercive association of joint clarification between policy societies and makers on the one hand and the ignored daily integrating practices of the individuals on the other (culture, economics,

and foreign policy). These two concerns are linked because, in my view, official integration can only be legitimate and effective if it is internally compatible with and influences popular practices of integration rather than erasing them. As a result, the "no demos" issue is not a concern for the European Union. Demoi are numerous, but they frequently go unreported, which causes them to either be excluded from or be included in official integration processes, where they are subsequently exposed to elite-driven and assimilative ways.

Integration through culture includes elements like multiculturalism, multinationalism, and diverse majorities, minorities, and individual civilizations (multicivilizationalism). The current integration programmes typically rest on anti-democratic and restricted viewpoints. One of two main strategies is often used to integrate immigrants, minorities in culture, language, and religion, Indigenous peoples (like the Sami), sub-state countries, and non-territorial states (like the Roma), as well as national civilizations and traditions of other member states.

1. Democratic conciliation involves mainly of approving fundamental set of membership rules, which is believed to either transcend national, cultural, and civilizational distinctions or to encapsulate core western principles;

2. On the other hand, it is claimed that there is room for the look of cultural and minority nation differences.

The uproar that resulted from the caricatures of Prophet Mohammed (Peace be upon him) that were published in the Denmark newspaper, Jyllands-Posten on 30 September, 2005, has a propensity to further expand and constrict the discussion on integration norms. An extremely assimilative (and frequently offensive) set of membership norms, often couched in the 19th century imperial terminology of "civilization," is the alternative to a minimizing and non-negotiable government of minority and their rights, as if this signifies a plentiful defense of the ambitions of multinationalism, and multiculturalism as in the debate over Turkey (Devji 2006, Halliday 2004).

As illustrated by social scientists and democratic theorists studying conflicts over appreciation, these techniques ignore or co-operate the affected members' active appointment in the way of defining the terms and conditions of integration, discussion them, and talking adjustments to them over time. Even though individuals' demands aren't entirely satisfied, these democratic happenings encourage a sagacity of belonging to the greater community. Contrarily, exclusion from or subordination within these discursive practices fuels xenophobia, prejudice, extreme viewpoints, and the anticipated resentment explosion (Bader 2005; Kompridis 2005, 2006b; Breda 2006; Tierney 2004 ;) For instance, Vito Breda offers the following justifications as a partial justification for the "no" votes in Netherlands and France has an open-ended perspective on the constitutionalization of the EU:

The European Convention, which was tasked with creating the Treaty to establish a rule and regulation for Europe, attempted to simplify the current treaties and provide

the foundation for a new style of European supremacy. Due to its institutional construction and objectives, which were viewed as an impediment to European integration, this Convention was not an appropriate democratic platform for a procedure of recognizing national characteristics and their demands. (Breda 2006)

Lack of a democratic forum for Muslim youth to voice their grievances and shape public policy may have contributed to the riots that broke out in 2005 in the impoverished neighborhoods of French cities.

The sadness is that why people had voted "no" on one occasion and staged protests in the other because rambling traditions of having a voice were absent from both circumstances. There has been substantial assumption about the intentions and objectives of people busy in both circumstances because the open-ended technique, which would have delivered the solution, was not applied. For instance, it is difficult to comprehend how issues such as discrimination, well-documented racism, and economic inequities faced by Muslim can be talked without having a significant voice from people who are affected from the bottom up. According to Breda, the majority of the member states already have the political and legal resources needed to develop democratic discourse-negotiation strategies for numerous methods of cultural integration (Breda 2006).

The intercultural, international, and intercivilizational relationships in daily life in Europe are among the friendliest on the world, despite all the enormous obstacles to cultural fusion. The many participants frequently negotiate their interactions (in both senses of the word "negotiate"). Through these communications, or what Paul Gilroy terms "conviviality"—"the procedures of living together and interacting with a diverse-culture are ordinary qualities of public life in Britain's town areas and in post-colonial towns all over"—a new sort of diversity-savvy unity across cultural dissimilarities is emerging. (Gilroy 2004). In addition to the usual activities of school, play and work, these practical arts of diplomatic dialogue and conflict resolution among various partners can be acquired and practiced in non-profit organizations, refugee and immigrant organizations, and other contexts. As many examples from Breda, Gilroy, and Weiner show, they exist throughout the entire EU. Because, we have realized and inclined to concentrate on the obvious standards rather than the hidden diversity of democratic character within them, the majority of societal systematic research, policymaking, and theory do not address the moral arts of mass cordiality in addressing inequality, racism, and discrimination. Despite this, the basis for a different and democratic unification is provided by these shared practical abilities and unofficial artistic expressions.

Finally, it is impossible to analyze cultural integration separately from the other two types of integration in the parts that follow (external and financial policy). The presidents of Turkey and Spain created it last year through the UN to address civilizational fusion holistically and through multi-level talks between Muslims and non-Muslims. Muslims won't be able to successfully integrate into Western cultures until

civilizational disparities are addressed and the ongoing expansionism of Western powers' external policy in Muslim countries is eliminated, according to Thomas Mastnak, executive of the secretariat for the alliance of civilizations. It also denotes the conclusion of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and more. (Naumkin 2006; Gregory 2004; Al-Hadidi 2006; Mastnak 2005).

4. Integration through Economy

A similar situation can be said to exist for economic integration, which is arguably the most important sector of integration and complicatedly affects the other two. Neo-liberalism currently dominates the financial integration model. Naturally, there are many things about this to hate. To remove the unhappiness from formal talks is, nevertheless, the most typical response to the inquiry, what is the nature of this dissatisfaction with neo-liberal economic integration? However, the anticipated response is that this outward demonstration of dissatisfaction signals support for a very well-known alternative, i.e., a socio, democratic and economic model with an outdated public domain for the European demos. Furthermore, this alternative approach encourages division rather than unity when it is supported by the opposition elites of the Union's "core countries." Many of the financial and political elites in the central countries find the neoliberal (or Anglo-American) model to be plainly more comfortable, and they do not want to jeopardize their financial ties with the US by proposing a rival financial model. Along with many other "non-core" or "new Europe" countries, the UK rejects performing the role that the core counter-elites have allocated to them and supports the neo-liberal model instead (Deppe 2005). The debate over these two prepackaged economic integration models is go along with by theoretical explanation of the sporadic eruptions of public discontent, similar to the debate over cultural integration: the no votes on the constitution may have been an appearance of discontent with neo-liberal integration, the protests of union members, French students, and concerned citizens probably were, the election of social democratic governments in Italy and Spain may have been, and the protests of concerned citizens in France may have been.

However, these two prevalent models frequently ignore or undervalue the role of discursive activities where individuals could influence the terms of economic integration. However, within the confines of the two diametrically opposed elite models, a wide variety of different forms of economic integration already exist in Europe's civic communities.

There is an increasing quantity of scholarly research on these dominant alternative economic links in Europe and throughout the world. The growth of democratic relations based on mutual elucidation, where participants in alternative financial practices can freely voice their opinions in discussions of official economic policy without being constrained to speaking only in terms of neoliberal or Keynesian economics, is still an

innovative idea that must overcome all the usual obstacles posed by powerful interests. However, if there is to be a direction for financial integration within Europe that does not damage the environment, deepen disparities both internationally and inside Europe remain remote from the people who are subject to its results, and so lead to deeper separations and fragmentation, there is no substitute for a more open ended democratic method.

5. Integration through Foreign Policy

One of the most hotly debated and divisive topics in the world today is the union of the EU's allies into a new system of foreign policy. On one side, a number of adherent states care the alliance led by the USA and the UK, their fight against terrorism on a global scale, and their ongoing conflicts in and rule over Iraq and Afghanistan. Even those who support US involvement in the Iraq War despite having significant disagreements with US foreign policy haven't strayed that far from it. In addition, after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Europe adopted extensive securitization and monitoring regimes in imitation of the United States. On the other hand, the coalition in general and the Iraq war in particular have drawn the ire of millions of European citizens. The conflict has been the focus of the biggest protests in the history of the European Union. On the other hand, a democratic approach would be to genuinely inquire about any viable alternatives offered by the protesters. An alternative external policy that has already been created is offered as a replacement, and it is typically portrayed as the solution that the protesters themselves would offer. As a result, much like in the case of financial integration, two hegemonic models of international policy integration dominate discourse in the official public realm, disregarding a more democratic and dialogical approach based on a more exposed array of public domains.

The key components of an external policy, which should involve the EU, often comprise the following. It is presented as a thorough critique of and replacement for American imperialism in international affairs. It would try to make the UN Charter the foundation of the global community, be multilateral instead of unilateral, and cooperate with the UN and international law rather than rejecting or discouraging them. It would also promote a more robust social-democratic alternative to global neo-liberalism and push for humanitarian intervention and unalienable human rights through the World Bank, IMF (international monetary fund), and WTO (world trade organization). These continental transnational constitutional systems would emerge following the EU. This elitist alternative has been written by authors like Ulrich Beck and Jurgen Habermas (Habermas 2007; Beck 2003, 2004; Habermas & Derrida 2006;). It is a "counter-empire," in Peter Swan's words, fighting US imperialism. In particular, he draws influence from Alexandre Kojève's 1945 proposal for a new European empire as well as Carl Schmitt's 1955 proposal (Swan, 2006).

It is challenging to understand how this alternative approach to world politics

would be more unified and less polarizing than affiliating with the alliance headed by the United States. There doesn't seem to be any more in mind than a low-intensity controlled democratic conciliation with all four constraints, and its formulation hasn't undergone any kind of open democratic conciliation with the general European public, much less with the non-European peoples who are thought to welcome it wholeheartedly. The European Union and other major countries (the G8) will cooperate rather than acting one-sidedly and through international and transnational law rather than outside the law, which is the basic distinction from the United States' current imperial external policy.

The important regions would be rebuilt in the EU's image, which would be just as oppressive and anti-democratic as the foreign policy it is intended to resist, legitimizing the tragically flawed institutions of the current international order. In many aspects, it is similar to the liberal colonization of the previous two centuries. (Koskenniemi 2001; Deppe 2005; Simpson 2004; Anghie 2004). There is "one final and perhaps fatal issue," Neil Walker writes in his thorough analysis of this possibility. The thesis is founded on a superb description of a specific set of teleological modernization and legalization processes that, despite being widely acknowledged, have their origins firmly established in periods of Western dominant history. Although they have no reason to believe it and have every reason to disagree historically, the people who had historically been disempowered and impoverished by these practices are asked to believe in their final democratization (Walker 2007).

The open-ended democratic alternative is either completely ignored in the discussion between the two powerful elite models of external policy integration in all its manifestations or, if it is mentioned, is treated as being outside the bounds of public reason because the four different types of restrictions that these two models uphold define the boundaries of public reason. The open-ended alternative is therefore perceiving some sort of absurd radical democracy, even though it seems to be a practical and even workable alternative, because the powerful orientation is seen as just one restricted orientation among others in a wider field of creative skills of public reasoning (Toulmin 2001; Tully 2005). The open-ended strategy proposes a wider cum deeper parley of a potential European external policy, much like the circumstances surrounding cultural and economic union. This is to light what the official discourse overlooks: currently, there are numerous local-global ties between non-Europeans and European that don't adhere to both elite models but rather exist among distant neighbors in the global village. The World Social Forum, alternative disagreement resolution initiatives, backing networks for local democratic empowerment processes as opposed to imposing structural change, Western decree, and low-intensity democracy, just trade as opposed to free trade, reciprocal aid as opposed to a race to the bottom, and other initiatives are actively supported by millions of regular, concerned Europeans (Dunkley 2004; Sponeck 2006; Seabrook 2003).

These local-global alternative external policy connections stand out because they

are anti-imperial and democratic. They are grounded in dialogical ties that partners from both inside and outside of Europe have built up over many generations and are democratically negotiating now. As a result, they provide a concrete example of the framework for an open ended democratic external policy for the EU, one that would be established through democratic discourse between Non-Europeans and Europeans who would be both its subjects and co-authors. Instead of being pre-structured around a single western paradigm of modernism and pluralistic order, the international ties that Europe would forge with other nations would be negotiated between a range of pre-existing civilizations, alternative modernity's, and cosmopolites (Latour 2004). The two dominant Western models impose western law and order before engaging in "civilized" dialogue, but these appeasing external relationships are not based on the fear assumption that the other lives in anarchistic state of nature and is hostile toward us. Rather, these relationships are predicated on the assumption that the other is a victim of our hostility. They are founded on the diametrically opposed, but mutually reinforcing, principles of the value of critical discourse and the disarming openness to persons with different cultural backgrounds. Most of the world's major religions, ethical systems, and methods of promoting peace have long regarded this Gandhian approach as the actual source to global peace (Ackerman and Duvall 2000). One can only hope that programs like the coalition of civilizations and global social environment foster a critical discourse between the two major methods of integrating international interactions that favor democracy and nonviolence and these genuine alternative forms of such relations (Mastnak 2005; Sousa Santos 2003). Because, as opponents of the same governing ideology of "democratic peace" assert today and as Nietzsche insightfully saw in response to the crisis of European political and historical culture in the 1870s, the two dominating approaches would never result in peace (Lawrence 2006; Nietzsche 1986; Emden 2007; Alvarez 2001)

6. Conclusion

It has been asserted that the integration of foreign policy, the economy, and culture inside the EU would adopt a more democratic and flexible approach. Additionally, I have argued that this approach already partially exists inside the confines of the existing norms of integration in the democratic conciliation and camaraderie that millions of Europeans and non-Europeans engage in daily. These pragmatic methods of democratic integration are typically disregarded, but if the official integration plans gave them greater consideration, they might serve as a true and practical source of integration.

The primary issue is that these resources for democratic integration are overly overlooked. James Scott refers to this type of issue as seeing like a state. it requires neglecting the variety of present practical arts of communication and integrating different citizens, including non-theoretical embodied savoir faire (Scott 1998). States and significant organizations like the European Union are not the only ones capable of

this form of "seeing." Additionally, it affects the idea that individuals are creating modes of production and consumption that may be organized in accordance with a set of standards and criteria for commodification (Quastel 2006). Unfortunately, a mixture of these impersonal causes—legal juridification, political planification, and commercial commodification—seems to be the dominant trend in the European Union at the moment.

If this conclusion is accurate, then it will be the responsibility of researchers to first understand the economic, cultural, and foreign policy integration practices that lie under the common way of viewing and organizing public activities, and then to connect these practices to approved policies of integration using democratic negotiation forums, where public, policy makers, and researchers can collaborate and learn from one another without the inherent subordination. Peter Mair claims that political parties in general and the European Parliament are failing to fulfil their duty to operate as a forum for bringing together citizen practices and decision-makers (Mair 2005). Manuel Castells' defense of his position might offer one explanation for this. He makes the case that over the past 30 years, networks have changed the way societies and their institutions are structured. Almost all organizations today, including huge enterprises, military cum industrial complexes, the European Union, and the world's small volunteer organization, have switched to the network form as their predominant "social morphology" (Castells 1998). If so, one of the reasons for political party crises may be the failure of political parties to make the transition to networkization, in contrast to people's grassroots democratic practices of integration. The challenge is to network political parties in Europe so they can arbitrate between the public and decision-makers more successfully. In the network era, they must also develop new types of democratic links of conciliation built specifically for open-ended democratic mediating (Warleigh 2001 and Bellamy).

I believe that in this situation as well, we should look to the routines of democratic integration for monitoring as there are currently state-of-the-art experience in such mediating ties contained in the routines, I have alluded to in the three sectors of integration. Additionally, utilizing the actor-network methodology developed by Bruno Latour and his associates as well as related methodologies, one may investigate existing relationships from the critical viewpoint of open-ended democracy. These methods are currently among the most promising in Europe (Latour 2005; Quastel 2006; Law and Hassard 1999). The bulk of existing links between people and politicians, according to actor-network research, entail unequal interactions between hegemonic individuals who determine the terms of parleys and subalterns who are compelled to comply (Bernstorff, 2003). Despite this, research demonstrates that the complex webs of authority, law, and communication are not inflexible systems of dominance. Instead, the subaltern actors who are both subject to and actors in them to differing degrees can reconcile, amend, and occasionally transform them (Weiner 2006; Tully 2005, 2006; Walker 2002). Considering this, there are valid arguments for using the open-ended approach in this situation, as well as a few glimmering causes for optimism when

connecting customary means of democratic integration with legalized practices at various levels.

If the EU had the guts and humility to interact with its free population in this ruthlessly introspective and trial-and-error manner, it would be seen as being enlightened and democratic. Instead of a union organizing its members at the end of the day, a discussion of mutual explanation and co-articulation with the members of the demoi who have been present there since dawn would take place. This is how democratic governance functions between the people and their governors if my memory serves me correctly.

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