

National Security and Sustainable Economic Development in Nigeria since 1999: Implication for the Vision 20:2020

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Abstract

Global terrorism constitutes a veritable threat to international peace and security. On the other hand, Nigeria has witnessed sustained attacks through militancy and other forms of insurgency orchestrated by different groups since the inception of the 4th Republic in 1999. The operations of these armed groups with varying and conflictual ideological, political and ethno-religious agenda have become ominous to Nigeria's quest of joining the league of the 20 largest economies in the world by 2020 as encapsulated in the Vision 20:2020 Economic Transformation Blueprint. This paper, therefore, examines the implication of militancy on the actualisation of the Vision 20:2020. Using the Radical Approach to National Security, the paper concludes that the answer to the national security question, sustainable economic development and the Vision 20:2020 is hinged on the welfare and security of the people. The paper recommends the formulation and effective implementation of populist policies and programmes capable of addressing the underlying causes of insurgency in Nigeria. These would invariably place Nigeria on the path of sustainable economic development thereby boosting its prospect of actualizing the Vision 20:2020.

Keywords: *National Security, Militancy, National Economy, Sustainable Economic Development, Vision 20:2020*

1. Introduction

The unhealthy interface between insecurity and national development in Nigeria has been established in the literature (see Nwanegbo & Odigbo, 2013; Akpan *et al*, 2012; Nwagboso, 2012; Anyadike, 2013; Adebakin & Raimi, 2012). Nonetheless, substantial academic attention has not been paid to the overwhelming effect of militancy on the sustainability of growth of the national economy, especially in relation to Nigeria's quest of being numbered amongst the 20 largest economies in the world by 2020 otherwise code-named Vision 20:2020. This paper is a contribution to the ongoing debate. The crux of the paper, therefore, is to analyze the implication of militancy in all its colourations since 1999 on the actualisation of the Vision 20:2020.

It is noteworthy that the incidence of militancy in Nigeria predates the 4th Republic. Nonetheless, the dismantling of military rule in 1999 led to the proliferation of insurgent and rebellious groups that were hitherto suppressed by successive military governments. The activities of these nefarious groups have been ascendant since the enthronement of civilian rule in 1999. Successive civilian administrations have witnessed consistent and sustained pressure from different ethnic militias like the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), Movement for the

Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger-Delta (MEND), Oodua People's Congress (OPC), Arewa Youth Consultative Forum, etc. Similar pressure and general insecurity has also accompanied the increasing spate of kidnapping in the South-East geopolitical zone, politically motivated killings by unscrupulous groups, ethno-religious uprisings in Jos, Kano, Kaduna, Bauchi, as well as the incessant and often co-ordinated bombings in some terrorism-infested states of northern Nigeria by the Boko Haram sect.

The Boko Haram uprising of July 2009 in Northern Nigeria marked a tipping point in the conflict between the sect and government authorities. The brazen execution-style killings by both sides left more than 800 people dead in Borno, Bauchi, Yobe and Kano States (Human Rights Watch, 2012:32). From 2009 till date, the sect has engaged in arson, bombing, shooting and stabbing with disdain and impunity. The insurgents have attacked some strategic and high profile places/persons like the Nigeria Police Headquarters in Abuja on June 16, 2011; the UN House in Abuja on August 26, 2011; and St. Theresa Catholic Church, Madalla on December 25, 2011. Others are This Day and The Sun Newspapers' Offices in Abuja and Kaduna on April 26, 2012; the massacre of nine construction workers at the Shehu of Borno Central Mosque, Maiduguri on July 1, 2012; and the assassination of a respected elder statesman, Maj. Gen. Muhammadu Shuwa and his guest, Sagir Musa, on November 2, 2012 in Maiduguri.

The activities of the Boko Haram insurgents and other militant sects in the country have caused Nigeria an irredeemable image crisis in the international community as well as engendered unprecedented humanitarian and economic catastrophe in the deeply affected states in Northern Nigeria. Accordingly, Adagba *et al* cited in Nwanegbo & Odigbo (2013: 289) assert that between July 27, 2009 and February 17, 2013, Boko Haram has launched fifty three (53) attacks in which 1,157 people were killed and hundreds of people injured in Northern Nigeria. The threat posed by these insurgent and subversive groups to national security is real. Several rating agencies within the international community have repeatedly declared Nigeria a failing state. These are found in several circles as well as in policy papers. For instance, the Fund for Peace (FFP) in its 2012 report ranked Nigeria as one of the top 10 failed states in Africa and 14th in the world because of growing wave of insecurity and endemic violence (Tella cited in Adebakin & Raimi, 2012:3).

The apparent inability of successive administrations to squarely and comprehensively address the lingering crisis of national security in Nigeria poses serious threats to the fragile unity and corporate existence of the country as a sovereign entity. Secondly and perhaps more importantly, the national security question adversely impinges on the sustainability of the Nigerian economy and, by implication, its preparedness to join the league of the 20 largest economies in the world by 2020. The overall effect of the malaise is overwhelming. Within the period under study, it has dwindled income from petroleum resources because of pipeline vandalism and crude oil theft; resulted in astronomical increase in the nation's expenditure on defence and internal security; weakened the infrastructural base of the economy; and decelerated the growth rate of the gross domestic product (GDP), etc. The different levels of government have also committed large chunk of their monthly allocations into rebuilding of public and private infrastructural facilities destroyed by the insurgents as well as the rehabilitation of victims of the attacks.

Furthermore, the crisis of national security has culminated in unprecedented diversion of scarce capital in the national budget for the procurement of sophisticated military hardware. This has correspondingly denied capital projects in the education, health, agriculture and construction sectors the needed attention. According to the 2012 Report of the Central Bank of Nigeria, in the 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 fiscal years, the total expenditure earmarked for both internal security and defence in the approved budgets were ₦292.7 billion, ₦276.5 billion, ₦422.9 billion and ₦563.2 billion respectively (CBN 2012, see Table II below). Despite huge spending on defence and internal security in Nigeria, wave of insecurity of lives and property continues unabated in different regions of the country. The vandalism of oil installations, theft of crude oil, and hostage-taking of

expatriate workers in the Niger Delta; the unabated incidence of kidnapping in the South East; the unmitigated armed robbery in the South West; and ethno-religious crises and the Boko Haram insurgency in different parts of the northern region have enervated economic sustainability and the Vision 20:2020 agenda in Nigeria. See Table I below for a highlight of the regional distribution of insurgent operations of these sectarian groups in Nigeria since 1999. The table also shows the dimension and degree of intensity of the sectarian unrests.

Although Nigeria is unarguably one of the countries with enormous untapped market for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Africa, it has continually witnessed poor participation of foreign investors in economic development of the country. The economy continues to wobble under the weight of militancy and insurgency. This has damaged investors' confidence thereby sending the economy on a downward slide. The 2011 world investment report prepared by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Investment (UNCTAD) confirms the decline in FDI. According to the report, FDI capital to Nigeria declined to \$6.1 billion in 2010 from \$8.28 billion in 2009 (UNCTAD, 2011). Similarly, Umejei (2011) notes that:

most of the foreign missions have advised their citizenry to be wary of doing business in the country because of what they believe is a high security risk...hence, with travel advisories by most of the foreign missions warning their citizenry of the risk of doing business in Nigeria, it remains to be seen how the government can muster \$33 billion as projected.

Corroborating the foregoing, Gbanite quoted in Nwagboso (2012: 245) opines that:

...when our citizens' right to safety from all kinds of man-made threats are reduced considerably, the government will inherit an increase in foreign investments...most countries would like a likely trading partner to secure the lives and property of their citizens first before they themselves allow theirs to move into such territories...

The effects of the various threats to national security on the sustainability of economic development in Nigeria as well as its overall implication for the Vision 20:2020 agenda are quite phenomenal. Arising from the foregoing therefore, it is appropriate to investigate, analyze and answer the question: *does the recurrence of militancy in Nigeria since 1999 implicate the actualization of the Vision 20:2020?* The paper reveals that the realization or otherwise of the Vision 20:2020 is, among other things, hinged on the ability of the federal government to comprehensively address the security questions in the country. The paper is divided into five sections namely: introduction, theoretical framework, the crisis of national security and sustainable economic development in Nigeria, the implication of the crisis of national security on the Vision 20:2020 and conclusion and recommendations.

Table I: Regional Distribution of Security Crisis in Nigeria since 1999

S/N	Security Threat	Geo-Political Zone	Degree of Intensity
1	Niger-Delta Militancy	South-South	Recessive
2	Ethno-Religious Crisis	Northern Region	Dominant
3	Kidnapping, Ritual Killings, & Armed Robbery	South-East	Dominant
4	Boko Haram Insurrection	Northern Region	Dominant
5	State Terrorism (Bakassi Boys, OPC, Arewa Youth Consultative Forum, etc)	Evenly spread across the country	Recessive

Source: Authors' Fieldwork

2. Theoretical Framework

The unhealthy interaction between the crisis of national security, sustainable economic development and the Vision 20:2020 in Nigeria cannot be appreciated without adequate understanding of national security. A close examination of the origin and escalation of the activities of militants and other insurgent groups since the return to civil rule in 1999 shows that the state

and its apparatuses are intricately involved and even culpable. This is essentially because of the prevailing warped conceptualization of national security. Consequently, this paper employs the radical approach to national security as its theoretical framework.

The radical approach to the conceptualization of national security arose as a counterpoise to the overwhelming influence and dominance of the orthodox, militaristic and state-centric interpretation and understanding of national security. This scholarship which has dominated the international system evolved from the Westphalia state system after 1648. Thus, the orthodox scholarship conceptualizes national security purely as politico-military phenomenon. It is used to refer to the capacity of a ruling group to use state power to protect its interest or values from external threats as well as maintain order internally. This unbridled use of instruments of coercion otherwise called 'hard security' to maintain an existing state of affairs, usually favourable to the ruling groups is largely implicated in the origin and escalation of militancy and terrorism in Nigeria. Accordingly, Mbah (2008:156) argues that the greater application of hard security is an indication that the ruling groups are in fact insecure, notwithstanding the appearance of strength represented by coercive instruments of the state.

Contrariwise, the radical approach to national security as championed by the neo-Marxist scholars like Okwudiba Nnoli, Esko Toyo, Assisi Asobie, Claude Ake, Okechukwu Ibeanu, Ogban Ogban-Iyam, amongst others relates national security to the satisfaction of basic human needs. These needs include the provision of social services (food, shelter, education, health), the right to a sustainable environment, the protection of cultural and religious identity, and so on. The absence/neglect of these essential services is largely responsible for the ever increasing spate of armed violence and terrorism in the country since 1999.

The Nigerian state through its coercive apparatuses has inflicted and imposed extreme suffering on the citizenry. This is done essentially in the name of 'national security'. According to Nnoli (2006), this has been possible because much of the leadership in Africa and the rest of the world have rigidly adhered to the concept of national security devised during the seventeenth century in accordance with realities of the time. The prevailing conception of national security in terms of external attack is therefore, largely defective and irrelevant. There is general acceptance that national security must go beyond the narrow focus on external attack and the use of the military to defeat it. Thus, Nnoli (2006:17) avers that:

although a concern for security must ultimately focus on the physical danger to a state that is posed by imbalances in military power, a concern for security cannot be limited simply to military power. A state fashions the military power it deploys from various elements: the economic wealth of the nation, the quality of its political leadership, the cohesiveness of the polity, the motivation of its citizenry, the nature of its military leadership, its access to food and raw materials, and so on.

Ultimately, security demands military power sufficient to dissuade or defeat an attack; but so many non-military elements are required to generate effective military power that a concern for security can never be restricted solely to the final military end product. It is therefore not surprising that the orthodox conceptualization of national security is counterpoised to human, environmental, economic and social security. In the resultant anarchy of perspective that prevails, individuals, rebel movements, ethnic groups, political parties and even pressure groups implement disparate security measures. Consequently, private security outfits, ethnic militias, political thugs and armed rebel movements emerge.

The disintegration of the security arrangements of the Nigerian state has produced serious discussions about the concept of national security and its underlying relations to power. It has demonstrated the failure of the successive Nigerian governments to link the security of their regimes to the physical security of their citizens. The government is yet to realize that the best guarantee of state security is the security of their citizens, and the willing acceptance by the latter of the political rules of the game on which the legitimacy of the state rests. The radical approach to

security is therefore more inclined to see citizens, rather than states as the beneficiaries of national security.

Since the return to civilian rule in 1999, the lives and properties of ordinary Nigerians have been terrorized by different armed groups. These groups which range from ethnic militias to state-sponsored terrorists include MOSOP, MASSOB, Bakassi Boys, Egbesu Boys, OPC, MEND, Arewa Consultative Forum, ethno-religious fanatics in Jos, Kaduna, Kano, Bauchi and the Boko Haram sect. The origin and escalation of the activities of these groups are not dissociated from the government's penchant to exclude, marginalize and discriminate against the generality of the citizenry or some parts of it. Accordingly, Nnoli (2006:9) holds that:

political exclusion, economic marginalization, and social discrimination threaten the security of citizens to such an extent that they regard the state as the primary threat to their survival. In desperation, the victimized citizens take the laws into their own hands as a means of safeguarding their fundamental values from the threat of unacceptable government policies. People who believe that the government no longer represents their best interests seek, by all means, to overthrow it or otherwise establish an alternative state. The decline of the state as the guarantor of protection and human security is serious; but its role as the creator of insecurity is more serious.

In internal security management in Nigeria, the roles of the Nigerian Police Force, the Prisons Services, the Nigerian Immigration Services, the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps, the Nigerian Customs Service and the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency are obviously indispensable. Unfortunately, the management of internal security in Nigeria seems to have been an exercise in futility in spite of the establishment of numerous security apparatuses as well as huge budgetary allocation to security agencies. Following this analytical tradition, a number of observers like Usman (2010), Asuni (2007), Aghedo & Oarhe (2009), have persuasively argued that Nigeria's security management is bedevilled with misdiagnosis and very poor institution building. Paradoxically, the Nigeria's security establishments with the responsibility of dousing the internal security challenges in the country is spectacularly obsessed with 'hard' factors – those factors that threaten the very foundation of the state and by extension, the vested interests of the ruling elite. This pathetic scenario has been at the expense of the 'soft' factors – factors that affect the entire society. In a similar context, the current conception of the Nigeria's internal security management is at best state-centred and not society-centred.

As noted above, the unprecedented diversion of scarce capital in the national budget for the procurement of hi-tech equipment has correspondingly denied capital projects in the education, health, agriculture and construction sectors the needed attention (see Table II below). Despite huge spending on defence and internal security in Nigeria, wave of insecurity of lives and property continues unabated in different regions of the country. The vandalism of oil pipelines, crude oil theft, and hostage-taking of expatriate workers in the Niger Delta; the interminable incidence of kidnapping in the South East; the ferocious armed robbery in the South West; and ethno-religious crises and the Boko Haram insurrection in different parts of the northern region have become ominous to economic sustainability and the Vision 20:2020 agenda in Nigeria.

While the 36 states and the 774 local government councils in Nigeria enjoy security votes, the enormous fund allocated to this vote has not translated into better and more secure environment that is supportive of sustainable economic development and the Vision 20:2020. Consequently, the votes have come under serious attacks and criticisms in recent times. The prevailing public opinion is in total support of its abrogation on the ground that it is not economically sustainable considering the diverse challenges facing the nation. Greater emphasis must therefore be paid to the human components of our national security otherwise called 'soft security'. This involves the conscious formulation and effective implementation of policies and programmes that could accelerate the amelioration of poverty, exploitation, diseases, injustice, and the like. This will provide the fertile ground for the revitalization of our wobbling national economy and consequently, facilitate the

accomplishment of the Vision 20:2020.

3. The Interface between National Security and Sustainable Economic Development in Nigeria

There is no single universally accepted definition of national security. The variety of definitions provides an overview of the many implications of the concept. The term remains ambiguous, having originated from simpler definitions which initially emphasized the freedom from military threat and political coercion. However, the scope of the term has been expanded to include other forms of non-military security as suits the circumstances of the time. The term has therefore been enlarged to include elements such as economic and environmental security. According to Harold Brown, the former US Secretary of Defence, national security is the ability to preserve a nation's physical integrity and territory; to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to preserve its nature, institution, and governance from disruption from outside; and to control its borders (Brown cited in Watson, 2008:281). Similarly, Prabhakaran (2008:521) defines national security as:

The measurable state of the capability of a nation to overcome the multi-dimensional threats to the apparent well-being of its people and its survival as a nation-state at any given time, by balancing all instruments of state policy through governance, that can be indexed by computation, empirically or otherwise, and is extendable to global security by variables external to it.

National security is therefore an appropriate and aggressive blend of political resilience, human resources, economic structure and capacity, technological competence, industrial base, availability of natural resources and of course the military might. National security from the various definitions provided above is a sacrosanct and non-negotiable phenomenon in human society. Little wonder Section 14(b) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria states that the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government.

On the other hand, the term sustainable economic development or sustainable development is a novel concept in the development literature. Sustainable economic development is defined as an economic development which meets the needs of present generation without endangering or compromising the needs of future generation. The World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), one of the foremost international bodies advocating economic and environmental sustainability across the globe, defines sustainable development as development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (WCED, 2000:43). Similarly, Tounés *et al* (2011) view sustainable economic development as a worthy attempt by environmentalists, economists and scientists to come up with new models of exploiting the environment and its resources in a manner that guarantee long-term economic, social and environmental progress.

Sustainable development is a process in which the natural resource base (of a nation) is not allowed to deteriorate but utilised optimally for the benefits of the current and future citizens. The term aims at ensuring the effective utilisation of physical environment and its diverse natural resources in a manner that the environment and its resources would provide continuous stream of benefits to both current and future generation. It became a front-burner issue because of rising ecological challenges in the forms of impact of residue of agricultural pesticide on lives, effect of growing population demographics, emergence of environmental protection protests across Europe and America and the backlash of the Earth Day summit.

National security is generally held as a prerequisite for economic growth by economic development theorists. In other words, the sustainability or otherwise of the development of any given economy is essentially dependent on the general state of health of the national security architecture. The prevailing unenviable state of the Nigerian economy is attributable to the poverty of understanding of the ramifications of national security in the country. This has culminated in the

adoption of a reductionist approach through which national security is associated with or approximated to the acquisition of sophisticated hi-tech military equipment. Thus, the proportion of GDP devoted to military spending or purchasing of arms has increased exponentially over the last decade. This diverts funds from productive activities to unproductive ones. Other things being equal, a rise in military spending exerts a negative impact on the rate of investment in productive fixed capital. This occurs because of well-known crowding-out effects: an increase in military spending must be financed either by raising current taxes or by borrowing (future taxes). In either case, it will lower the expected after-tax return on productive fixed capital, while simultaneously reducing the flow of (domestic plus foreign) savings that is available to finance productive fixed capital formation in the domestic economy (Deger & Smith, 1983:335).

The 2012 Report of the Central Bank of Nigeria indicates that in the 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 fiscal years, the total expenditure earmarked for both internal security and defence in the approved budgets were ₦164.5 billion, ₦276.5 billion, ₦422.9 billion and ₦563.2 billion respectively (CBN, 2012). Official statistics provided by the apex bank from 2000 to 2011 lend credence to the fact that national spending on security is not economically sustainable (see Table II below). For instance, defence and internal security spending for 2000 were approximately ₦43.4 billion and ₦25.2 billion respectively. Considering the deplorable security situation in the country, the budgetary provision has risen astronomically. From table II below, the budgeted amount for security in 2006 was ₦202.2 billion. By 2010, the nation was spending the sum of ₦422.9 billion on security. Right from 2000 to 2011, the huge budgetary allocation to defence and internal security has diverted attention from education, agriculture, health and construction. In 2006, allocations to education, agriculture, health and construction were ₦87.3 billion, ₦17.2, ₦62.3 billion and ₦20.1 billion respectively. The analysis shows clearly the preference for security as opposed to boosting real sectors of the economy that impact directly on the wellbeing of Nigerians.

Table II: Federal Government Recurrent Expenditure (N' Million)

Year	*Security	Education	Agriculture	Health	Construction	GDP
1961	9.47	4.52	0.42	1.81	0.59	2361.2
1965	27.73	10.61	6.08	1.88	25.29	3110.0
1970	135.18	24.44	1.92	12.48	14.28	5205.1
1975	610.11	126.5	22.48	52.85	31.97	20957
1980	595.13	155.81	17.14	52.79	46.03	49632.3
1985	1430.2	258.60	20.36	132.02	151.11	70633.2
1990	6540.2	2402.80	258.00	500.70	643.40	271908
1995	11855.2	9746.40	1510.40	3320.70	1699.10	1934831
2000	68556.99	57956.64	6335.80	15218.08	4991.09	4727523
2001	85922.29	39882.60	7064.55	24522.27	7202.04	5374335
2002	132369.9	80530.88	9993.55	40621.42	7452.14	6232244
2003	119444	64782.15	7537.35	33267.98	16951.37	6061700
2004	174117.5	76524.65	11256.15	34197.14	14897.01	11411067
2005	153618.1	82795.06	16325.60	55661.63	17914.96	15610882
2006	202200	87294.56	17212.81	62300.00	20100.00	18564595
2007	253400	107529.39	21202.73	81900.00	71300.00	20657.317
2008	164500	164000.0	65400.0	98200.00	94500.00	24296329
2009	276490	137156.6	22435.2	90200.00	80630.00	24794238
2010	422900	170800.00	25200.00	99100.00	138050.00	29205782
2011	563200	335800.00	41200.00	231800.00	195900.00	33994612

*Security column is the summation of expenditures for Defence and Internal Security for 1961-2011

Sources: Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazettes, Central Bank of Nigeria (1961, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000–2011)

Apart from diverting attention from the productive sectors of the national economy, the growing crisis of national security in Nigeria has adversely affected the country's economy. Before the federal government's Amnesty Programme designed for repentant militants in the Niger Delta region, the oil production and the number of barrels produced per day declined drastically. This was largely due to kidnapping and hostage of oil workers in the region. This singular problem adversely reduced government's revenue from oil as well as implementation of government's policies and programmes during this period. Thus, most capital projects captured in the 2007 and 2008 annual budgets were not effectively implemented largely due to shortage of financial resources occasioned by militancy in the Niger Delta. This include the construction and rehabilitation of federal roads in the six geo-political zones, construction of dams in the North-West and North-Central zones, the immediate take-off of dredging of River Niger, and construction of additional power plants in the six geo-political zones (Ezeobi, 2009:47). This ugly trend denied Nigerians these amenities because government was incapacitated to provide social services to the people.

Similarly, the spate of kidnapping in some parts of Nigeria ultimately resulted in serious economic problems. The continuous kidnap cases in commercial cities of Port Harcourt, Aba and Onitsha, obviously forced investors, businessmen and manufacturing companies to either relocate to other relatively peaceful cities in Nigeria or other countries within the West African sub-region. In Aba for instance, the NBL, SEVEN UP PLC, UNILEVA PLC, PZ PLC relocated to Enugu largely due to constant kidnapping of their expatriates (Nwagboso, 2012:254). The period 2007-2011 witnessed increase in kidnapping activities and the target group initially was the businessmen who frequently paid millions of naira as ransoms to kidnapers. Later on, this inhuman and violent criminal activity was extended to poor people and innocent children in the affected states in Nigeria. More worrisome is the silent suspicion that the security agencies are actually involved in the business of kidnap for ransom in the South.

Although the security challenges seemed not to have completely deterred investments inflow into the country, it has indisputably become the gravest bane to national development in Nigeria. According to Agomuo (2013:1), in the first nine months of 2012, data from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) shows that portfolio investment stood at US\$4.6 billion while Foreign Direct Investment stood at \$1.44 billion. Foreign investors also controlled an average of 60 percent of all trading done on the Nigerian Stock Exchange in 2012 despite rising insecurity. However, what is difficult to evaluate is how much investments would have come into the country without the current security challenges. This is the opportunity cost of the current insecurity which (because it is difficult to measure), has been ignored by political economists and the government. The ever-increasing cases of kidnapping in the country has therefore affected Nigeria's quest to sustain the growth of the national economy through the attraction of foreign direct investors. The malaise has considerably eroded investors' confidence thereby diminishing the per capita output and technology transfer into the country.

In a typical behaviour of a nation that thrives on a rent economy, the government has always sought to buy peace and always ended with the peace of the graveyard like the current situation in the Niger Delta region. The ineffectively implemented and corruption-riddled Amnesty Programme has transformed the erstwhile militants into either top level government contractors or emergency crude oil refiners in the creeks or kidnap merchants. Thus, it is the opinion of this paper that the programme which has gleaned several billions of naira from government's revenue cannot sustain the relative peace in the region.

Besides the incidences of kidnapping and militancy in the Niger Delta region, the lingering Boko Haram insurgency which started in 2009 in Maiduguri, Borno State has brought the economy of the northern region to a standstill. The insurgency has weakened the north's once prosperous textile industry, thereby leaving thousands of people unemployed. Similarly, major consumer

goods' companies have seen their distribution chains destabilised as the distributors of their goods in the northern part of the country have been forced to relocate to the south. The telecommunication companies have seen their facilities destroyed while bank branches have been attacked and robbed. Several road construction companies have seen their expatriate staff kidnapped and in some cases killed. The economic cost of the violence may however be difficult to evaluate immediately in terms of lost investment opportunities and actual cost of damage done to existing infrastructure and human lives. Under the prevailing security situation, the first group of individuals to flee the country are investors or potential investors; those whose capital would have made any GDP growth possible at all.

Furthermore, the agricultural sector which provides jobs for most people and contributes almost 40% of our GDP has been devastated by the Boko Haram insurgence in the northern region. The 24 hours curfew imposed on Kaduna and Yobe States in June 2012 following the escalation of the insurgence provide vivid examples of what is in store for Nigerian agriculture. Kano, Kaduna and Yobe States are pivotal to the success of Nigerian agriculture which is over 75% northern based. Apart from being major contributors, Kano and Kaduna are vital trans-shipment points for produce from the Northwest while Yobe performs the same role for transport of agricultural produce from the Northeast. Even without 24 hour curfew, there has been a sharp drop in the flow of agricultural output, with post-harvest losses previously estimated at 40% soaring to more than 50% (Sobowale, 2012:2).

Owing to the fact that most farm produce are raw materials, any delay between farm gate and markets increases the post-harvest loss incrementally with the days spent on the road. With curfew, most of what is loaded at the farm will have to be thrown away. This was the situation in the 1990s when Kano State was rocked by a series of violent demonstrations. The entire length of the Kano-Zaria Expressway was littered with rotten tomatoes, peppers and vegetables. Thus, the Boko Haram insurrection which has wider regional spread with its attendant catastrophe portends greater ill to the Nigerian economy.

This prevailing state of insecurity has lowered agricultural outputs as farmers flee to safer territories. Second, those who still brave the odds to go farming (mainly because they have no other means of livelihood and no place to go), might find it difficult to evacuate their farm produce now that transporters are reluctant to go to the northern region. Narrating his ordeal in his bid to secure the services of transporters from Lagos (Idodo and Apapa) to Maiduguri, Sobowale (2012:2) laments that:

only one out of 35 was willing to go; and that was because the company's headquarters is in Maiduguri. Even, that "willing" driver set conditions that would have been considered insane only two years ago. Apart from charging three times the normal rate for the trip, he could not guarantee reaching Maiduguri in less than two weeks...and at the sign of great trouble, he would abandon the consignment and run for dear life.

The ripple effects of the foregoing are enormous. Despite our over-dependence on imported raw materials as a nation, there are some agro-allied manufacturing businesses which depend on local agricultural input for production. For instance, NESTLE and Cadbury, the world's largest food marketers purchase millions of tonnes of onions, soybean and sorghum from local farmers. Similarly, the United African Company of Nigeria (UACN) Feed Processor Grand located in Jos, is perhaps the country's largest consumer of groundnut and soybean; so does Livestock Feeds. These are only a few of the manufacturers whose fortunes and ours are inextricably tied with the fate of farmlands in the northern region. The bigger tragedy lies in the fact that famine and hunger which might result could actually make the situation worse.

4. The Implication of the Crisis of National Security on Vision 20:2020

The Vision 20:2020 is a dream statement that Nigeria would become one of the first 20 economies in the world by the year 2020. According to the Nigeria Vision 20:2020 Economic Transformation Blueprint, by 2020 Nigeria will be one of the 20 largest economies in the world, able to consolidate its leadership role in Africa and establish itself as significant player in the global economic and political arena (NV20:2020, 2009). The Vision is essentially aimed at achieving a globally competitive economy that is resilient, diversified and able to fully optimize Nigerian human and natural resources to meet the needs and aspirations of her citizens. It also tends to achieve an industrialized economy with a globally competitive manufacturing sector that is tightly integrated with the primary resource base of the nation and contributes about 25% to the GDP. Thus, according to the NV20:2020 (2009:9), the Vision statement posits that:

Nigeria will have a large, strong, diversified, competitive, technologically enabled economy that effectively harnesses the talents and energy of its people and responsibly exploits its national endowments to guarantee a high standard of living and quality of life to its citizens.

The federal government through the National Planning Commission launched the Nigerian Vision 20:2020 in December 2010. The Vision is traceable to a research conducted in 2005 by Goldman Sachs, a New York-based investment banking group. The research suggested that if current reforms are sustained, Nigeria would emerge the strongest economy in Africa, superseding South Africa and Egypt. It held that by 2020 Nigeria would become one of the 25 biggest world economies and by 2025 the 20th largest economy in the world. The report indicates that the country may even grow by 2050 to become the 12th largest economy in the world ahead of countries like Italy, Canada and Korea. In the same vein, Nigeria has been ranked amongst the N-11 countries— countries identified by Goldman Sachs to have the potential for attaining global competitiveness based on their economic and demographic settings and the foundation for reforms already laid. Nonetheless, the reports noted the challenge the nation faces in converting potentiality into reality. These reports apparently encouraged the government to pursue the vision of placing Nigeria among the 20 largest economies in the world by 2020. According to Eneh (2011:21), this was based on assessment of its abundant human and material resources and on the assumption that the country's resources would be properly managed and channelled to set economic goals.

The vision is an articulation of the long-term intent to launch Nigeria onto a path of sustained social and economic progress and accelerate the emergence of a truly prosperous and united Nigeria. In recognition of the enormous human and natural endowments of the nation, the long term plan is to improve the living standards of Nigerians and place the country among the league of 20 largest economies in the world with a minimum GDP of \$900 billion and a per capita income of not less than \$4000 per annum. The targets for year 2020 are based on a dynamic comparative analysis of the country's potential growth rate and economic structure vis-à-vis those of other top 40 economies in the world (Ayodele *et al*, 2013; NV20:2020, 2009). The implication of this projection is that the Nigerian economy must grow at an average of 13.8% per annum during the time horizon. Agricultural and industrial sectors are expected to drive the growth at the earlier stage while service sector will take over from 2018. In other words, the economy would transform from agro-allied industrialization to service-based economy in line with the theory of economic development.

In his analysis of the Vision 20:2020 Economic Transformation Blueprint, Akpan (2009:35) states that the Vision 20:2020 has seven objectives, namely:

- ❖ To make Nigeria one of the 20 largest economies in the world by the year 2020;
- ❖ To make Nigeria an international finance centre;
- ❖ To evaluate Nigeria's potentials using development variables;

- ❖ To make Nigeria to be African's financial hub where most of the international financial transactions in Africa would be connected with Nigeria;
- ❖ To help other African nations move out of financial doldrums;
- ❖ To move Nigeria out of third world country state to an industrialized nation;
- ❖ To drive rapid and sustainable economic growth in Nigeria and Africa.

To be one of the 20 biggest economies by 2020 means that Nigeria must be able to do what some of the 20 biggest economies like the USA, China, Japan, Germany, France, Brazil, United Kingdom, Italy, India, Russia, Canada, Australia, Spain, Mexico, South Korea, Indonesia, Netherlands, Turkey, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, can do. As noted above, the vision envisages a GDP size of US\$900 billion. However, the current size of Nigeria's GDP is US\$245,229 billion, US\$268,708 billion, US\$262,606 billion and US\$268,700 billion and global ranking by size of GDP is 39, 37, 37 and 37 out of 193 countries based on the United Nations, World Bank, IMF and CIA World Factbook 2012 data respectively (see Table III below). While the projected growth rate per annum over the time horizon is 13.8%, the growth rates for the economy since 2009 are as follows: 2009 (7%); 2010 (8.1%); 2011 (6.9%); 2012 (6.7%) (See <http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/countries/>). The growth levels above are well below the desired growth of 13.8% per annum. It is very easy to see the yawning gap between the GDP of \$900 billion required by 2020 and the present situation. Thus, each year the country fails to grow at the projected 13.8%, it places itself in a situation in which it has to grow by 17 to 19% in subsequent years in order to catch up. Even a non-economist knows that this is impossible!

Table III: List of the First 20 Largest Economies in the World by GD

Rank	Country	*GDP \$Billion (UN, 2012)	Country	**GDP \$Billion (IMF, 2012)	Country	***GDP \$Billion (World Bank, 2012)	Country	****GDP \$Billion (CIA World Factbook, 2012)
1	United States	14,991,300	United States	15,684,750	United States	15,684,800	United States	15,680,000
2	China	7,203,784	China	8,227,034	China	8,227,103	China	8,227,000
3	Japan	5,870,357	Japan	5,963,969	Japan	5,959,718	Japan	5,964,000
4	Germany	3,604,061	Germany	3,400,579	Germany	3,399,589	Germany	3,401,000
5	France	2,775,518	France	2,608,699	France	2,612,878	France	2,609,000
6	Brazil	2,476,651	United Kingdom	2,440,505	United Kingdom	2,435,174	United Kingdom	2,441,000
7	United Kingdom	2,429,184	Brazil	2,395,968	Brazil	2,252,664	Brazil	2,396,000
8	Italy	2,195,937	Russia	2,021,960	Russia	2,014,775	Russia	2,058,000
9	India	1,897,608	Italy	2,014,079	Italy	2,013,263	Italy	2,014,000
10	Russia	1,857,770	India	1,824,832	India	1,841,717	India	1,825,000
11	Canada	1,736,869	Canada	1,819,081	Canada	1,821,424	Canada	1,819,000
12	Australia	1,515,468	Australia	1,541,797	Australia	1,520,608	Australia	1,542,000
13	Spain	1,478,206	Spain	1,352,057	Spain	1,349,351	Spain	1,352,000
14	Mexico	1,155,206	Mexico	1,177,116	Mexico	1,177,271	Mexico	1,177,000
15	South Korea	1,116,247	South Korea	1,155,872	South Korea	1,129,598	South Korea	1,156,000
16	Indonesia	846,834	Indonesia	878,198	Indonesia	878,043	Indonesia	894,900
17	Netherlands	836,823	Turkey	794,468	Turkey	789,257	Turkey	794,500
18	Turkey	774,983	Netherlands	773,116	Netherlands	772,227	Netherlands	773,100
19	Switzerland	660,762	Saudi Arabia	723,307	Switzerland	632,194	Saudi Arabia	727,300
20	Saudi Arabia	597,086	Switzerland	632,400	Saudi Arabia	576,824	Switzerland	632,400
28	S/Africa	408,237	29 S/Africa	384,315	29 S/Africa	384,313	29 S/Africa	384,300
39	Nigeria	245,229	37 Nigeria	268,708	37 Nigeria	262,606	37 Nigeria	268,700

Key:

*The first table includes data for the year 2012 for the first 20 largest economies of the world within the United Nations. Data are in billions of international dollars and were calculated by the United Nations.

**The second table includes data for the year 2012 for the first 20 largest economies of the world within the IMF. Data

are in billions of international dollars and were calculated by the IMF.

***The third table includes data for the year 2012 for the current United Nations member states. Data are in billions of international dollars and were compiled by the World Bank.

***The fourth table is a tabulation of the CIA World Factbook GDP data update of 2012. Final figures are estimates in billions of international dollars.

Source: http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP-489k-

Meanwhile, clarifying doubts on the prospects of actualizing the Vision 20:2020 while presenting the 2012 achievements of his ministry before the leadership of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) on 24th April 2012, the then Minister of National Planning, Dr Shamsuddeen Usman noted inter alia:

where were we in 2009 when we started the process? We were number 44. By the end of 2011, we were number 39 and by the end of 2012 we were number 36. This is progress...What I am saying is that even if we are not number 20 by that time, if by 2020 we are number 25, I will be a proud man. The reason is that we are consciously moving and doing all the necessary things to move up there (Vanguard, April 30, 2013).

Reiterating the above claims by the then minister, Eze (2013) notes that:

...the Commission and the Minister have continued to repose hope in the Vision as a realistic long term growth and development roadmap for the country, in line with this Administration's demonstrated determination, disposition and capacity to do things differently, to bring about change and the needed economic growth and strategic development.

A critical look at the national economy under the prevailing state of insecurity indicates that these positive and optimistic prospects from the Ministry of National Planning pale into insignificance. Accordingly, the vision is widely discountenanced as a utopian stunt that is not based on sound economics. This is essentially, though not exclusively, because of the prevailing state of insecurity in the country. Although Nigeria has made remarkable progress in some key sectors of the economy such as the macro-economic environment, information communication technology and science, the country's economic standing on the global scene in 2020 does not put her among the 20 most economically developed countries in the world as contained in the NV20:2020 document. Wave of insecurity of lives and property continues unabated in different parts of the country. The vandalism of oil pipelines, crude oil theft, and hostage-taking of expatriate workers in the Niger Delta, the interminable incidence of kidnapping in the South East, the armed robbery in the South West, and ethno-religious crises and the Boko Haram insurrection in different parts of the northern region have become ominous to the Vision 20:2020 project.

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

The paper examined the implication of the recurrent incidents of militancy and terrorism in Nigeria since 1999 on the actualization of the Vision 20:2020. It reveals that the realization of the Vision 20:2020 is essentially, though not exclusively, hinged on the ability of the Federal Government to squarely and comprehensively address the security questions in the country. Anchoring analysis within the radical approach to national security, the paper found that the undue attention paid to the hard (instead of the soft) components of our national security by the successive administrations is largely responsible for the origination and escalation of the activities of different militant and terrorist groups in Nigeria since 1999. As a misguided solution to the multifarious crises of national security, the government has consistently increased the annual fiscal allocation to internal security and defence within the period under study. However, the present practice whereby security gulps larger proportion of the national budget is unhealthy and unsustainable. This is because it has continued to deny critical sectors like health, education, agriculture, energy, construction, etc. the

needed attention and funding.

The vast human and material potentials in the country have not been repositioned to build a fast growing, dynamic and prosperous economy. Several factors such as harsh business environment have undermined the country's development. Its huge potentials are largely untapped, local entrepreneurship is weak while inflow of FDI remains unimpressive. This is because the degree of public safety and security is not only a barometer of political stability but also a key consideration by potential investors. Nigeria therefore needs as much foreign and domestic investment as it can garner to realize the ambition of the vision especially under the prevailing international perception of the country as riven by periodic eruptions of violence. The underlying causes of these problems need to be effectively addressed to create an enabling environment for the country's sustained growth and long term development. The paper therefore established that this ugly trend has crippled the national economy and correspondingly dimmed the actualization of the Vision 20:2020 project, which is merely seven years away.

Arising from the above findings therefore, the following recommendations are proffered:

- ❖ The federal government in collaboration with other sub-national governments should work assiduously to provide direct and indirect employment opportunities for the army of unemployed, disillusioned and restive youth in the country who are readily available for recruitment as militants, armed robbers, kidnappers, abductors and terrorists. The federal government should therefore formulate and effectively implement policies and programmes capable of addressing the root causes of insecurity in Nigeria such as poverty, unemployment, environmental degradation, dearth of infrastructural facilities, uneven development, among others.
- ❖ The federal government should phase out the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) and establish a more viable and result-oriented agency capable of addressing the problem of abject poverty among large population of Nigerians, particularly those residing in the rural areas.
- ❖ The government should resuscitate the National Directorate of Employment (NDE) and reposition agricultural sector so as to play active role in job creation for Nigerian youths.
- ❖ Since national security is the precondition which enhances the ability of government, its agencies, and citizens to function without let or hindrance, the successful implementation or otherwise of NV20:2020 is largely dependent on the state of security in the country. All inclusive and well coordinated security networks should therefore be worked out as a matter of urgency to assure safety of life and properties in Nigeria.
- ❖ As a corollary, the federal government should re-organize the country's intelligence system and build a capable and more proactive security apparatus in Nigeria. This will add more values in checking incessant bombings, robbery, kidnapping and violent crimes by hoodlums all over Nigeria and correspondingly attract more investors.
- ❖ The government should include Peace Studies and Security Management in school curriculum at primary, secondary and tertiary levels in Nigeria. This will enable the Nigerian youths to appreciate the importance of peace and security in a secular state like Nigeria.
- ❖ The use of military action to confront militants appears to be very expensive and most often military confrontational approach escalates violence rather than douse tension. Principles of mediation, negotiation, arbitration, reconciliation and general amnesty are contemporary strategies for contemporary conflict resolution. All militants who accept reconciliation should be rehabilitated and reintegrated.
- ❖ Lastly, the government and other interest groups should develop sincere political will to implement the recommendations of several panels and committees set-up to investigate immediate and remote causes of violent socio-political and ethno-religious crises in Nigeria.

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