

Activity of the UN Security Council with the Aim of Restoring Stability in Kosovo in 1998-1999

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Doi:10.5901/ajis.2013.v2n9p436

Abstract

The last ethnic conflict in the Balkans was ended on 10 June 1999. On the same day, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1244, in which the Security Council announced their decision to deploy international civil and security presence in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices. Taking into account that the UN Security Council is responsible for maintaining international peace and security, there is a question what did the UN Security Council do to avoid the conflict in Kosovo in 1999. The aim of the article is to find the answer to the question why the UN Security Council failed and why the NATO took the leading role in the wake of a deepening conflict in this region.

1. Introduction

At the beginning of the 1990s, Europe did not see Kosovo as a future war zone. Politicians from the Western European countries regarded Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia and an element of Serbian national identity.¹ What is more, in 1991-1997, Kosovo was not directly involved in the Balkan conflict and nobody predicted that this might change in the nearest future.² However, in 1992, the European Community attempted to discuss the problem of Kosovo. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) established a mission of long duration in this territory. Their efforts turned out insufficient.³ In addition, the Kosovo issue was not a part of peace negotiations in Dayton, which ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁴ It was evident that neither Europe nor the United States did undertake any strong effort to solve the problem in Kosovo, which then was only in its initial phase.

Since the beginning of 1998, the situation in Kosovo had deteriorated. In that time, the province evolved into a zone of widespread fighting between Serbian and Albanian people. At this stage of the conflict, the international community was forced to take action in order to solve the problem of Kosovo. One of the subjects involved in 1998-1999 in the process of stabilization in the province was the United Nations (UN). This article examines the engagement of the UN Security Council in solving the armed conflict in Kosovo.

2. Actions taken by the UN Security Council to stop the violent escalation in Kosovo

The first attempt of the UN Security Council to resolve the problem in the province took place in 1993. On 9 August 1993, the Security Council of the United Nations decided to establish resolution 855. In the document, the Security Council called upon the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to reconsider their refusal to allow the continuation of the activities of the CSCE mission of long duration in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina. In addition, the government in Belgrade was encouraged to cooperate with the CSCE mission and to increase the number of monitors as decided by the CSCE. The Security Council emphasized that the mission was an example of preventive diplomacy undertaken within the framework of the CSCE and had greatly contributed to promoting stability and counteracting the risk of violence in this part of the Balkans (Resolution S/RES/855).⁵ The government in Belgrade did not comply with the provisions of the Security Council. Since that time, this body of the United Nations had not taken any activities with the aim to bring back stability in Kosovo.

Facing the problem of the deepening conflict in Kosovo, on 31 March 1998, the UN Security Council issued resolution 1160. In that document, the Council condemned the use of excessive force by the Serbian police against civilians and peaceful demonstrators in Kosovo, as well as all acts of terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation Army and other groups which supported terrorist activities in Kosovo (Resolution S/RES/1160(1998)).⁶ In addition, the Security Council noted with appreciation all the actions taken by the international community with the aim of restoring peace in Kosovo.⁷ The UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,⁸ called upon both the authorities in Belgrade, and the leadership of the Kosovar Albanian community, to enter into a meaningful dialogue on political status

issues, without preconditions. In Article 8 of the resolution 1160, the UN Security Council established an embargo on arms and related materials of all types: weapons, ammunition, military vehicles and equipment. Under this article, arming and training for terrorist activities were forbidden in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including Kosovo (Resolution S/RES/1160).⁹ The Security Council called upon all states and all international and regional organizations to act strictly in conformity with the resolution. In addition, the body decided to create a Security Council committee consisting of all the members of the Council. The committee was established in accordance with rule 28 of its Provisional Rules of Procedures¹⁰ and was responsible for gaining information regarding the actions taken by from all the states concerning effective implementation of the prohibitions imposed by resolution 1160 and making periodic reports to the Security Council on the basis of this information.¹¹ The Security Council requested the Secretary General of the United Nations to provide all necessary assistance to the committee and keep the Council regularly informed on the situation in Kosovo and on the implementation of resolution 1160. The Security Council stressed that the situation in Kosovo would be reviewed on the basis of reports submitted by the Secretary General of the United Nations. At the end of the resolution, the Council emphasized that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were obliged to cooperate with the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal, which had been gathering information related to the violence in Kosovo. The UN Security Council also affirmed that progress in resolving political and human rights issues in Kosovo would improve the international position of the Republic of Yugoslavia, whereas failure in making constructive progress toward the peaceful resolution in the province would lead to consideration of additional measures.

Although resolution 1160 was established under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the document did not include a single statement that the situation in Kosovo might be posing a threat to international peace and security. This was probably caused by the fact that resolution 1160 was a compromise between Western states on one side, and Russia and China on the other. The two latter countries avoided being involved in integral issues of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. That was the reason why during the voting, the Chinese representative abstained, whereas the Russian ambassador, stressed that Russia had some doubts about this resolution, even though he decided to vote for it.

Resolution 1160 turned out to be insufficient. Even more so, that in spring 1998 the fights among Serbian and Albanian became more intense. The reports of the UN Secretary General stated that the situation in Kosovo was grave.¹² In these circumstances, the international community started considering the possibility of a military intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The lack of progress in peace negotiations, as well as the deterioration of the conflict, resulted on the establishment, on 23 September 1998, of the UN Security Council resolution 1199. This document included a statement that the situation in Kosovo was a threat to international peace and security. The Security Council expressed its concern about the rapid deterioration of the humanitarian situation across Kosovo. In addition, the Council condemned all acts of violence by any party, and emphasized that violations of the prohibitions imposed by resolution 1160 were still evident. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council demanded all parties to cease hostilities immediately and maintain a ceasefire in the province. What is more, the Council insisted on the authorities in Belgrade and the Kosovo Albanian leadership to enter into a meaningful dialogue without preconditions and with international involvement. The Security Council of the United Nations also stressed that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should have implemented all the measures which were contained in the Contact Group statement of 12 June 1998.¹³ In resolution 1199, the Security Council also recalled the obligations of all states to abide the prohibitions imposed by resolution 1160 and called upon them to provide adequate resources for humanitarian assistance in Kosovo. The Secretary General of the United Nations again was obliged to inform the Security Council on the compliance with the resolution.

It should be noted that resolution 1199 did not include a statement of military intervention in the case of the parties do not conform to the obligations. Russia and China opposed the resolution. Russia only supported a political settlement of the conflict and claimed that the actions taken by resolution 1199 were in line with the Russian point of view. China, however, did not use the veto, and instead abstained from voting for the resolution.

Resolution 1199 was a matter of importance. The NATO supported it, especially the United States and Great Britain, who stated that the lack of implementation of this document's provisions would be a basis for launching a NATO military operation, which was the reason why the international community was impatiently waiting for the report of the Secretary General.

The report of Kofi Annan, who was then the Secretary General of the United Nations, was published on 3 October 1998. Kofi Annan stressed that the report was created based on information provided by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Contact Group, and individual states. By taking into account these sources, the Secretary General was able to determine that the situation in Kosovo did not change. In his report, Kofi Annan stated that although in the last days of September 1998 the number of

fighths dropped, Kosovo was still a place where hostilities were visible. Fighting in Kosovo resulted in mass displacements of civilian population and destruction of villages (Report of the Secretary General S/1998/912).¹⁴ The Secretary General also noted violation of human rights, including killings and kidnapping, as well as the poor humanitarian situation in Kosovo. On the other hand, Kofi Annan welcomed the conclusions of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. These conclusions were adopted on 28 September 1998 and regarded the resolution of all humanitarian problems in Kosovo. The National Assembly also decided that the Government of Serbia would continue to cooperate with both the International Committee of the Red Cross and UNHCR.¹⁴ In the report, Kofi Annan condemned not only actions taken by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but also all the activities of the Albanian side. The report of the UN Secretary General was not unequivocal. Due to this fact, it was not a sufficient basis for a NATO military intervention.

The signing of an agreement by the United States Special Envoy – Richard Holbrook and President Slobodan Milosevic on 13 October 1998 was a milestone on the road to stabilization in Kosovo.¹⁵ However, the Security Council decided to establish another resolution. Resolution 1203 was adopted on 24 October 1998. In this document, the Security Council welcomed agreements providing for the OSCE to establish a Verification Mission in Kosovo,¹⁶ as well as an agreement providing the establishment of an Air Verification Mission by the NATO in the province.¹⁷ The Security Council again emphasized its support for a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo problem, which in its opinion would include an enhanced status for Kosovo with a substantially greater degree of autonomy and meaningful self-administration. The Council condemned all the violations of resolution 1160 and expressed its concern about the closure, by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, of independent media outlets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In addition, the Council required both the Serbian government in Belgrade and the Kosovo Albanian leadership to fully comply with resolutions 1160 and 1199, as well as to fully cooperate with the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo. The Council once again stressed that lack of a peaceful resolution in Kosovo was a threat to international peace and stability. In the article 15 of the resolution, the Security withdrew the embargo on guns and other military materials, which were used by the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo.¹⁸ Resolution 1203, also obliged the Secretary General to submit reports to the Security Council regarding the implementation of the resolution. Resolution 1203 turned out to be controversial. The Russian ambassador – Sergey Lavrov – emphasized in a speech that the government in Belgrade made some progress in the process of resolving the conflict in Kosovo. Russia claimed that this resolution did not take into account this kind of progress. What is more, Russia did not agree with the statement that the conflict in Kosovo was still a threat to peace and security. Sergey Lavrov did not support the sentence connected with the problem of free media in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Taking into account these arguments, Russia, as well as China, decided to abstain from casting a vote.

The first report of the UN Secretary General, which was related to the compliance with resolution 1203 and two previous resolutions, was announced on 12 November 1998. The Secretary General of the UN emphasized that:

The accord reached by the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, and the United States Special Envoy, Richard Holbrooke, on 13 October 1998, as well as the agreements signed in Belgrade on 15 October 1998 between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the OSCE, have contributed toward defusing the immediate crisis situation in Kosovo and have created more favorable conditions for a political settlement (Report of the Secretary General S/1998/1068).¹⁹

However, the report was announced after the signing of the agreement of 13 October 1998. It included some information which was gained by the Mission of the United Nations, and was considered as a significant proof that the conflict in Kosovo had not ended.²⁰ In the same document, the UN Secretary General did not support the idea of establishing a permanent UN mission in Kosovo. He only stated that, at the request of the Security Council, the UN could establish temporary observation missions which would examine the situation in Kosovo.

Another report by Kofi Annan was announced on 24 December 1998. In it, the Secretary General alarmed that the situation in the province had become more serious. More than 50 persons died during massive attacks in Kosovo (Report of the Secretary General S/1998/1221).²¹ Despite the European Union's and the United States' attempts to find a solution, there was no progress in the political dialogue.

In January 1999, the situation in Kosovo came to a boiling point. Then, journalists and the OSCE verified the discovery, in the village of Racak, of the bodies of 45 civilians (Weller, 2008),²² who had been executed – apparently by Serbian forces.²³ The Secretary General, in his report of 30 January 1999, shed also some light on the massacre in Racak, claiming that the situation in Kosovo was profoundly serious. In the view of the Secretary General, the conflict in Kosovo was likely to cause an outbreak of civil war in the province. At the same time, the NATO warned both parties that should not political settlement be made, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would start a military intervention.

On 6 February 1999, the Contact Group organized peace negotiations in Rambouillet. The delegation of Albanian signed the agreement of 18 March 1999; which was rejected by the representatives of Serbia.²⁴ In this situation, the military intervention of the NATO became a real option. The Security Council of the United Nations could not have adopted any resolutions which would legitimate the military actions supported by the United Nations. The deadlock was caused by Russia and China. These two countries declared they would veto this kind of a resolution, which resulted in the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization claim that UN Security Council resolutions 1160, 1199, 1203, based on the Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and the indications of the threat to international peace and security were sufficient to establish military operations. The lack of a Serbian-Albanian agreement, as well as the further steps of the UN Security Council, resulted in the NATO air campaign in the territory of Kosovo on 24 March 1999.

3. The UN Security Council facing the situation in Kosovo after the NATO military intervention

During the NATO military intervention in the province, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1239 of 14 May 1999. The resolution had a primarily humanitarian dimension. The UN Security Council expressed its concern about the humanitarian catastrophe in and around Kosovo, which also caused an enormous influx of Kosovo refugees into Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and other countries (Resolution S/RES/1239(1999)).²⁵ The Council also emphasized that the states, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and international organizations, should coordinate humanitarian relief activities in Kosovo. The Security Council called upon the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to enable the United Nations, as well as all other humanitarian personnel to operate in Kosovo, as well as other parts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. At the end of resolution 1239, the UN Security Council warned both sides that the absence of a political solution to the crisis would continue to make the humanitarian situation worse. The resolution was also adopted, China and Russia abstaining, as the countries decided not to support the humanitarian assistance of the UNHCR and other organizations in the province.

The official military intervention of the North Atlantic Organization lasted until 20 June 1999. On 3 June 1999, Belgrade decided to accept a peaceful settlement. On 10 June 1999, the Security Council adopted, with the support of Russia, resolution 1244. In this resolution, the Security Council decided to deploy international civil and security presence under United Nations auspices. The Council authorized the Secretary General with the assistance of relevant organizations²⁶ to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo – the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK, Mandate).²⁷ The mission was divided into two components. The NATO was responsible for military issues, whereas the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations coordinated the civilian component of the mission. The mission was responsible for:

*Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement of substantial autonomy and self-governance in Kosovo, performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required, organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government, supporting the reconstruction of the key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction, protecting and promoting human rights etc (Resolution S/RES/1244).*²⁸

Resolution 1244 also stated that the mission was responsible for facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status. The resolution did not precisely describe the future status of Kosovo. The document did not mention a future independence of the province. Resolution 1244 guaranteed only autonomy for Kosovo, within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. At that time, the future status of Kosovo was a question mark.

4. Conclusion

The crisis in Kosovo became turned out as a striking example of the UN Security Council's weakness. Although the deepening of the conflict in Kosovo happened in 1998, the UN Security Council, by the adaptation of resolution 855 in 1993, proved that since that year, the stability in Kosovo had been in danger. Taking into account the fact that resolution 1160 was adopted in 1998, the Council had been avoiding the issue of Kosovo for almost five years.

The UN Security Council, under Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations, is responsible for maintaining international peace and security. All the resolutions which were proclaimed in 1998 were the outcome of compromise. Without that compromise, it is highly possible that the Security Council could not have adopted any of them. That was the reason why this body decided not to establish any other form of sanctions, such as economic ones, or restrictions to travel.

In this situation, the NATO member states, while establishing the military intervention, broke the Charter's provisions, thereby making the military intervention illegal in the light of international law.

On the other hand, there is the question what the international community should have done in this kind of situation. Kosovo was a place where human rights were violated. The deadlock in the Security Council caused the spreading of the humanitarian disaster. In these circumstances, the NATO had two options: to break international law, or observe human rights being violated. The casus of the Kosovo conflict once again showed that the system of the United Nations requires changes. In contrast, the UN Security Council does not have the practical tools to solve conflicts dividing the permanent representatives of this body.

5. Notes

- 1 According to Serbs, Kosovo has been their property since the Middle Ages. In the 14th century, all the registered villages inhabited by Albanians were situated in the Western and South-Western Metohija. Only 2% of the whole population of Kosovo was Albanian. See: Gibas-Krzak, D. (2008, 19) *Serbsko-albański konflikt o Kosovo w XX wieku. Uwarunkowania, przebieg, konsekwencje*. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek.
On 15 June 1389, the Battle of Kosovo Polje took place. As a consequence, most of the Balkan territories were seized by the Turks. This battle strengthened the historical between Serbia and Kosovo.
- 2 On the other hand, in 1990, in Kacanik, the Albanians from Kosovo decided to accept the Constitution of Kosovo. At the same time, Serbs exacerbated repressions against Albanians in Kosovo, and on 28 September 1990, the new Serbian Constitutional Act abolished the territorial autonomy of Kosovo and Metohija. On 26-30 September 1991, more than a million inhabitants of Kosovo participated in the referendum. 99,87% voted in favor of the sovereignty and independence of the province. Some months later, Bujar Bukoshi became Prime Minister of Kosovo, whereas Ibrahim Rugova was nominated as the President of Kosovo. Since then, Kosovo has been a territory of dual power. See: Koszel, B. (2000, 39). *Konflikt na Bałkanach (1991-1999) a bezpieczeństwo europejskie*. Poznań: Instytut Zachodni.
What is more, in 1996, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) confirmed that they had organized several bomb attacks against Serbian Police units in Kosovo. The KLA wanted to make international community resolve the conflict in Kosovo and support the independence of this territory. The activities of the KLA, dual power in Kosovo and the poor economic situation of Albanians in the province contributed to the escalation of the violence in time. Marcinko, M. (2008, 148-149). *Wyzwoleńcza Armia Kosowa: analiza struktury i ocean działalności*, in: P. Czubik (Ed.), *Bałkany u progu zjednoczonej Europy*. Kraków: Instytut Multimedialny.
- 3 In June 1992, the European Council created a declaration which emphasized the legitimate aspirations of the Kosovars to autonomy. On the other hand, during the summit in Edinburgh, the European Council decided to support the autonomy of Kosovo within Serbia. Koszel, B. (2000, 39).
The Mission of CSCE in Kosovo was launched in 1992. The aim of its mission was to promote the dialogue between Serbs and Albanians in the province. In 1993, the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not allow this mission to exercise its mandate.
- 4 Peace negotiations in Dayton lasted from 1 November 1995 until 21 November 1995. The official peace treaty was signed on 14 December 1995 in Paris. See: Orzelska, A. (2004, 166). *Wpływ konfliktu w byłej Jugosławii na stosunki między Stanami Zjednoczonymi a Unią Europejską 1990-1995*, Warszawa: Wiedza Powszechna.
- 5 Resolution S/RES/855 (1993), accessed on June 21, 2013 [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/855\(1993\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/855(1993)).
- 6 Resolution S/RES/1160 (1998), accessed on June 22, 2013 [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1160\(1998\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1160(1998)).
- 7 The Security Council especially noted the statements of the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America (the Contact Group) of 9 and 25 March 1998, including the proposal on a comprehensive arms embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including Kosovo. The UN Security Council also appreciated the decision of the Special Session of the Permanent Council of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) of 11 March 1998 (S/1998/246). See: Resolution S/RES/1160 (1998).
- 8 Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations concerns action with the respect to threats to peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression. See: Charter of the United Nations, accessed on June 22, 2013 <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml>.
- 9 Article 8 of resolution 1160, see: Resolution S/RES/1160 (1998).

- 10 Rule 28 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure says that "The Security Council may appoint a commission or committee or a rapporteur for a specified question". Provisional Rules of Procedure (S/96/Rev.7), accessed on 22 June, 2013 <http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/rules/>.
- 11 All the states were requested to report to the committee, within 30 days of adoption of this resolution, on the steps they had taken to give effect to the prohibitions imposed by the resolution.
The committee was also obliged to consider any information brought to its attention by any state concerning the effective implementation of the prohibitions imposed by resolution 1160.
- 12 The first report of the UN Secretary General was announced on 30 April 1998. It was based on the information gained by the European Union, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the Contact Group. The Secretary General stressed that the situation in Kosovo deteriorated and that there was no progress in peace negotiations between the parties. All the other reports submitted by the Secretary General on 4 June 1998, on 5 August 1998, and on 4 September 1998, did not mention any further progress in this matter. See: Reports of the Secretary General to the Security Council in 1998, accessed on June 22, 2013 <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/sgreports/1998.shtml>.
- 13 The Contact Group statement of 12 June 1998 says that actions taken by the security forces affecting the civilian population should be ceased. What is more, in this statement, the Contact Group called upon the government in Belgrade to enable effective and continuous international monitoring in Kosovo, by the European Community Monitoring Mission, and the diplomatic mission accredited to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In this document, the Contact Group also requested the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to facilitate, in agreement with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the safe return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes and allow free and unimpeded access for humanitarian organizations and supplies in Kosovo. See: Article 4 of resolution 1160, Resolution S/RES/1199(1998), accessed on June 22, 1998 [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1199\(1998\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1199(1998)).
- 14 Report of the Secretary General pursuant to resolutions 1160(1998) and 1199 (1998) of the Security Council, S/1998/912, accessed on June 22, 1998 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/1998/912.
- 15 On the basis of this agreement on the territory of Kosovo a verification mission of the OSCE and air mission of the NATO was launched.
- 16 This agreement was signed in Belgrade on 16 October 1998 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Chairman-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Resolution S/RES/1203 (1998), accessed on June 22, 2013, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1203\(1998\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1203(1998)).
- 17 The agreement was signed in Belgrade on 15 October 1998 by the Chief of General Staff of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. See: resolution S/RES/1203 (1998).
- 18 Article 15 of resolution 1203, Resolution S/RES/1203 (1998).
- 19 Report of the Secretary General pursuant to resolutions 1160(1998), 1199(1998), and 1203 (1998) of the Security Council (S/1998/1068), accessed on June 22, 2013 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/1998/1068.
- 20 The Mission of the United Nations established by the Secretariat of the United Nations which was functioning from 17 to 27 October 1998 in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including Kosovo and Montenegro. The members of the mission took active part in meetings with the representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the local leaders and representatives of the Albanian community. The mission also organized consultations with local and international non-governmental organizations and governmental organizations. Due to this fact, the United Nations deepened its role in the Kosovo crisis. See: Report of the Secretary General prepared pursuant to resolutions 1160(1998), 1199(1998), and 1203 (1998) of the Security Council (S/1998/1068).
- 21 Report of the Secretary General pursuant to resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998) and 1203 (1998) of the Security Council S/1998/1221, accessed on June 22, 2013 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/1998/1221.
- 22 Weller, M. (2008, 85). *Peace Lost. The failure of conflict prevention in Kosovo*, Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
- 23 The massacre in Racak was a controversial matter. Belgrade claimed that the individuals killed in the village were KLA fighters who had been killed in an armed engagement. The OSCE asked the European Union to

- establish an EU Forensic Expert Team on the Racak Incident. See: Report of the EU Forensic Expert Team on the Racak Incident, March 17, 1999, the United States Information Agency, accessed on June 22, 2013 <http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/kosovo/kosovo-massacres2.htm>.
- 24 See: Weller, M. (2008, 92-95).
- 25 Resolution S/RES/1239 (1999), accessed on June 22, 2013, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1239\(1999\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1239(1999)).
- 26 The UNMIK was divided into four pillars: Police and justice coordinated by the United Nations; Humanitarian issues led by the UNHCR; Democratization and institution building, under the OSCE; and Reconstruction and economic development managed by the European Union. See: Rydzkowski, J. (2003, 132-133) *Słownik Organizacji Narodów Zjednoczonych*, Warszawa: Wiedza Powszechna.
- 27 UNMIK Mandate, accessed on June 22, 2013, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmik/mandate.shtml>.
- 28 Resolution S/RES/1244 (1999), accessed on June 22, 2013, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1244\(1999\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1244(1999)).

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