



Research Article

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Preventative Strategy to Solve Radicalism in University: The Case Study in State University of Surabaya, Indonesia

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Abstract

This study aims to explore and explain the spread of radicalism ideology at the State University of Surabaya and how the preventative strategy from the university to solve it. The data research was collected through observation, interview, and Forum Group Discussion (FGD) with students, lecturers, and university staff. The data analysis was conducted with a qualitative narrative approach. The study result implies that the spread of radicalism ideology begins with a small halaqah and then grows to become a more significant regular event held in the university that can attract many visitors and followers passively or actively of this ideology. Therefore, UNESA created Radicalism Preventative to reduce the spread of radicalism from the policy to the technical level, able to control all religious extracurricular activities of students within the campus free from radicalism.

Keywords: Ideology, Law, Preventative Strategy, Radicalism, Responsibility, University

1. Introduction

In 2018, The State Intelligence Agency informed that seven state universities in Indonesia were exposed to radicalism. The State Intelligence Agency research also revealed that 39 percent of students in fifteen provinces were interested in radicalism. The level of student interest in radicalism ideology is categorized into low, medium, and high (Halim, 2018). Radicalism becomes one of the significant problems of the nation that must be resolved to maintain the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia. Considering that the threat of radicalism is genuine for a country, the government has to cut the connecting link between citizens and terrorists through synergism with various local communities in the country (Harding, 2008). Furthermore, radicalism in a country can be suppressed and prevented by the role of government in setting regulations and policies (Al Qudah et al., 2019).

The phenomenon of radicalism exists in every country. In Indonesia, radicalism found its fertile ground to bloom after the political reformation liberated democratism in society after being suppressed by a dictatorship government for about thirty years. In this country, radicalism is often connected to the ideology a group of Muslims adopted (Yani et al., 2020), for example Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) as one of the radical organizations. However, in the general context, radicalism can be raised in various conditions of a country's economic, political, social, and cultural. Awan (2012) stated that the religion issue becomes a target of radicals in spreading their ideology through infiltration into a religious event held in mosques and students' religious gatherings. Therefore, radicalism is often correlated to religious radicalism, specifically Islamic radicals. Islamic radicals are identified as "extremists," "jihadists," and "terrorists." This stigma is vague and openly aimed at specific groups of Muslims. Based on Keene (2011) states that the stigma built-in radical cadre is jihad that is interpreted as a Muslim war with non-Muslims.

Furthermore, radicals use mass media to solicit and preach their ideology. In the political constellation of Indonesia, the problem of Islamic radicalism has become even more remarkable because its supporters are significantly increased. The freedom of sharing opinions and participating in community organizations and activities is part of human rights enforcement as long as it does not threaten national security (Tahrir, 2013a).

There are internal factors and external factors that cause students to be exposed to radicalism. First, the internal factor comes from the characteristic of youth age in students. The seeds of radicalism are spread systematically and strategically in the campus area to target Muslim youth because they often face dilemmas in the search for identity, aspire to lead others, and need social recognition (Angel, 2008). Then the other internal factor comes from socioeconomic motives (Ljubic et al., 2017). It was discovered that terrorists are supported by donors who combine grants and social funds that manage operational costs for organizations such as Al Qaeda and Hizbulloh (O'Halloran et al., 2018).

Meanwhile, the external factor comes from the influential and persuasive charismatic leader of radicals who can attract their cadre. According to Domínguez Escrig et al., (2016) leaders' ability in a radical group is very influential in recruiting cadres and managing their organization. For example, radical leaders often use their influence and social networking to spread radical doctrines in various communication and events. Therefore, terrorist cadres can be assumed as victims of extremism ideology exposure (Chown et al., 2018).

A study stated that government supervision and integrity in supporting and playing an active role in solving radical movements in a country (McDonald & Mir, 2011). When radicals create a passionate community of interacting and discussing with students, it will cause high fanaticism (Mayes, 2019). According to Sekerka & Yacobian (2018), who explained that preventive strategy is needed to deal with radicalism based on ethics, religion, race, and belief issues to prevent its effect, such as Islamophobia caused by narrow mindset and prejudice about Islam that generalize this religion as the breeder of terrorism movement across countries.

In the context of Higher Education in Indonesia, not many State Universities are suspected to be exposed to radicalism ideology. The results of the Institute for Research and Community Service of

the Nahdhatul Ulama University of Indonesia (UNUSIA) Jakarta showed an entire Islamic organization that infiltrated eight state universities in Indonesia. The study's results also revealed that the inclusion of radicalism was brought by three exclusive Islamic organizations: Salafi, KAMMI, and HTI (Amanullah, 2019). The phenomenon of radicalism and the movement are targeting students by inviting them to join activities on and off campus and infiltrating their cadre into student organizations.

There were several research findings by Setara Institute investigated and ranked the Indonesian universities in which fundamentalist studies such as UIN Bandung, UIN Jakarta, Mataram University, Institute Bogor Agriculture, Yogyakarta State University, Gajah Mada University, Brawijaya University, Bandung Institute of Technology, Airlangga University, and the University of Indonesia. Fundamentalist is a person who believes in a literal and strict interpretation of religious scriptures (Satria, 2019). According to Rayment & Smith, (2013), concerns about stopping radicalism in educational institutions increased. It is because the educational institution is responsible for solving any humanitarian issues that should be sustained and transferred to its university students to support society's unity, safety, and prosperity. Based on the works of literature above, this article aims to explore and explain the spread of radicalism ideology in Universitas Negeri Surabaya (UNESA) and how the preventative strategy of the university is to solve it. The study focused on the period after the Indonesian government banned HTI as one of the radical organizations.

2. Methods

The data collected in this study applied observation, interview, and forum group discussion (FGD) methods. The observation was carried out in early 2019 by participating in the routine *halaqah* or meeting by HTI Unesa activists and its followers every Tuesday and Thursday afternoon held around the Campus Mosque area. This event discussed leaders, members, sympathizers, and followers covered by common issues (not only about religious issues) to camouflage their identity as banned HTI. The nuances of radicalism ideology are still intense. Meanwhile, the interviews were conducted by the researcher to explore the reasons for members or followers participating in the *halaqah* organized by HTI, as well as to explore the discussion issues in that event. Descriptive-qualitative and narrative approaches analyzed the collected data.

3. Results

As a futuristic-oriented Islamic movement, Hizb ut-Tahrir targeted students as the central pillar of his mission. With this perspective, HTI activists also expanded their target to Muslim students who have a Muslim spirit and struggle to uphold religion (Ghirah fi al-Islam). Based on Valasik & Phillips (2017), radical organizations target scholars and practitioners because of their awareness of the robustness of literature and dynamic decentralized perspectives in the modern era. Besides, students have a strategic position as agents of change who are highly expected to bring the brightest future to the nation and maintain harmonization in a multi religious and multicultural society in a country, especially in Indonesia. The strategic position is not only because they are young people who will become future leaders but also because of their intellectual potential to change society.

Furthermore, HTI's preaching methods, before being officially banned by the Indonesian government, included organizing seminars, book reviews, talk shows, dialogue, and Qur'an recitals in the campus area, inviting all students. The topics of these events are political issues and the latest issues that aim to attract student interest and drive public opinion to agree with the radicalism mindset to address and solve the issues. Besides organizing events, HTI radicals also personally approach students by distributing their bulletins (formerly known as Al-Islam Bulletin) or publishing books given to students at events they hold. Falkheimer (2014) mentioned that printed and online media could be effective communication methods to raise public awareness and anxiety about specific issues. Therefore, this massive radical movement requires serious attention from the

university to be concerned and solved.

Moreover, the local and global networks support the broader and stronger HTI network in preaching activities to build awareness about reviving Islamic Caliphate to lead the government (El Siwi, 2018; Osman, 2010). For example, the Southeast Asian Network of Hizb ut-Tahrir also mutually reinforces da'wah in Indonesia and Malaysia (Osman, 2010). In their kaderization process, not all HTI activists have reached the organization's target. Because the students' understanding of the meaning of the HTI da'wah mission is also influenced by several factors, such as the emotional closeness to the preacher and the motivation of students to join organizations or activities, such as student desires to add political insight, nationalism understanding or even economic-driven motivation (Sabry, 2018).

When there was suspicion of the involvement of UNESA lecturers exposed to the radical movement, the Chancellor of UNESA confirmed it to the lecturer because this condition would also impact the campus as an institution as the Ministry of Research and Technology vision to liberate campus from radicalism ideology. It becomes an effort to counter radicalism at the grassroots level, as Sawalha (2017) explained that the state system's communication, collaboration, and intelligence unit must be involved in counter-terrorism. Addressing this issue, the Minister of Research and Technology and Higher Education of the Republic of Indonesia has warned university leaders to give attention and make efforts to prevent radicalism in universities. This warning includes no hesitation in imposing sanctions on university leaders who could not overcome radicalism on campus. It shows that radicalism on campus has become an important issue that needs to be addressed seriously through various meanings.

Therefore, at the end of 2018, the Chancellor firmly stated that organizations exposed to radical ideology should not grow and develop in UNESA. Even all campus academicians are prohibited from participating in the organization and related activities. The formation of the Profiler Team then followed the Chancellor's policy to prevent the entry of radical ideology on campus. Moreover, the provision of the principles of nationalism to students through extracurricular activities and discussions that are not too doctrinal is more effective and preferred by the younger generation in China (Chong, 2018). The university leaders also created an extra-campus organization policy exposed to radicalism not to use campus facilities. The activists and sympathizers of this organization were very smooth and soft in carrying out their movements and activities, including merging their events with the activities carried out by UNESA internal student organizations. Several HTI activists were even appointed as internal functionaries in student organizations, enabling them to distribute leaflets, bulletins, and magazines to students around campus. Many radical organizations employ media publications to recruit members from Muslim student societies (Corcoba & Portilla, 2019).

4. Discussion

4.1 *The Development of HTI in Indonesia*

Several factors cause HTI to develop rapidly in Indonesia. First, the persecution carried out by Arab countries against HT due to HT's aggressive efforts to take power in 1970 has encouraged HT activists to emigrate to Muslim-populated countries in Africa, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Southeast Asia, and even western countries such as Australia and America thereby expanding its network and allowing it to internationalize (Wibisono, 2018). Secondly, the approach HTI has used in Indonesia follows the spirit of the Islamic political movement that had already existed in this country, which continues to try to Islamize politics and society through the emergence of many Islamic political parties participating in government or as opposition to the government.

In addition, HTI has proven itself capable of modifying its movements to fit the context of Indonesian political change: secret and low profile during the authoritarian era and able to maintain mass mobilization critical to any government policy during the democratic era. Finally, HTI has shown that it can penetrate the circle of civilian and military leaders and obtain the protection they need in return for their capacity to mobilize sympathizers in Islamist-nationalist interests. HTI needs

this protection not only to avoid repressive actions by the government but also to keep the organization on the outskirts of Indonesian political Islam in terms of its ideological orientation. The Indonesian President's decision to revoke the HTI permit significantly hindered organizations' ability to organize in society even though they had deep roots in Indonesian society and had expanded their presence regionally. Finally, HTI relies on more than specific leadership figures published outside to maintain the movement but relies on their mobilization machines at the grassroots level (Wibisono, 2018).

4.2 Radicalism Movement in Higher Education

Radicals and radicalism are neutral concepts in the world of thought and movement. In many kinds of literature, it is mentioned that the word radical is derived from the Latin word *radix* means "origin" or "root." Those who embrace radical ideology want to return to something original or fundamental. Thus, religious radical means people who return to a pure and basic foundation of their religious beliefs, in the context of Muslims "returning to sharia laws." Based on the Collins Dictionary of Sociology, radicalism is a joint effort to change the status quo. Radical social movements are "social movements that reject the prevailing social order as a whole and are characterized by a strong moral irritation to oppose and be hostile to people who have special rights and power." Radicalism is an understanding or movement to take things to the root.

Gidden in Achmad (2020) explained that being radical means having particular insights to escape from the clutches of the past. Some of those who are radical are indeed revolutionary, although not identical, radicals also called revolutionists. The passage explains that there was nothing wrong with radicals at first. However, their efforts to return to the original or root usually trigger blinded fanatic behavior and groupthink and assume others are wrong. Radicals become "true believers," so the seeds of radicalism are exclusive, monolithic, and intolerant. *Radicalism* is an attitude that wants a totalitarian and revolutionary system to change by drastically revoking existing values through massive thinking.

Radicalism is a response to the conditions, which manifests through evaluation, rejection, strong resistance, and the desire to change with the new system. There are several indicators of radical attitude and understanding, such as: (1) intolerant, not willing to respect the opinions or beliefs of others, (2) fanatics, feeling righteous of themselves; considering other people or groups to be wrong, (3) exclusive, differentiate themselves from Muslims in general, and (4) revolutionary (tend to use violent means to achieve goals), (5) make efforts to continually reject and demand drastic change (6) followers of radicalism usually have a strong belief in the program designed.

This radicalism movement initially emerged as a form of resistance to Pancasila as a single principle on one side and the siege of secularism, capitalism, and socialism on the other. For Islamic radicals, the Pancasila democratic system is considered unlawful, and the government is called a *kafir taghut* (unbeliever and one who has crossed the limits) based on Islamic law. From the perspective of Islamic radicals, Western capitalism has ravaged morals, ethics, and order of life so that people fall into a promiscuous, hedonistic, and materialistic life far from Islamic values. Therefore, in their perspective, to drive people back to glory, they must return to Islam by echoing the formalization of sharia as a solution in the state's life. Nevertheless, sharia cannot be enforced if no country guarantees the validity of sharia constitutionally.

4.3 Preaching (Da'wah) Method of HTI in Higher Education

As stated above, the purpose of HTI's establishment is to continue the life of Islam and Islamic *da'wah* by applying Islamic rules in a secret society in the form of an international Islamic state (Islamic State or Islamic Caliphate). By establishing this Islamic state, Muslims will be able to free themselves from the grip of the West both politically and culturally. More than that, in reality, all Muslim lands, especially in the Middle East, apply the *Kufr* law and system but only to specific laws that use Islamic law to rule

marriage, divorce, and inheritance. Therefore, applying total Islamic rules is mandatory (Tahrir, 2013b). According to Korstanje, (2018), radicalism actors who came from abroad made the tourism route a way of entering a country. Then, they continued to spread their ideology that was forced to oppose the form or ideology of a country with the support of elements from the country of origin.

The method of Hizb ut-Tahrir propaganda for raising public awareness includes:

1. fostering or raising awareness of the ummah (al-Thathqif),
2. interaction and war on thoughts other than Islam (al-Shira ma al-Ummah), and
3. enforcement of power in the presence of Daulah Islamiyah (Islamic State).

In this step, Hizb ut-Tahrir was able to gain power through the people and subsequently carry out the ideology (*mabda'*) in a revolutionary and comprehensive manner rather than partially and gradually in society. In this step, sharia is adopted with the Islamic Caliphate as the central pillar. Baines et al., (2010) explain that terrorists use ideological politicization and the pretext of religious awareness raised with propaganda. According to Dean & Pettet (2017), the government needs to detect the seeds of terrorism by implementing risk triangulation (estimating, calculating, and managing risk). In addition to these efforts, compelling and coercive counter-terrorism strategies are needed to give a deterrent effect by implementing deradicalization programs (Hofmann, 2017).

Furthermore, this group also emphasized in its various works that Daulah Islamiyah, led by Islamic Caliphate, is a distinct Islamic state model and very different from the current state models such as the kingdom, republic, empire, federation, or others. This difference concerns the principle from which rules or thoughts arise, understanding and reference standards used to regulate their people, and how they do law enforcement based on Sharia Law. From the HTI perspective, some current Islamic state models are not the same as the Islamic Caliphate as it deviates and violates the Islamic *aqidah*. Therefore, the existence of HT is predicated on gradually worsening democracy because of their dualism in ideology and government systems (Hung, 2017).

Table 1: Concept, Purpose and Da'wah (Preaching) Method of Hizbut Tahrir (HT)

Concept	Objective	Method	Strategy
Liberating Muslims from kufr (Islamic unbeliever) and the kufr (government) system	Enforcing sharia law in all life aspects.	Three stages; 1. Fostering Daulah Islamiyah and Islamic Caliphate ideologies through planned social movement.	- Selection of cadre candidates through halaqah, discussion, dialogue events - Intensive halaqah for cadres and HT members
	Establishing Daulah Islamiyah (Islamic State) led by the Islamic Caliphate System.	2. Preaching activity to enable political and ideology discourse within Muslim societies.	Formation of public opinion (criticizing government policies, attacking capitalist infidels' ideas, providing alternative Islamic solutions)
		3. Enforcement of the Islamic Caliphate by infiltrating and participating in passive and active political action.	Involving in practical politics such as becoming Islamic parties' members or applying as election candidates.

4.4 The Spread and Prevention of Radicalism at the University

In 2010, the government issued Presidential Regulation No. 46 of 2010 concerning establishing the National Counterterrorism Agency (in Indonesia called *Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme* or abbreviated BNPT), which is 2012 was amended by Presidential Regulation No. 12 of 2012. The establishment of the BNPT is a state policy in combating terrorism in Indonesia as the development; of the Terrorism Eradication Coordination Desk (in Indonesian called *Desk Koordinasi Pemberantasan Terorisme* or abbreviated DKPT) was established in 2002. To prevent terrorism, BNPT uses two strategies (Tjumano, 2020):

4.4.1 Counter Radicalization

This strategy uses non-violent values to prevent terrorism implemented through both formal and non-formal education. Counter-radicalization is directed at the general public through collaboration with religious leaders, educational leaders, community leaders, traditional leaders, youth leaders, and other stakeholders in internalizing nationalist values into societies. Nevertheless, this cannot be a standalone strategy since some educational leaders who cooperated with BNPT in combating radicalism are lately recognized as radicalism activists or sympathizers (Muryanto, 2018).

4.4.2 Deradicalization

This deradicalization was focused on sympathizers, supporters, sponsors, and all HTI members inside and outside the prison. The purpose of deradicalization is to make them abandon the methods of violence and terror in achieving their mission to change their radical ideas and adapt them to the spirit of moderate Islamic groups by the principles of unity and integrity of the Republic of Indonesia. This strategy is indeed one of the things that must be done to overcome radicalism. However, it still needs to be refined further by continuous monitoring to ensure they are genuinely free from radicalism.

Meanwhile, some universities in Indonesia also created their prevention strategy to overcome the massive radicalism movement on campus. UNESA has established a "Radicalism Prevention System" or called as *SiPERA* that collaborated with BNPT that aims to profile radicals since they were accepted into this university. This system aims to prevent the exposure of radicalism to students from the beginning, and those who have been exposed to radicalism will be fostered to change so as not to influence other students to join to create harmony in the religious life and organize on campus.

The profiling system is an investigation system implemented by profilers (BNPT special division) to prevent and identify possible terrorism suspects and analyze patterns that can predict criminal acts and future victims. It is a system of eliminating radicalism in the scope of higher institutions in a detailed, structured, and coordinated manner so that it can be carried out by all state and private universities in Indonesia. Profiler Division will make a permanent guideline on the characteristics and criteria of radicalism as a reference for the entire academic community, as explained in Figure 1 below.




Figure 1: UNESA Radicalism Prevention System (*SiPERA*)

Further, Green, (2017) revealed that young people tend to want to know more about their country through information obtained, social interactions, and understanding local wisdom. Young people, especially students, manifest their loyalty to the country through thoughts and actions. Therefore, the success of radicalism prevention and prevention efforts can be maximized with the collaboration of four institutions: the state, family, community, and educational institutions.

The state should not have provided space for growing the seeds of radicalism by anticipating any causes of the radicalism movement. Then, the family or parents play a role in instilling loyalty and nationalism in the younger generation and make the family a unit to instill the values of justice, peace, respect, tolerance, and a place for consultation and discussion. Moreover, the community plays a role in creating a conducive space for creating a culture of peace among the younger generation. Educational institutions are providing knowledge and understanding about the negative effect of radicalism ideology to the student. The combination of these elements will impose a strong deterrent effect in dealing with the influence and invitation of radical terrorism.

To extend students from exposure to radicalism, *SiPERA* also fosters student religious groups on campus to implement da'wah that is under the teachings of Islam, which are more moderate and do not conflict with the principles of nationalism and nationality as follows:

- a) Preaching Islam as a religion that brings blessing for all (*rahmatan lil 'alamin*) to students by emphasizing the actualization of the teachings of justice (*ta'âdul*), balance (*tawâzun*), moderate (*tawassuth*), tolerance (*tasâmuh*) and improvement / reformative (*ishlâhiyah*).
- b) Directing the Islamic movement in the context of *ishlâh al-ummah* (improvement of the people) without opposing the Republic of Indonesia. It is because religion and state power are two twin brothers. Religion is the foundation, while state power is its bodyguard. Islam does not determine, let alone oblige, a particular form of state and system of government for its adherents. The people are given the authority to regulate and design government systems to the demands of the development of the times and places.
- c) Engraving a spirit of nationalism and student loyalty to the Republic of Indonesia.
- d) Implementing a cultural approach by exploring and internalizing local cultural wisdom that upholds tolerance and harmony.

This strategy and program imply that organizations must adapt to the changes and necessary conditions surrounding them (Fischbacher-Smith, 2014). Nevertheless, responsibility through compliance and actions following regulations is needed to achieve the target of loyalty to nationalism and tackle radicalism (Jallow, 2009). Therefore, to fortify the campus academic community, in 2019, UNESA formed a study center for the Development of the Pancasila Ideology under the auspices of the Institute for Research and Community Service (LPPM). The establishment of this center of study aims to ensure that the ideology of Pancasila is genuinely engraved in the academic community so that it is not easily exposed to radicalism that has flourished on several state campuses in Indonesia.

5. Conclusion

After the dissolution of the Indonesian Hizbut Tahrir organization (HTI) by the Government, it did not necessarily mean that ex-HTI activists and sympathizers immediately vanished. The phenomenon of radicalism still appears to be carried out by ex-HTI activists and sympathizers, both lecturers and college students. Activities carried out explicitly no longer use the HTI symbol but instead use other symbols and smoother approaches combined with training activities, workshops, and club studies on life tips for success, leadership, entrepreneurship, and others. To prevent this, UNESA implemented a counter-radicalism and deradicalization approach by establishing *SiPERA* (Radicalism Prevention System) and collaborated with the National Counterterrorism Agency. Through its profiler division, UNESA can map out the new students who are exposed to radicalism or not and guide them through religious programs that are true and follow the principles of nationalism and nationality that respect differences in Indonesia's multicultural society. Thus, there are better solutions than Daulah Islamiyah to safeguard harmony.

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