

## Some Aspects of the Italian Diplomacy Towards the Albanian Republic (1925-1928)

Msc. Esilda Luku (Ph.D candidate)

Faculty of Political Sciences and Law  
University "Aleksandër Moisiu", Durrës, Albania  
Email: [esildaluku@yahoo.com](mailto:esildaluku@yahoo.com)

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**Abstract:** This paper aims to analyze the relations between Italy and Albania during the republican government of the President Ahmet Zogu (1925-1928). Its approach is based on the study of the documentation, focusing on the factors that influenced the Italian diplomacy towards the Albanian state, as follows: At first, the government of Italy had economic interests in Albania, forcing the political class to make concessions to search and exploit the oil and mineral reserves from the Italian enterprises, such as: Azienda Italiana Petroli d'Albania (AIPA), Sindaco Italiano Giacamenti Minerari Albanesi (SIGMA) etc; the Italian investments in agriculture and the establishment in Rome of the National Bank of Albania, in March 1925. Secondly, Italy intended to exert the political influence on Albania because of its strategic position in the Balkan. Rome benefited from the necessity of the President Zogu to protect his political regime and to overcome the difficult economic situation, forcing the Albanian government to sign the First Pact of Tirana, on 27<sup>th</sup> November, 1926. According to this agreement, Italy would defend the juridical, the territorial and the political status-quo of Albania against every potential aggression. Also it imposed some restrictions on the foreign policy of Albania, menacing its sovereignty. While, the Second Pact of Tirana signed on 22<sup>nd</sup> November, 1927, was basically a defensive alliance that strengthened the Italian domination in Albania, using it as a military base for further penetration in the Balkan. Thus, the Italian diplomacy towards the Albanian state with the aim of achieving its political and economic goals not only posed a threat to the sovereignty of Albania but also to the stability of the region.

**Keywords:** the Italian diplomacy; the Albanian Republic of President A. Zogu; economic and political interests; bilateral agreements;

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### 1. The Italian influence on the economic system of Albania

Ahmet Zogu was elected as the President of the Albanian Republic by the deputies of the Constitutional Assembly on January 31<sup>st</sup>, 1925. He took also the Head of the executive power and began implementing new reforms in the political, juridical, social and economic system in particular. The Albanian government aimed at overcoming the difficult financial situation and developing different sectors of the economy. For that reason, it asked for the support of the foreign capital that was refused repeatedly from the League of Nations. In case of absence of the collective financial assistance, the Albanian neighbor on the other side of the Adriatic, Italy, was ready to offer its help to Tirana. The Italian government was potential enough financially and had strategic interests in Albania, factors that influenced the pro-Italian orientation of the president Zogu.

The two governments signed the Treaty of Trade and Navigation, on January 20<sup>th</sup>, 1925, which came into force the next month. According to article no.1, it was guaranteed the complete freedom of trade and navigation between citizens of the Italian Monarchy and those of the Albanian state. While, article no.2 gave the contracting partners the right of transit and the treatment of the most favor nation, meaning the taxes relief compared to that of co-nationals (The Archive of Institute of History (AIH), A.V.43, p. 2). This agreement helped to intensify the economic cooperation between the two countries.

In addition, the Albanian government attended the policy of encouraging the foreign investments, making a number of concessions with many companies, especially Italian ones. Those were mostly concentrated on the search and the exploitation of the mineral resources in different areas of Albania. Thus, "Ferrovie dello Stato Italiano", that was an Italian state enterprise, in March 1925, won the concession to search an area of 50.000 ha and to exploit 30.000 ha. In order to administer its works was established a special company, called "Azienda Italiana Petroli d'Albania" – AIPA. Another venture was "Societa Italiana delle Miniere di Selenizza" – SIMS-a, which signed a twenty years concessionary agreement with the Albanian government, to search the oil reserves in 2140 ha, with the right of exploitation of 800 ha ("It was signed the oil concession..., 1925, p. 1). The Italian company, AIPA managed to expand the area of exploitation from 30.000 ha to 42.313 ha, on April 1<sup>st</sup>, 1926. The Italian ventures worked on these areas: Mirol Picikat, Selenizza, Devoll – the AIPA Company and Penkove, Drashovice – the SIMSA one (AIH, A.V.43, pp. 5-6).

Another important event in the economic field was the sign of the agreement to establish the National Bank of Albania (NBA), on March 15<sup>th</sup>, 1925, between the minister of Finance, Mufid Libohova, and the representative of the Italian financial group, Mario Alberti. He was the Director of Credito Italiano and the delegate of Italy on the Committee of

Finance of the League of Nations, in charge of the duty to obtain the capitals necessary for a Bank of coins issue of Albania. M. Alberti became the first president of our National Bank centered in Rome. Its aim was to standardize the Albanian coin in circulation in order to improve the economic and the financial services. The National Bank of Albania had the exclusive right to issue coins, paper money and to reach agreements about a municipal or a governmental loan (AIH, A.V.95, p. 24). Therefore, the stability of the monetary system eliminated the deficits in the financial relations through the organization of the credit and the utilization of the savings.

The agreement of the establishment of the National Bank of Albania settled: Article no. 1 – A nominal capital of 12.500.000 gold francs, depositing firstly only 2.625.000 gold francs. Article no. 2 – The Albanian citizens had the right to possess up to 49% of the share capital. Article no. 6 – The Bank had the exclusive right to issue coins and paper money, taking the responsibility of every financial or bank service. Article no. 9 – The Main Directory of the Bank consisted of four members, two Italians and two Albanians, but the Head of it was given to one of the Italian representatives, who had the decisive vote. Article no. 14 – The Bank had no tax duty to the state, despite the patent one that was low and unimportant. Article no. 18, 19 and 25 – For a month, the Bank was going to create the Italian Society for the Economic Development of Albania (“Societa per lo Sviluppo Economico dell Albania” - SVEA), which would guarantee the Albanian government a loan of 50.000.000 gold francs, for forty years with 7.5% interest rates (AIH, A.V.59, pp. 38-39). It would deliver a sum of 7.500.000 gold francs for the first and the second year; 10.000.000 gold francs for the third year and 12.000.000 gold francs for the fourth and the fifth one (AIH, A.V.43, p. 14). The loan repayment was based on the customs incomes and the state trusts on salt, paper-cigarettes and matches up to 8.500.000 gold francs per year. The loan of SVEA was used respectively: 34.5% for road construction, 25% for bridges, 19.5% for buildings, 15% for the port of Durres and 6% for the others (AIH, A.V.59, p. 44).

The National Bank of Albania was dominated by the Italian capital because of the abusive activity for personal profits of the minister of Finance, Mufid Libohova. The Investigative Commission of the Albanian Parliament proved it, too, accusing the minister of corruption and of national wealth misuse. Based on the secret agreement “the executive accord no.13”, between the representative of the Italian group, Amedeo Gambino, the General Secretary of the National Bank, and the Albanian minister of Finance, the article no. 4 determined the May 5<sup>th</sup>, 1925, as the last date, when the Albanian government was obliged to deposit the sum of its citizens on Banco Credito Italiano, in Rome. While, article no. 5 gave the foreign group the right to repeal the Albanians package of shares if the government had not deposited the necessary capitals. The secret agreement, that was not signed from the Council of Ministers, (AIH, A.V.43, p. 12) denied the Albanian citizens the right to possess the decided amount of shares in the National Bank of Albania.

However, the establishment of NBA-s played an important role towards the progress of the national economy, especially of finance, industry and trade. At first, the bank made the possibility to remove the financial actions from “the special financiers”, mainly called the usurers, under the administration of a contemporary institution of finance, organized and directed in conformity with all the regulations and the relatively sufficient capital. Secondly, the bank managed to hold an optimistic exchange rate. Though the level of circulation of gold franc banknotes was high, the bank guaranteed the strength of money restoring the faith to the national and foreign consumers. Thirdly, the bank became a relatively strong institution of credit, increasing the number of merchants, industrialists and other categories that got a credit from 121 in 1928 to 1772 creditors in 1938. Fourthly, the bank was considered a secure place to deposit the savings, guaranteeing high incomes not only from the capital investment in industry, trade, agriculture., but also from the money investment in the financial sphere. Fifthly, the bank influenced positively on the reduction of the credit interest rates able to compare with the neighboring countries (Kareco, 2010, pp. 79-81).

## **2. The diplomatic relations between Albania and Italy during the Republic of A. Zogu**

Despite the economic domination in Albania, the Italian government signed a military agreement that gave the possibility to intervene aimed at supporting the Albanian state in case of aggression. This fact made the president Zogu conscious that every single inner instability would serve Italy as a pretext for military intervention. As a result, in order to protect its personal power, Zogu took measures to enforce the police, inviting a British Inspector accompanied by a group of observing officers (Grant, 2002, p. 20). “In comparison with the other troops, the British police was considered more objective, loyal and law implemented. As Chief was appointed the colonel W. F. Steerling, who held at the same time the position of the counsellor at the Ministry of Interior. The British officers, that had the duty of inspectors and troops’ organizers, were chosen from Steerling as civil servants” (Vickers, 1995, p. 150). “In August 1925, colonel Steerling resigned and he was replaced from the major general sir Joycelyn Percy, a well-known officer of the army, who became the Chief of the British officers and of a nearly 3000 police force. Percy insisted on paying regularly the wages of the troops and finding good accommodation, uniforms and arms. Thus, he could inspire conviction and responsibility for the

police activity. Also, Percy made efforts to educate his troops how to serve with justice and accuracy to the citizens, aimed at having a good reputation rather than arousing suspicion. Though corruption dominated, the police had a great respect for the legal system" (Vickers, 2008, pp. 191-192).

Parallel with the consolidation of the Interior power, Albania under the government of Zogu became an important factor in the politics and the balance of the Balkan's issues (Meksi, 1926, p. 1). Its neighbors, Italy and Yugoslavia continued their rivalry to exert influence on it. Hence, Rome proposed the Yugoslavian government to divide Albania between them into zones of influence. This proposal was opposed firmly from Beograd, which considered Albania an *état-tampon*, meaning a country that being positioned between the two rivalries, helped to avoid the potential conflicts and the worsening of the relations (Meksi, 1926, p. 2).

Behind the rivalry between Italy and Yugoslavia were the Great Powers, such as Britain and France that wanted to expand the zone of influences and maintain the balance of power. During the meeting of December 1925, in Rapallo, between B. Mussolini and Austen Chamberlain, Italy provided the support of London to further control Albania, while Yugoslavia and its ally, France were not able to prevent the Italian domination (Bisak, Kurti and Gashi, 1995, p. 11).

On June 24<sup>th</sup>, 1926, the Italian minister in Tirana, Baron Pompeo Aliosi, asked the Albanian government to finish a political pact, in conformity with the decision of November 9<sup>th</sup>, 1921, of the Conference of Ambassadors. The last one gave Italy the exclusive right, without the mediation of the League of Nations, to protect Albania in case of an aggression. On the other hand, Rome promised the president Zogu 3000 rifles, 10 mountain's batteries, 5000 guns, 2000 military uniforms, 2000 mules and a "personal gift" of 15 million liras. If he refused, P. Aliosi threatened to make a compromise with Beograd against Albania, aimed at organizing a non-governmental uprising. The policy of Italy worried the Head of the State, who informed the representatives of Britain, France and Yugoslavia (AIH, A.V.111, p. 4).

The British diplomacy decided to use this case in order to give the Italian fascist expansion an orientation in accordance with the main objectives of Britain. The government of London was interested in understanding the intentions of the Italian minister in Tirana. Thus, Mussolini became aware of the fact that, without the approval of Britain, the further domination in Albania would be difficult. For that reason, on September 30<sup>th</sup>, 1926, in the Italian city of Livorno, was held a meeting between B. Mussolini and A. Chamberlain (Selim, 1926, p. 1). The British Foreign Minister explained Mussolini that Britain would reject each effort of Rome to influence on the west coast of the Mediterranean. Therefore, Chamberlain advised the fascist leader to give up the pretensions over Gibraltar, Malta, Savoia, Nice, Tunisia and Corsica, that menaced the interests of Britain and France (AIH, A.V.60, p. 14). The discussions during the meeting put in evidence clearly the intentions of Chamberlain on the Mediterranean Sea and his promise to support the Italian policies in the Balkan ("The intention of Mussolini", 1926, p. 1). The purpose of this diplomatic action of FO was to reduce the French influence in Europe and to give the green light to Italy towards the Balkans' and the Danubian area (Verli, 2002, p. 107).

The political compromise between Britain and Italy dissatisfied greatly Beograd that, experiencing the weakening of Yugoslavian influence in Albania, encouraged the population of Dukagjin to organize a rebellion against the government of Zogu. It began, on November 20<sup>th</sup>, 1926, in the region of Shala in the North part of Albania, under the direction of the Catholic cleric Don Çopa. The state forces put down the rebellion in the last minute and only few kilometers away (AIH, A.V.16, p. 4). This event accelerated the end of the negotiations about the First Italian-Albanian Pact of Friendship and Security. It was signed in Tirana, on November 27<sup>th</sup>, 1926, between Baron P. Aloisi and the Albanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hysen Vrioni. The Pact had five articles and the first one presented the essence of the content because it determined the objectives of the First Pact of Tirana. According to it "Italy and Albania declared that every threat against the political, juridical and territorial status quo of Albania was in opposition to the political interests of the two countries". This article guaranteed the power of A. Zogu from each menace inside or outside Albania and legitimated the intervention of Italy to avoid any potential danger. While, article no. 2 settled the dependence of Albania on the neighbor of the other side of the Adriatic, Italy, because the Albanian government had no right to sign other political or military agreements at the expense of the contracting partner (AIH, A.V.95, p. 26). The First Pact of Tirana stayed into force for five years and it could be denounced or repeated a year before the end of the deadline.

In December 1926, the Italian-Albanian Pact of Friendship and Security was voted unanimously in the Chamber of Deputies. During the discussions and the speeches of the deputies Poga, Libohova, Floqi and Çako, was understood clearly that a) the political status quo of article no. 1 protected the rights of the Albanian state, as the independence and the sovereignty; b) the juridical status quo meant the current situation of Albania since the membership in the League of Nations; c) the territorial status quo referred to the political borders of Albania acknowledged and decided internationally, thus the border line of the Conference of Ambassadors. Regarding article no. 2 of the Pact, the deputies analyzed that the two countries were not allowed to sign any military or political agreement with the other states against the interests of the contracting partner or in opposition to the interests that included the pact. However, the contracting countries accepted the sign of friendship agreements with other states that enforced the interests of the Italian-Albanian Pact.

These explanations estimated the pact as a success of the Albanian government that signed an agreement with a Great Power, in respect of the state dignity, protecting its rights with absolute sovereignty ("The Parliament ratified..., 1926, p. 1). While, on February 8<sup>th</sup>, 1927, the signing countries sent the First Pact of Tirana to Geneva for the purpose of registering at the respective institutions of the League of Nations. Although it violated the independence of a member state, like Albania, the Council of the League didn't refuse to register the pact (AIH, A.V.60, p. 16).

The Italian-Albanian Pact made a bad impression on the political circles of Beograd, bringing to light the existent rivalry between Yugoslavia and Italy for the Adriatic. For that reason, the Yugoslavian government annulled all the agreements signed between the two countries, aimed at defending the territorial integrity of the Albanian state, ("The Italian-Albanian Pact..., 1926, p. 1) based on the argument that the pact took a step towards the Italian protectorate over Albania. This event was considered a failure of the Yugoslavian diplomacy and the Foreign Affairs' Minister, M. Nincic, resigned. On December 8<sup>th</sup>, 1926, the Yugoslavian government gave the resignation, too ("Again the Adriatic", 1926, p. 1)

On the other side, the Italian diplomacy called the Pact of Friendship and Security as an important agreement to guarantee the political and the territorial integrity of Albania. In order to avoid every misinterpretation of the pact, Mussolini proposed Yugoslavia to sign a similar agreement with the Albanian government, or the three countries to draw up a common treaty in conformity with the Pact of Tirana. This proposal was supported by the Foreign Minister of Albania, Iljaz Vrioni, who admitted to finishing an agreement with Yugoslavia, in respect of good neighborhood and the status quo protection ("The Minister of Foreign Affairs..., 1927, p. 1). The idea of the multilateral cooperation could be generalized to the Balkan's "Locarno" that included Italy, too. But, such an agreement requested the Balkan countries to acknowledge the borders and the sovereignty of each-other. Thus, Yugoslavia had to say "farewell" to its intentions in Albania, Thessaloniki and elsewhere. So, the Balkan's Confederate couldn't be impossible ("Why not a Balkan, 1927, p.1). When the contradictions between Italy and Yugoslavia in the Balkan deepened, in April 1927, the president Ahmet Zogu gave an interview for "Daily Mail", considering peaceful the First Pact of Tirana. According to him, because of the geographical position Albania should have good relations with the neighbors. The Pact with Italy would provide its assistance in many aspects, not violating the sovereignty and the independence of Albania. The mutual support and the friendship cooperation mentioned in the pact were simply of diplomatic nature. The Albanians were very satisfied because Rome had arisen their question at the Chancelleries of Europe. But neither Italy nor Albania had planned to take any military action. Despite this, the Albanians were free to ask or not for the help of Italy ("An interview of President..., 1927, p. 4).

The First Pact of Tirana continued to worry the circles of the European diplomacy because of the aggravation of the relations between Italy and Yugoslavia referring to Albania. Concerning Beograd, the attitude of the Great Powers, particularly of Britain, was very important to the Italian position in the Albanian state. In January 1927, the visit of Churchill in Italy was analyzed as a Britain's tendency to include Rome in its anti-soviet policy at the expense of the Italian intentions in the Balkan. Although the Foreign Office was aware that the Pact of Tirana didn't help to consolidate the situation in Europe, especially in the Adriatic and the Balkan. This fact was in direct contradiction to the purpose of London for the European stability. Sir William Trel, during the conversation with the Yugoslavian legate, admitted that the personality of Mussolini and his dictatorial regime presented uncertainty about the political stability of Europe. However, the good relations between Chamberlain and Mussolini gave Britain the possibility to minimize this uncertainty. According to Trel, the FO was in favor of protecting the independence of Albania and respecting its rights as a member state of the League of Nations. On the other hand, the French diplomacy believed that Mussolini was conscious that the Italian-Albanian Pact was not a calculated action. For that reason, the fascist leader had noticed that the signing of the pact was quite similar to the Corfu' adventure, a policy rejected by everyone. Moreover, France declared its unwavering friendship with Yugoslavia, requesting Beograd to calm down and to give up any potential intervention in Albania (Arifi, 1991, pp. 283-284).

Despite the suggestions of its ally, France, the Yugoslavian government, in March 1927, organized the armed bands and enforced the military troops along the Albanian border. In order to face every possible invasion, Ahmet Zogu charged the colonel Percy with the duty of commanding the troops of the Northern Albania. These incidents attracted the attention of Italy, which sent a note to the Great Powers, such as Britain, France and Germany, informing about the Yugoslavian plans to provoke aggression against Albania (AIH, A.V.16, p. 5). The ambassadors of Yugoslavia in different capitals of Europe answered the diplomatic attacks of Rome that the Yugoslavian military actions aimed at defending rather than invading the Albanian territories. The Italian campaign against the activity of Yugoslavia didn't find the expected support of the Great Powers, as Britain and France, that accepted the request of Beograd to conduct an international investigation along the Serbian-Albanian border. Italy strongly opposed this initiative reasoning that it would be a waste of time for Europe to form the Investigative Commission and go there. Because Yugoslavia was going to take the necessary measures to eliminate all the traces on the place. Thus, Rome proposed Britain and France to exert their influence on

Yugoslavia to abandon the "Balkan's intrigues" than asking for investigations without results (Treska, 1927, p. 1).

The situation in the Balkan was tensioned due to the rivalry between Italy and Yugoslavia for influence in Albania. This fact intensified the Italian-Albanian negotiations to finish a military pact. Hence, on November 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1927, the ambassador of Italy, Ugo Sola, and the minister of Foreign Affairs of Albania, Iljaz Vroni, signed the "Treaty of the Defensive Alliance", or the so-called the Second Pact of Tirana (AIH, A.V.16, p. 8). According to it, the contracting partners were obliged to share the fate of each-other in case of aggression, guaranteeing the military assistance if needed. This principle of reciprocity aimed at avoiding every misinterpretation of the alliance as a kind of protectorate or the Italian mandate over Albania (Rothschild, 1928, p. 3).

The Treaty of the Defensive Alliance came into force for a period of twenty years, showing clearly the calculations of Rome not to lose its control over Albania, if the First Pact of Tirana was not repeated. The military nature of the treaty enforced the Italian influence on the Albanian armed forces. There were brought arms and munitions from Italy. A military mission headed by general Pariani reorganized the Albanian army. The officers went to Italy for drilling. The fascist instructors came to organize the Albanian youth and to receive pre-military trainings (AIH, A.V.95, p. 26).

The Italian Prime Minister, B. Mussolini, considered the Second Pact of Tirana as a manner or mean of mutual defense of the two countries' interests. During his speech on the Chamber of Deputies, he declared that the unwavering desire of the Italian population was the protection of the independence of Albania, which gave a guarantee of the security of Italy on the eastern part of the Adriatic (Chekrezi, 1927, p. 2).

Also the printed media in Albania treated the importance of the Treaty of the Defensive Alliance signed with Italy. It was noticed that 1) the independence and the territorial integrity of Albania was secured internationally. 2) The last declarations of the Prime Minister, B. Mussolini, of the Senators and the deputies of Italy, due to the ratification of the First Pact of Tirana and the Treaty of Alliance, explained that there was no doubt about the real intentions of the Italian government towards Albania. 3) The Albanians, from the President up to the last citizen of the Republic, understood these agreements as a guarantee of the independence and the territorial integrity of Albania that excluded every single intervention in the governmental problems. Because Italy and Albania not only shared common political interests, but also the feelings of a traditional friendship ("Albania and Italy", 1930, p. 1).

While, the Head of the State Council, Mehdi Frashëri, opposed everyone who underestimated the alliance between Italy and Albania, based on the argument that the existence of the Albanian state was guaranteed from the League of Nations. He analyzed that the Second Treaty of Tirana was drawn up in conformity with the principles of the League Statute that each member, in case of aggression, obliged the other states to impose sanctions against the aggressor. The Council of the League of Nations consisted of the representatives of the fourteen countries tended to be expanded further. Thus, if there was a war danger, the Council would be assembled deciding unanimously to impose or not the sanctions. At first, it was difficult to take the decisions unanimously; secondly, if that was reached, the League of Nations needed time to act effectively, so the aggressive country arrived at the coast. Therefore, the League of Nations formed a collective guarantee. The Italian-Albanian Alliance added an individual guarantee to the collective one. The ally because of the geographical proximity and the vital interests in the Adriatic, morally and materially was disposed to move faster than the League. However, nothing banned the League of Nations, in case of war, to provide assistance to the allies. At the same time, Mehdi Frashëri, refused to accept that the Treaty of the Defensive Alliance offered Italy the possibility to play an aggressive role in the Balkan, which wouldn't keep the balance and the world peace. Otherwise this treaty, guaranteeing the order of Albania, could influence positively in the stability of the continental neighboring countries (Frashëri, 1929, pp. 14-15).

The alliances with Italy helped Zogu to concentrate the power in his hands and to prepare the public opinion inside and outside Albania about the necessity of changing the political system from Republic to Monarchy. For that reason, only one day before the proclamation of the Albanian Monarchy, on August 30<sup>th</sup>, 1928, Ahmet Zogu finished some secret agreements with the Italian government in order to concrete the Second Pact of Tirana. On one side, it gave a strong military support to Tirana, organizing a sufficient army aimed at defending against any attack from the political opponents or the neighboring countries, such as Yugoslavia. On the other side, Italy wanted to use the army for its intentions in the Balkan and elsewhere. The Italian minister in Albania, Ugo Sola, thought of the considerable position of Rome and that  $\frac{3}{4}$  of the economic activity was dominated by the Italians. Thus, the Monarchy proclamation would protect the Italian interests in Albania (The Academy of Science of Albania, 2007, p. 288).

### 3. Conclusions

The Republic government of Albania made efforts to intensify the diplomatic relations with Italy rather than Yugoslavia. Due to the fact that 1) the Yugoslavian government provided Ahmet Zogu with financial and military support to come into

power after the overthrow of the Cabinet of F. Noli. Thus, Zogu didn't want to become a mean of promoting the Yugoslavian interests in Albania. 2) Also Beograd couldn't compete with the Italian capital that was necessary to develop the Albanian economy. Hence, the president Zogu was oriented towards Italy which had considerable financial means and strategic interests in Albania.

The relations between Italy and Albania included many spheres of cooperation. Economically, some Italian companies, such as AIPA, SIMSA etc. won concessions to search and exploit the mineral resources in different areas of Albania. Another important event was the establishment of the National Bank of Albania aimed at improving the economic and financial services, as the standardization of the monetary unit in circulation, the system of credit etc. But, NBA centered in Rome was dominated by the Italian capital that took the decisions, too.

The political rivalry between Italy and Yugoslavia for influence in Albania dictated the Italian government to finish two agreements with Tirana. The Pact of Friendship and Security, of November 27<sup>th</sup>, 1926, that installed the dependence of Albania and legitimated the intervention of Italy in case of aggression. This pact guaranteed the personal power of A. Zogu from any attacks inside or outside the country. While, the Treaty of the Defensive Alliance, signed on November 22<sup>th</sup>, 1927, enforced the Italian control over the Albanian armed forces that would be used also to reach the intentions of Italy in the Balkan. Moreover, the alliance with the neighbor on the other side of the Adriatic, Italy, helped Zogu to concentrate the political power and to be proclaimed the "Monarch of the Albanians".

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